Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait (2003)

49 Pages·2003·0.35 MB·English

by  Strategic Studies Institute

CRISIS DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Douglas McCready
November 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-136-9
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PREFACE
The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and
government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic
issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army and
Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its Carlisle
Papers in Security Strategy Series.
In this paper, Chaplain (Colonel) Douglas McCready examines the most volatile issue of the complex
relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China―Taiwan. He considers the
situation in terms of deterrence theory and its application across cultures. Colonel McCready looks at
the perceptions and misperceptions of the involved parties; and their interests, capabilities, and possible
intentions. He concludes with courses of action and ways to increase the likelihood of successful U.S.
deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
STEVEN METZ
Director of Research
Strategic Studies Institute
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
DOUGLAS MCCREADY, an Army Reserve colonel, is a chaplain currently assigned to the 104th
Area Support Group in Germany. He received a direct commission in the Chaplain Corps in 1982.
Chaplain McCready is a Special Forces veteran of Vietnam and has served as a chaplain from
battalion to installation level. He was a Senior Service College Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy. Chaplain McCready has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional
journals, including Interdisciplinary Humanities and the Christian Scholar’s Review. His “Learning from
Sun Tzu” was published in the May/June issue of Military Review. He is the author of Jesus Christ for the
Modern World, published by Peter Lang, and has contributed to the Dictionary of Historical Theology and
Historians of the Christian Tradition. Colonel McCready graduated from the University of Pennsylvania
with degrees in Chinese studies and international relations. He holds an M.Div. from Gordon-Conwell
Theological Seminary, an M.A. and Ph.D. from Temple University, and studied at the University of
Tübingen. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
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ABSTRACT
For more than 50 years, Taiwan’s unresolved international status has been the cause of repeated
crises in East Asia. While the parties involved could be willing to live with the status quo, the domestic
political transformation of Taiwan has called the status quo into question. China, Taiwan, the United
States, and Japan have national interests in how the conflict is resolved, and these interests will be
difficult to reconcile. By conventional measures, China cannot gain Taiwan by force before the end of
this decade. Chinese leaders believe that, by using asymmetrical means, they will be able to overcome
the military advantage of the United States and Taiwan. While the United States will be able to delay
Chinese action against Taiwan, it is unlikely to be successful at long-term deterrence. Deterrence, as
used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, will not be effective with China without significant
modification. The cultural divide affects not only deterrence theory, but also how China and the United
States understand and communicate with each other. Crisis deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely
to succeed due to conflicting national interests and several crucial mutual misperceptions.
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CRISIS DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Despite the recent warming of People’s does the United States have? The challenge
Republic of China (PRC)-American relations, the facing the U.S. Government is to convince both
Taiwan Strait retains a great potential for direct the PRC and Taiwan to refrain from precipitous
U.S. military involvement. Although Taiwan action toward unification and independence,
is only one part of the complex relationship respectively. This will be much less difficult with
between the United States and the PRC,1 it is respect to Taiwan than the PRC.
the most volatile part. A December 2000 RAND For more than 50 years, the deliberate
study of foreign policy and national security American policy of strategic ambiguity has
issues concluded, “Critical differences between successfully deterred both the PRC and Taiwan
Mainland China and Taiwan about the future of from major conflict. Domestic developments in
their relations make the Taiwan issue the most both the PRC and Taiwan are requiring all three
intractable and dangerous East-Asian flashpoint― parties to reevaluate their policies and increasing
and the one with the greatest potential for bringing the likelihood of the use of force by the PRC to
the United States and China into confrontation in gain control over Taiwan. The future success of
the near future.”2 Similarly, an official of China’s American deterrence is questionable. The stated
Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in September American policy that resolution of the conflict,
2001, “The issue of Taiwan is the most sensitive whatever the result might be, must be by peaceful
sore issue in Sino-American relations. And it is means appears increasingly unlikely and does
the only issue that could derail Sino-American not adequately address U.S. interest in the region.
relations in the foreseeable future.”3 These That the United States can delay Chinese actions
somber conclusions reflect the nearly unanimous is almost certain; that it can indefinitely deter
view of American and Chinese specialists in Sino- Chinese action is unlikely.6
American relations. The concern increases when This paper considers the Taiwan situation in
we consider that China has both nuclear weapons terms of deterrence theory and its application
and a primitive but improving intercontinental across cultures to see under what conditions
delivery system. More broadly, “the challenge the PRC might be convinced not to use force to
presented by a rising China is the principal issue resolve the Taiwan situation to its satisfaction.
facing American policy.”4 Denny Roy puts this The author also examines the perceptions and
into regional perspective: misperceptions of each of the parties involved;
their interests, capabilities, and possible
Taiwan’s security problem is Asia’s intentions; and how the PRC intends to deter U.S.
security problem: cross-Strait conflict
intervention in the Taiwan Strait. An examination
would disrupt regional trade and force
of the options available to each party concludes
other Asian states to side with or against
by suggesting the most likely courses of action
the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan’s
security problem is also America’s: one and ways to increase the likelihood of successful
likely consequence of such a conflict would U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. There
be unambiguous Chinese opposition to,
is no presumption here that China will soon
and corresponding action against, the U.S.
become a peer competitor to the United States.
military presence in Asia.5
Chinese decisionmaking and actions regarding
Taiwan will be driven by what the PRC―but not
The question facing U.S. policymakers is
necessarily other nations―views as its domestic
whether they can deter the PRC from its declared
concerns. Unable to defeat the United States in
willingness to use force to achieve political control
a direct military confrontation any time in the
over Taiwan. If so, how? If not, what alternative
foreseeable future, China is likely to seek to
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develop “niche weapons” and strategies that to its way of thinking. This moral self-image is
would make U.S. intervention too difficult or too deeply ingrained in both Chinese and American
costly. culture.
The complexity of the Taiwan Strait situation The most desirable outcome would be for
suggests any future American attempt at crisis China to transform into a pluralistic, democratic
deterrence will be exceedingly difficult, and society where Taiwan could be accommodated
success is unlikely unless at least one party to the and feel comfortable but not necessarily required
conflict makes enormous concessions to the others. to integrate politically with the mainland. This is
The tangled relationship involves a combination highly unlikely in the short term, so we need to
of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As the plan now for alternatives. This paper explores a
United States seeks to deter Chinese military range of alternative courses of action based on
action and Taiwanese provocation in the Strait, the assumption that good crisis management will
the PRC seeks to deter U.S. intervention and make a long-term peaceful solution possible.
formal Taiwanese independence. China is also That the Taiwan Strait is the locus of crisis,
seeking to coerce Taiwan to reverse its tentative how there came to be a state on Taiwan separate
steps toward formal independence. A dangerous from Mainland China, and U.S. involvement in
aspect of the relationship is the confrontation the situation are all matters of recent history.
between an inconsistent U.S. policy regarding Without a sense of the post-World War II history
Taiwan and the PRC on one hand, and a PRC that of the region, nothing else about its potential for
exhibits simultaneous characteristics of paranoia, crisis will make sense.
entitlement, victimization, and arrogance arising
out of its history, on the other. This paranoia leads HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
China to view all actions of potential adversaries
as directed primarily against China. Its historical The conflict in the Taiwan Strait involving
self-image as the paramount state in Asia causes the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan dates
China to view the behavior of regional rivals, the from the early days of the Korean War in 1950.
United States and Japan, as intended to weaken Jurisdictional claims to the island are shrouded
or marginalize China and deny it its rightful in nationalistic myths of the PRC, Taiwan, and
place in the international community.7 The their respective international advocates, although
complexity of China’s self-image can be seen in its China gained control of the island only in the 17th
simultaneous expectation of being accorded the century. The relevant background to the conflict is
prestige and authority of permanent membership that Taiwan was a Japanese colony during World
on the United Nations Security Council with War II and had been so since the Japanese victory
the right to a decisive say on events in Asia, the over China in 1895. Chiang Kai-shek, the wartime
claim to foreign aid from developed nations, the leader of China, insisted that the restoration of
expectation of the preferential treatment given Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan be included in
to developing nations, and opposition to any the 1943 Cairo declaration of Allied leaders. Prior
modification of the United Nations Charter to to this, Taiwan does not appear to have figured
permit Japan a permanent Security Council seat in the concerns of Mainland Chinese, Nationalist
because this would dilute Chinese primacy as the or Communist. Following Japan’s surrender,
spokesman for Asian interests. Nationalist Chinese soldiers occupied the island.
Both the United States and the PRC see Their initially brutal occupation of the island
themselves as occupying the moral high ground moderated only after American intercession.
in their international dealings.8 This makes As the forces under Mao Zedong successively
compromise and communication difficult because defeated Nationalist armies during the Chinese
each presumes it is in the right, while the other is Civil War, the Nationalists found themselves by
acting wrongfully and must be brought around 1950 limited to control of Taiwan, the Pescadores
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Islands, and several groups of small islands government on Taiwan had affirmed since 1949.
just offshore of Mainland China. At this point, This led to military confrontation between the
conquest of Taiwan became a major goal of the PRC and the United States in 1995-96 and periods
Chinese Communists as they sought to bring the of tension during the summer of 1999 and in early
civil war to a successful conclusion.9 In late 1949, 2000. Several of these periods of tension had the
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President potential to become large-scale wars, due as much
Harry Truman that Taiwan was strategically to misperception and miscalculation by one party
important, but warned that the United States was or another as to conflicting national interests.
too overextended militarily to defend it.10 They This review reveals the stunning complexity
expected the PRC to invade and conquer the island of an issue formed from elements of history and
in late 1950 or early 1951. Some State Department geography; the experience of colonialism; a world
officials, including George Kennan, proposed that war; the Cold War; domestic interests in four
the United States take direct control of Taiwan political entities (United States, PRC, Taiwan,
and ask the United Nations to hold a plebiscite and Japan); and the East Asia-Pacific strategic
on the island to decide its future.11 They favored balance.
distancing the U.S. Government from Chiang The experience of repeated conflict in the
Kai-shek and offering Taiwan’s population the Taiwan Strait during the past half century has
opportunity for independence or union with the resulted in a variety of mutual perceptions and
Mainland. This would have required revoking misperceptions on the part of each of the political
the Taiwan portion of the Cairo Declaration.12 entities involved as they have learned and
Events developed too rapidly for this proposal to mislearned the lessons of each conflict. China and
gain a hearing. Truman’s interposition of the U.S. Taiwan have sharply different views of Japan’s
Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Mainland proper international role as a result of their
in response to the North Korean attack on June different colonial and World War II experiences.
25, 1950, frustrated both PRC invasion plans and China and Taiwan each have an image of the
alternatives to U.S. support for the Kuomintang other that does not fully reflect the history of its
on Taiwan. In late 1950, the PRC probably could development or its aspirations. The PRC ignores
have invaded Taiwan successfully. the fact that Taiwan has had a separate history
Thus, since 1950, the Taiwan Strait has been and developmental path for more than a century.
a source of international tension. In 1954-55 and Both the PRC and the United States view each
1958, this tension involved military force and other through the lens of their participation in
the potential for escalation. A 1962 crisis was the Korean War and handling of the Taiwan
less serious. Until the U.S. opening to China Strait crises since 1954. Japan’s images of its
in 1972, the PRC harassed the offshore islands American ally and Chinese neighbor are based
with artillery fire every other day. After the on their words and deeds, particularly during
warming of U.S.-PRC relations, China appeared the last 25 years. Some of these perceptions are
willing to live with the status quo for decades well-grounded, but others lack substance. Both
with relations between the PRC and Taiwan misunderstanding and lack of understanding can
gradually becoming friendlier. The evolution of spark a new Taiwan Strait crisis as easily as can
democracy on Taiwan since 1987, however, has irreconcilable national interests. The author will
transformed what had been a relatively stable argue that each of these conditions is characteristic
environment once again into a source of regional of the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship.
tension. This time the reason was that Taiwan’s Chinese leaders believe that, had the United
move toward democratic government appeared States not intervened in 1950, they would have
to imply a move toward formal independence successfully invaded Taiwan and concluded their
from the Mainland and a denial of the one-China civil war. There remains a residue of bitterness
policy that both the PRC and the Nationalist among Chinese leaders toward the United
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States dating back to the earliest days of the PRC conflict scenario is the belief, prevalent in both
and even earlier, when the United States sided the United States and China, that the United
with the Chinese Nationalists during much of States has no significant national interest at stake.
the 1945-49 civil war. This distrust prompted This mistake alone could cause the two nations to
PRC intervention in Korea in late 1950. Despite stumble into war in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore,
American assurances to the contrary, PRC leaders it is imperative that U.S. political leaders define
viewed the attempted reunification of Korea and explain, both to the American public and
under the Seoul regime as one part of a concerted Chinese decisionmakers, what interests it has,
American attack on the PRC’s continued existence. why they are important, and to what extent the
Believing war between China and the United United States is prepared to defend them.
States was inevitable, PRC leaders decided their What could possibly be so important about
best hope lay in choosing the time and place for Taiwan that U.S. leaders should speak and act
that war.13 as forcefully as they have on several occasions?
The United States has a legal commitment under
PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan in
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS defending itself against forcible integration into
China; it also has a moral obligation going back
Wars result most often from real conflicts more than a half century to provide for Taiwan’s
of national interest. They may also, and too defense. This moral obligation has only become
often do, arise from the misunderstandings and stronger in the 15 years since Taiwan has taken
misperceptions between nations. John Stoessinger the path of democracy. American failure to keep
considers misperception the most important its word regarding Taiwan would cause regional
single precipitating factor in the outbreak of allies to doubt U.S. commitment to them. In
war.14 In many cases, misunderstanding and Japan’s case, this might lead to rearmament and
misperception exacerbate the clash of national even development of a nuclear capability backed
interests. The situation becomes more complicated up by a long-range missile delivery system. This
when adversaries have different cultural is in no one’s interest, least of all China’s. Finally,
backgrounds and different histories. During the abandonment of Taiwan would be followed by
past 60 years, the United States has been involved a decrease of U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific
in three major Asian wars: with Japan, in Korea region and an increase in China’s ability to control
with the PRC, and in South Vietnam. In each case, the sea lines of communication Japan and South
misperceptions held by both sides played a major Korea need for their economic well-being and
role. In the Korean case, better understanding domestic stability. Some who do not see Taiwan’s
and clearer communication between the PRC democratic society, the security of Japan, and the
and the United States might even have averted credibility of American commitments as vital
war between them. Since 1950, China and the interests, still view conflict in the Taiwan Strait as
United States have confronted each other several a danger to the peace and stability of the region.
times in the Taiwan Strait; misperceptions, For them, regional peace constitutes a vital
misunderstandings, and miscommunication American interest.16 In any case, what happens
brought the two nations close to war on more in the Taiwan Strait is a concern for the United
than one of those occasions.15 States, which needs to understand and proclaim
This does not mean conflict of national this interest. Not to do so would weaken whatever
interest is not involved. For China, the United ability the United States has to deter China from
States, Taiwan, and even Japan, the resolution of using military force to gain political control over
Taiwan’s international status involves important, Taiwan.
even vital, national interests. Probably the most In the Taiwan Strait case, the problem of
dangerous misunderstanding in the entire misperception and misunderstanding includes a
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