Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations

359 Pages·2007·3.029 MB·English

by  Rudolf Avenhaus, I. William Zartman (auth.), Professor Dr. Rudolf Avenhaus, Professor I. William Zartman (eds.)

Diplomacy Games
·
Rudolf Avenhaus I. William Zartman
(Editors)
Diplomacy Games
Formal Models
and International Negotiations
With37Figuresand42Tables
123
ProfessorDr.RudolfAvenhaus
UniversityoftheFederalArmedForcesMunich
Werner-Heisenberg-Weg39
85577Neubiberg
Germany
[email protected]
ProfessorI.WilliamZartman
SchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies
TheJohnHopkinsUniversity
1740MassachusettsAve.,
Washington,D.C.20036
USA
[email protected]
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2007925685
ISBN978-3-540-68303-2SpringerBerlinHeidelbergNewYork
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ToHowardRaiffa
The formalmodelerofPIN
Preface
Whydoesalltheresearchoninternationalnegotiationsoverthepast20yearsmake
verylittleuseofformaltheory,despitestatementslikethatofPeytonYoungthatthe
principaltoolforanalyzingnegotiationsisthetheoryofgames?Formalanalysisof
negotiationscentersonparadigmaticmodelslikeNash’sbargainingschemeorStahl
andRubinstein’ssequentialmodels,yetcasestudiesofimportantinternationalnego-
tiationsuseonlythemostelementaryconcepts.Thestateoftheartwascharacterized
some years ago by a controversy surroundingthe role of formal models—notably
rationalchoice models—inpoliticalscience. Some politicalscientistsclaimed that
formalmodelshavecontributedlittletotheprogressofpoliticaltheoryas awhole.
Othersvigorouslydefendedformaltheory.Herewedealonlywiththeinternational
negotiationspartofthedispute.
Fromtheverybeginninganduntiltodayformalmodelswerepartoftheresearch
of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program of the International
InstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis(IIASA)inLaxenburgnearVienna,Austria.
In fact, there was a continuingemphasis on the importance of research on formal
models for internationalnegotiationsby Howard Raiffa, IIASA’s first director and
oneofthefoundersofthePINprogram,towhomthisbookisdedicated.Butitwas
notuntil2002that the ideawas put intoeffect by initiatinga PIN project devoted
exclusively to the purpose of analyzing the role of formal models of, for, and in
internationalnegotiationsandansweringsuchquestionsas:Howcanrationalchoice
theorists be induced to make greater efforts to render their abstract concepts and
resultsmoreunderstandabletopoliticaland social scientists?What can bedoneto
encouragesocial scientiststouseformalapproaches intheiranalysisof real-world
problems?Howcanpractitionersofinternationalnegotiationsbeinducedtodevelop
interestinandbetaughttoapplyformalmodelstotheirmoreimportantproblems?
Thisbookcontainscontributionsfromleadingexpertsinthefieldofformalmod-
elingandinternationalnegotiations.Thesecontributionswerefirstpresentedattwo
workshopsat IIASA in June 2003 and June 2004, where they were intensely dis-
cussedandrevisedbyworkshopparticipants.Theirclassificationintoformalmodels
of, for, and in internationalnegotiationsgrew out of these discussions (theeditors
werereluctanttoproposetheirgeneralcharacterizationas“formalmodelsfromAto
VIII Preface
Z”).Eventhoughnotallapproachesandtoolscouldbetakenintoaccountinalim-
itednumberofpages,wefeelthatthisbookrepresentsthestateoftheartofformal
modelsininternationalnegotiationsandgivessomeadviceintheformoflessonsfor
theoryandpractice.
ThebookispartofaseriesbeingproducedbythePINProgramofIIASA,whose
publicationsarelistedinthefrontofthisvolume.Wewishtoexpressourgratitude
forthecollectiveparticipationofthesteeringcommitteemembers,allofwhompro-
videdaconstructiveatmosphereandhelpfulcommentsatmanystagesoftheproject.
Wealsoappreciatetheflexibleandresponsiveparticipationoftheauthorsofthein-
dividualchapters who have joinedthe projectfrom a number ofcountries. Special
thanks are owed to Dan Druckman who encouraged us to initiatethis project. We
are also grateful for the ongoingsupport for theproject by IIASA’s director, Leen
Hordijk, who made PIN’s productivitypossible, and also to IIASA’s publications
team.Basicsupportforallouractivitiesandcarefulandpleasantattentiontoallthe
details of our workhave been provided by Tanja Huber, our project administrator.
Combiningthesystems analysis of IIASA withthediplomaticatmosphere of Em-
pressMariaTheresa’spalatialhuntinglodgeinLaxenburg,whereIIASAcarriesout
itsstate-of-the-artworkwithinbaroquewalls,hasbeenaninspirationforourefforts.
Laxenburg,
February2007 Theeditors
Foreword
Negotiationisthecentralactivityofdiplomatsandforeignpolicyleaders.Conflicts
areavoidedandendedthroughtheartandscienceofnegotiation.Every day,issues
inforeignpolicyareresolvedthroughnegotiation.Waterrights,environmentalcon-
cerns,tradeagreements,thebirthofnewinternationalorganizations,effortsatpeace-
keeping,andindeedeveryaspectofforeigninteractioninvolvesnegotiation.Thatthe
subjectandpracticesofinternationalbargaininghave,untilrelativelyrecently,been
mostlystudiedwithinthelimitsofdescriptive,after-the-factassessmentsofspecific
negotiationsisdisappointing.Suchstudieshavebeenuseful,ofcourse,butournego-
tiationknowledgeandskillsarelikelytobefurtherenhancedbycomplementingsuch
researchwithinvestigationsintothefundamentalprinciples,processes,andpractices
ofnegotiation.Asthisvolumemakesabundantlyclear,muchabouthowtoimprove
negotiationscanbelearnedfromandthroughthejudicioususeofformalmodels.
Inthenaturalcourseofanynegotiation,partieswithdifferinginterestsordiffer-
ent informationabout how best to advance common interests must find themeans
to persuade their counterparts of a way forward. Such persuasion often involves a
measureoftheartfuluseofrhetoric,butintheendeverynegotiationisaboutstrate-
gic interaction [3]. Participants select courses of action with an eye on what it is
thattheircounterpartssaytheyneedandwhatarebelievedtobetheiractualneeds,
as well as being equally focused on what the participants themselves need or the
principalson whose behalf they are acting need. Thus, understandingand shaping
negotiationoutcomes dependsonstrategiccalculationsofexactly thesortcaptured
by game-theoretic models of decision making under uncertainty. In this important
publication,theeditors,AvenhausandZartman,haveassembledanexceptionalcast
of contributorsand have significantly advanced the understanding and prospective
useofformalmodels—including,butnotlimitedto,gametheorymodels—astools
usedinthedevelopment,understanding,andconclusionofnegotiations.
This volume usefully distinguishes between models of negotiations, for ne-
gotiations, and in negotiations. The distinction among these three types of ana-
lytic/modelingexercisesneatlycapturestheideaofexamininganegotiationtodraw
outprinciplesofunderstanding,usingtheseprinciplestoevaluatealternativecourses
ofaction,andtheapplicationoftheseprinciplestofacilitatetheresolutionofspecific
X Foreword
negotiations.Assomeonewhohas beenengagedinthesethreeactivitiesfromboth
anacademicandcommercialformalmodelingperspectivefor25years,Iampartic-
ularlyexcitedbythepotentialthisvolumehas forunleashinggreater entrepreneur-
ship,especiallyamongpoliticalscientists,economists,andpsychologistsengagedin
themodelingofcomplex bargainingproblems.Thatthereisgreatdemandforsuch
services from government agencies and the private sector there can be no doubt.
Thattheknowledgeistheretoimproveupontheperformanceofcountryorproblem
specialists alone there is also no doubt[1], [2]. Whileeconomists have been quite
activeandsuccessfulindesigningandadvisingongame-theoreticactionsforpracti-
caluse,othersocialscientistshavetendedtolagbehind.Iknowofonlyahandfulof
companies,forinstance,formedbyoroperatedbypoliticalscientistswhoareusing
formal models to advise government and privatesector clients on how to improve
negotiatedoutcomes.Icertainlyhopethatthisvolumewillstimulateourcolleagues
and students to turn their skills to the translation of insights from formal models
intopracticaltoolsforpolicymakersandcorporatedecisionmakers.This,Ibelieve,
is themost promisingpath to improvingdecision making, tyingitclosely to logic
and evidencerather than continuingreliance onlyon opinion,wisdom, and insider
information.The latter are unquestionablyuseful, butthey are fundamentallynon-
reproducibleand inadequate as one shifts from one negotiation setting to another.
Wisdomcannotbetaught,buttherigorousinterpretationofthelogicalandempirical
implicationsofformal modelscan be. Indeed, many ofthechapters inthisvolume
pointthewaytohowtodoso.
The spread of formal model insights into the real-world, real-time negotiation
processrequires,asthisvolumehighlights,adeepappreciationofboththestrengths
offormalapproaches andtheirlimitations.Extensiveformgames, forinstance, are
avaluableandoftenintuitivewaytodescribethe—sotospeak—essenceofdecision
making. They force the analyst and the negotiatorto identifyexactly what critical
decisionsmustbemadebyallsidesinanegotiation.Gametreescompeltheanalyst
and theuser tothinkhard about whatis endogenous and whatis exogenous to the
decisionprocessand,therefore,whatcanbeinfluencedorreshapedandwhatcannot.
That trulyis theessence of resolvingdisputes. At thesame time, theanalyst must
not overstate the comprehensiveness of the problem encapsulated in a game tree,
andthedecisionmakermustnotallowtheanalysisofthegametobetakenonblind
faith—reallythereislittledangerofthis—butneithershouldheorsheallowpersonal
opinionor personal beliefs to remain comfortablyunchallenged when the model’s
implicationsdifferwithintuition.
Thestrengthofformalmodelsisintheirabilitytolayoutthelogicofasituation
andtomaketransparentwhatisassumedortakenforgranted,whatexpectationslook
like,what informationis criticalforworkingthrougha problem,and at whatjunc-
turesdifferentchoicesleadirretrievablydownbetterorworsepaths.Buteveryformal
model—likeeverysetofgeneralprinciples,howeverderived—isnecessarilyasim-
plified, skeletal representation of the true complexity of any situation. Those who
negotiatewithouttheaidofmodelsoftenriskblindingthemselvestothebigpicture
as they focus on intricate—and often inessential—details. But likewisethose who
relymechanically ona formalmodel blindthemselves toinformationnotcaptured
Foreword XI
adequatelybythemodel—suchasdifferencesintheskillsbroughttothenegotiation
bydifferentparticipants—andsoriskthrowingawayusefulinformationthatshould
beutilizedtoenrichtheirinterpretationofanalyticimplications.Thepresentvolume
doesamasterfuljobofremindingusofthetrade-offbetweenthebigpictureandthe
subtledetails.
Young [4] produced an earlier volume on a closely related theme about 15
yearsago,andwecantakeheartandencouragementfromtherealizationthatmuch
progresshas been made and continues to bemade. Increasingly, governments turn
toformal,analytictoolscombinedwithquantitativeanalysistoprovideguidancein
makingcriticaldecisions,testinginadvancealternativeapproachestocentralforeign
policymattersandusingmodelsasrelativelyobjective,detachedtoolsbywhichan-
alysts and policymakers can test theveracity or efficacy of their own judgments.I
saythisasonewhoknowsatfirsthandhowtheUnitedStatesgovernmenthasused
justsuchtoolstohelpinformaspectsofitspoliciestowardterrorismingeneraland
al Qaeda inparticular, as well as in itsapproach to negotiationswithNorthKorea
andnumerousothersocietiesandtroublingsituationsaroundtheworld.Thosewho
takeseriouslythecoremessages ofthisvolumewillstandattheforefrontoffurther
advancingthegoalofimprovingforeignpolicydecisionmakingandthescienceof
governmentnegotiationsintheyearstocome.
February2007 BruceBuenodeMesquita
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