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Courts under Constraints
Thisstudyoffersanewtheoreticalframeworkforunderstandinghowinstitu-
tionalinstabilityaffectsjudicialbehaviorunderdictatorshipanddemocracy.In
contrasttoconventionalwisdom,thecentralfindingsofthebookchallengethe
longstanding assumption that only independent judges rule against the gov-
ernmentoftheday.SetinthecontextofArgentina,thestudybringstogether
qualitativecasestudiesandstatisticalanalyseswithspatialandgametheoretic
modelstoexploretheconditionsunderwhichcourtsruleagainstthegovern-
ment. In addition to shedding new light on the dynamics of court-executive
relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions,
instability,andtheruleoflaw.Intheprocess,thestudybuildsanewsetofcon-
nectionsamongdiversebodiesofscholarship,includingU.S.judicialpolitics,
comparativeinstitutionalanalysis,positivepoliticaltheory,andLatinAmerican
politics.
GretchenHelmkeisanassistantprofessorinPoliticalScienceattheUniversity
ofRochester.HerresearchoncomparativeinstitutionsandLatinAmericanpol-
iticsappearsinseveralleadingjournals,includingtheAmericanPoliticalScience
Review,ComparativePolitics,andDesarolloEcono´mico.Herresearchhasreceived
grantsfromtheNationalScienceFoundationandtheSocialScienceResearch
Council.ShehasbeenavisitingresearchFellowattheFundacio´nCarlosNino
inBuenosAires,Argentina;theKelloggInstituteforInternationalStudiesat
theUniversityofNotreDame;andtheWeatherheadCenterforInternational
Affairs,HarvardUniversity.
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
GeneralEditor
MargaretLevi UniversityofWashington,Seattle
AssistantGeneralEditor
StephenHanson UniversityofWashington,Seattle
AssociateEditors
RobertH.Bates HarvardUniversity
PeterHall HarvardUniversity
PeterLange DukeUniversity
HelenMilner ColumbiaUniversity
FrancesRosenbluth YaleUniversity
SusanStokes UniversityofChicago
SidneyTarrow CornellUniversity
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StefanoBartolini,ThePoliticalMobilizationoftheEuropeanLeft,1860–1980:
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MarkBeissinger,NationalistMobilizationandtheCollapseoftheSovietState
NancyBermeo,ed.,UnemploymentintheNewEurope
CarlesBoix,DemocracyandRedistribution
Carles Boix, Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social
DemocraticEconomicStrategiesintheWorldEconomy
Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal,
1930–1985
Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Au-
thorityandInstitutionalChange
MichaelBrattonandNicolasvandeWalle,DemocraticExperimentsinAfrica:
RegimeTransitionsinComparativePerspective
ValerieBunce,LeavingSocialismandLeavingtheState:TheEndofYugoslavia,
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Serieslistcontinuesfollowingtheindex.
ToMyFatherandinMemoryofMyMotherandGrandmother
Courts under Constraints
JUDGES, GENERALS, AND
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA
GRETCHEN HELMKE
UniversityofRochester
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521820592
© Gretchen Helmke 2005
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2005
isbn-13 978-0-511-08160-6 eBook (EBL)
isbn-10 0-511-08160-x eBook (EBL)
isbn-13 978-0-521-82059-2 hardback
isbn-10 0-521-82059-6 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
ListofTables pagex
ListofFigures xii
PrefaceandAcknowledgments xiii
1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Actors,Institutions,andMechanisms 7
1.3 DesignandOverviewoftheArgument 14
2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION 20
2.1 TheStandardStrategicAccount 21
2.2 ANewPatternofInter-branchRelations 24
2.3 ModifyingtheSeparation-of-PowersApproach 27
2.4 JudicialMotivations 30
2.5 ProblemsofInformation 34
2.6 InstitutionsandSanctioningPlayers 36
2.7 Conclusion 39
3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS:
INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 41
3.1 PoliticiansandUncertainty 42
3.2 TheModel 44
3.3 Discussion 49
3.4 Conclusion:TestableHypotheses 56
4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS:
INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE
ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999 61
vii
Contents
4.1 TheGapbetweenFormalandInformalInstitutions 63
4.2 JudgesundertheBayonets:TheMilitary“Proceso,”
1976–1983 68
4.3 JudgesundertheAlfons´ınGovernment:TheReturn
toDemocracy,1983–1989 75
4.4 JudgesundertheFirstMenemGovernment:The
DifficultyofDemocraticConsolidation 84
4.5 JudgesundertheSecondMenemGovernment:The
PathtowardDemocraticConsolidation? 89
4.6 Conclusion:AnAnalyticNarrativeofInstitutional
Insecurity 92
5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN
ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE
ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT 98
5.1 DataandMethodology 98
5.2 Timing 100
5.3 Importance 105
5.4Participation109
5.5 TargetoftheThreat 115
5.6 RivalHypotheses:Composition,Legality,andtheMix
ofCases 118
5.7Conclusion124
6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS,
CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 126
6.1 TheMilitaryCourtandHumanRights 127
6.2 TheAlfons´ınCourtandHumanandCivilRights 131
6.3 TheMenem-EraCourtandPresidentialPower 135
6.4 Conclusion:DidDefectionWork? 141
6.5 Epilogue:TheCourtandtheCollapseofArgentina 145
7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 153
7.1 StrategicDefectionandtheReverseLegal-Political
Cycle 154
7.2 StrategicDefectioninComparativePerspective 158
7.3 FurtherImplications,FutureDirections 168
AppendixA OverviewoftheFederalArgentineJudiciaryand
theArgentineSupremeCourt 175
viii
Description:Although it has been some time since I have read this book, I still consider from time to time Helmke's introduction of the concept of strategic defection. The notion that judges may, out of self-interest, rule against sitting executives in order to signal to incoming executives is very interesting.
