Dialectics: A Classical Approach to Inquiry

208 Pages·2007·0.83 MB·English

by  Nicholas Rescher

Nicholas Rescher

Dialectics

A Classical Approach to Inquiry

ontos

verlag

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Chapter 1: Dialectical Processes: A General View 1

Chapter 2: Disputational Dialectic 17

Chapter 3: Cognitive Dialectic 37

Chapter 4: Methodological Dialectic 61

Chapter 5: Ontological Dialectic: The Hegelian Background 75

Chapter 6: Philosophical Dialectic 87

Chapter 7: A Brief History of Dialectic 119

BIBLIOGRAPHY 185

NAME INDEX 195

PREFACE

F
ew ideas have played a more continuously prominent role throughout
the history of philosophy than that of dialectic, which has figured on
the philosophical agenda from the time of the Presocratics to the present
day. Almost from the outset, dialectic has led a Jekyll/Hyde existence,
some viewing it as a matter of sophistry and deceit, and others as the only
true and secure road to a deeper understanding.
Actually, it is not particularly instructive to speak of dialectic as such.
One scholar not unjustly complains that “The term [dialectic] has been
used in so many different senses that it can only be employed meaningfully
after one has indicated with precision in which sense it is to be taken.”1
The fact of it is that dialectic is a genus of many species. There is the Pla-
tonic dialectic, the Aristotelian dialectic, the scholastic dialectic, the Kant-
ian dialectic, the Hegelian dialectic, the Marxist dialectic, and numerous
others. The present book will not endeavor to cover this entire waterfront.
Instead it explores the philosophical promise of dialectic, and especially
the dialogical version associated with disputation, debate, and rational con-
troversy. Its deliberations will endeavor to see what epistemological les-
sons can be drawn to exhibit the utility of dialectical proceedings for the
theory of knowledge. One prime goal of this exploration is the develop-
ment of a dialectical model for the rationalization of cognitive methodol-
ogy—scientific inquiry specifically included. (In particular, politically ori-
ented dialectics in the tradition of Marx and post-Marxism falls outside the
scope of the book.)
Why this focus on the dialectic of inquiry? For one principal reason:
because it exhibits epistemological processes at work in a setting of so-
cially conditioned interactions. This communal perspective is surely a step
in the right direction through countervailing against the baneful influence
of the Cartesian egocentric orientation of modern epistemology. The tradi-
tional and orthodox emphasis on the issue How can I convince myself?,
How can I be certain? invites us to forget the social nature of the ground
rules of probative reasoning—their rooting in the issue of: How can we go
about convincing one another? The dialectics of disputation and contro-
versy provides a useful antidote to cognitive egocentrism. It insists that we
not forget the build-up of knowledge as an interactive communal enterprise
subject to communal standards.
Nicholas Rescher • Dialectic
Dialectic is an area of crossroads where many philosophical programs
meet. On the one hand, a dialectical approach is congenial to and actually
in a way constitutes one version of process philosophy in assigning a fun-
damental and indeed paradigmatic role to a certain particular, specifically
dialectical mode of processes. On the other hand, a rational, reason-driven
dialectic is highly congenial to and actually in a way constitutes a version
of pragmatism because such a dialectic is committed to the quality control
of philosophical functional efficacy—of what works out best with respect
to the range of purposes at issue. Many instructive philosophical perspec-
tives come together in the study of dialectic—and particularly so when this
is viewed in its classical perspective as a process of rational inquiry.
The book represents a confluence, consolidation, and extension of ideas
developed over many years, some of which are scattered over various pub-
lications. The dialectical process of challenge-response-synthesis charac-
terizes a many-sided process that is not irrelevant to the production of
books.
I am grateful to Estelle Burris for her capable help in preparing this ma-
terial for publication.

Nicholas Rescher
Pittsburgh PA
June 2007

NOTES

1 A. Lalande, Vocabulaire de la philosophie (Paris: Felix Alcon, 1923; 9th ed.
Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 227.
II
Chapter 1

DIALECTICAL PROCESSES:
A GENERAL VIEW

1. GENERAL DIALECTICS

T
he characterizing format of a dialectical process can be described in
contemporary terms of reference as a feedback process with the cyclic
structure sketched in Display 1, where the output of every stage serves as
the starting point of a new cycle. Such effectively circular processes can be
encountered in artifice and nature alike, with dialectical interactions occur-
ring in inquiry, in history, in nature, and in social affairs. For pretty much
any mode of agency or action can in principle proceed dialectically. And it
does so whenever the processes involved react sequentially to or against
their own prior products.
A dialectical cycle accordingly consists of three phases or stages;
namely those of

• Initiation (positing, declaration, inauguration)

• Response (counter-reaction, reply, opposition, destabilization)

• Revision & readjustment (operational modification, sophistication,
complexification)
Nicholas Rescher • Dialectic

Display 2

THE STRUCTURE OF DIALECTICAL PROCESS

Initial Process-induced Changed
state impact state

Once achieved these stages are then followed by a return to the initial
phase.
As Display 2 indicates, the result is a cyclic process of INITIATION →
RESPONSE → REVISION → RETURN that moves the overall condition
of things to a higher level of stability and sophistication so that one would
expect a dialectical process to issue in a result that is at once ever more so-
phisticated and complex but at the same time more firm on its grounding.
Looking at the matter from the perspective of speech-act analysis we
have the analogous stages:

• asserting, maintaining, affirming

• challenging, denying, questioning

• reaffirming, qualifying, enmeshing

Such a triplet is then again followed by a return to the initial phase result-
ing in a succession of moves that exhibit a sequential reversal of declara-
tive polarities as per + – +.
Broadly speaking any process of interaction through a sequential and
progressive exchange between two parties can be characterized as dialecti-
cal. Negotiation and “haggling” provide a good example here.
The process of negotiative dialectic also carries over to the sort of inter-
active rivalry encountered in the competition between such “schools of
thought.” One example of this is the clash between rival interpretations of
a text, for example of the sequence at issue in the “When A, then B”-claim
of a certain discussion is to be construed as a matter of chronological suc-
2
DIALECTIC PROCESSES: A GENERAL VIEW
cession or of logical consequence. In the course of such a hermeneutic con-
troversy, each party will endeavor to counter the consideration achieved by
others, perhaps by way of “explaining them away” or perhaps by way of an
accommodation or appropriation.
In rational inquiry dialectics is generally a matter of the new and dis-
cordant findings afforded by a widening course of experience. This sort of
thing is typified by disputation. And so in natural history this sort of proc-
ess usually arises through the untenability under new conditions of prior
resolutions reached on the basis of earlier developments. A physical proc-
ess could also be characterized as one of dialectical development, and even
the designing interaction between an architect and a client could be charac-
terized in these terms. Overall, dialectic is something very diversified and
many-sided.

2. DISCURSIVE DIALECTIC

In the course of a discursively dialectic process the initial position becomes
subject to modification and refinement through the impetus of the destabi-
lizing pressure of counter-consideration. That initial position becomes
transformed continuously through a series of successive responses to chal-
lenges that results in its revisions and refinement. An ongoing process of
complexification and sophistication is set under way so as to render that
position increasingly less vulnerable to challenges and impedances.
Cogent counterarguments always require some concession. Whenever a
plausible contention is confronted with a plausible counterargument, that
original contention cannot be left intact and unqualified. It requires read-
justment, qualification, sophistication. The result is a cycle of

contention → counter-contention → revision

or, viewed differently

argument → counter-argument → harmonizing adjudication

The third stage of revision/adjudication is a reworking of the original
position that gives each side its own and acknowledges the separative
claims and merits of both opposing tendencies.

3