Table Of ContentRAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
D étente and
Confrontation
A m erican -S oviet
R ela tio n s
from N ix o n to R eagan
T H E B R O O K I N G S I N S T I T U T I O N
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 1985 by
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
Library of Congre» Cataloging in Publication Data
Garthoff, Raymond L.
Détente and confrontation.
Includes bibliographies and index.
1. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union.
2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—United States.
I. Title.
E183.8.S65G37 1985 327.73047 84-45855
ISBN 0-8157-3044-6
ISBN 0-8157-3043-8 (pbk.)
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,
In order to know what is going to happen
one must know what has happened.
N I C C O L O M A C H I A V E L L I
Foreword
Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union clearly
constitute one of the central problems of American policy and world politics.
The tension that has characterized the past decade, the evident misunder
standing that contributes to that tension, and the potential destructiveness
that could be triggered by U.S.-Soviet confrontation, all encourage an effort to
bring the most detailed and careful scholarship to bear on this topic. While it
is a formidable undertaking for any one person to deal with such a wide-ranging
and contentious subject, there is great advantage in having an integrated analy
sis by one scholar. Moreover, while judgments on particular issues will inevita
bly vary, it is important to set a standard for serious, constructive, informed,
and objective discussion that any challenging interpretation should seek to
meet.
The author of this study, Raymond L. Garthoff, is unusually well
qualified. He has long been one of the foremost American scholars of the
Soviet Union and has been intimately involved in practical diplomacy as well.
He was a key member of the diplomatic team that negotiated the SALT I
treaty—the episode that initiates the historical period reviewed in the volume.
He continued to serve in the U.S. diplomatic service for much of the period,
serving as U.S. Ambassador in Bulgaria before coming to the Brookings For
eign Policy Studies program in January 1980.
The study presents a fine-grained historical review of developments
affecting American-Soviet relations. It examines both U.S. and Soviet perspec
tives and their interaction. This approach demonstrates that each side tends to
see itself more as reacting to initiatives of the other side than is actually the
case. Indeed, this book yields insights and conclusions not available in the
current literature, and often modifies the prevailing impression, sometimes to a
startling degree.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the many people
who provided assistance based on their own direct participation in the events
discussed, many of whom must remain unnamed. Among those who provided
information, comments, or both are David Aaron, A. Doak Barnett, Harold
Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lawrence Caldwell, Alexander Dallin, Nathaniel
Davis, Karen Dawisha, Ralph Earle II, Harry Gelman, Alexander L. George,
Harry Harding, Jr., Christine M. Helms, Jerry Hough, John W. Huizenga,
IX
X Détente and Confrontation
William G. Hyland, Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Jan Lodal, Murrey Marder, Mi
chael K. MccGwire, Paul H. Nitze, Vladimir Petrov, William B. Quandt,
Dimitri K. Simes, Gerard C. Smith, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brent Scowcroft,
Marshall D. Shulman, Vladimir I. Toumanoff, Jiri Valenta, Paul C. Wamke,
and Herbert C. York. The author also benefited from discussions with many
Soviet officials, scholars, and commentators, especially those from the Institute
of the U.S.A. and Canada, the Institute of the World Economy and Interna
tional Relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and
the Central Committee. He also thanks Mark Koenig for research assistance, in
particular on U.S.-Soviet trade and human rights developments; Caroline La-
lire and Whitney Watriss for editing the manuscript; Bruce J. Dickson, Chris
tine L. Potts, and Steven Wegren for verifying its factual content; and Karin
E. Burchard, Ruth E. Conrad, Maxine Joyner, Jeanie Cline Roberts, and Ann
M. Ziegler for typing it. Ward & Silvan prepared the index.
This study was partially supported by the Ford Foundation, the
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and the National Council for Soviet and East Euro
pean Research. The Brookings Institution gratefully acknowledges the finan
cial assistance of those organizations.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and should not
be ascribed to the persons whose assistance is acknowledged above, to the
sources of funding support, or to the trustees, officers, or other staff members
of the Brookings Institution.
BRUCE K. MACLAURY
President
April 198S
Washington, D.C.
C ontents
1. Setting the Stage: Contexts, Perspectives, and Issues 1
Contexts and Perspectives 3
The Historical Context 5
The International Political Context 8
Domestic Political Contexts 10
The Strategic Context 16
Perspectives and Perceptions 17
Issues and Purpose 21
2. American and Soviet Conceptions of Détente 24
The American Conception of Détente 25
The Soviet Conception of Détente 36
Parity and Détente 53
3. Confrontation to Détente: The Road to the Summit,
1969-72 69
First Steps, 1969 69
Testing Parity: The Cienfuegos Submarine Base 76
World Developments 83
Trade and Linkage 87
Toward a Meeting at the Summit 93
Kissinger's Moscow Pre-Summit Meeting 97
Soviet Political Developments 99
4. Europe Moves to Détente, 1966-72 106
De Gaulle's Détente 107
West Germany's Ostpolitik 108
NATO and the Warsaw Pact 110
The Berlin Agreement 117
Eastern Europe and East-West Détente 121
xi
xii Détente and Confrontation
5. Opening an Era of Negotiation: SALT I, 1969-72 127
SALT and Détente, 1969 127
The Negotiations 133
The SALT I Agreements 188
SALT I and Détente, 1972 192
6. Establishing Triangular Diplomacy: China and
American-Soviet Relations, 1969-72 199
Sino-Soviet Relations 200
Sino-American Relations 213
Soviet Reactions 240
Triangular Diplomacy and Other Powers 243
Triangular Diplomacy in Perspective 245
7. The Crucible for Triangular Diplomacy: Ending the
War in Vietnam, 1969-72 248
The Nixon Administration’s Expectations 248
Engaging Soviet Support 250
Seeking Chinese Support 254
1972: Triangular Efforts 256
8. Triangular Diplomacy and Regional Conflict:
The Indo-Pakistani War, 1971 262
Eruption of the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 263
The Soviet Angle 266
The China Factor 280
Consequences and Implications 284
9. Détente Launched: The First Nixon-Brezhnev Summit,
May 1972 289
The Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations 290
SALT 298
Cienfuegos: New Tests 300
Other Aspects of the Summit 304
Reverberations of the Détente Summit 311
