Constructing Physical Fights: An Interactionist Analysis of Violence among Affluent, Suburban Youth

30 Pages·2013·0.37 MB·English

QualSociol(2013)36:23–52
DOI10.1007/s11133-012-9244-2
Constructing Physical Fights: An Interactionist Analysis
of Violence among Affluent, Suburban Youth
CurtisJackson-Jacobs
Publishedonline:13January2013
#SpringerScience+BusinessMediaNewYork2012
Abstract Based on more than four years of ethnographic fieldwork and a dataset of 189
violentencounters,thisarticleexploresthesocialphenomenologyofphysicalfightsinanovel
setting.AlthoughAmericansociologistshavetraditionallydepictedviolenceasadistinctively
“ghetto”phenomenon,themembersofthissamplewereoverwhelminglywhiteandaffluent.
Since the usual explanatory background factors—race, poverty, and neighborhood—cannot
adequatelyaccountfortheirviolentexperiences,thedatasetisespeciallyvaluableforanalyzing
the generic interactional processes through which physical fights unfold. Furthermore, the
articlesuggestsamodelthatrunscountertotheprevailingsociologicalperspectivethatviolence
isuniversallymotivatedbyindependent,preexistingconflicts.Oftentimes,thesamplemembers
set out to “get into” fights for their perceived experiential rewards and only later instigated
disputes as a means to motivate and justify violent action. Using the method of analytic
induction, the article presents a generalizable theory of how fights unfold in interaction.
Three stages were necessary for achieving a fight: (1) agreeing to fight as a solution to a
challengeto“interpersonalsovereignty,”(2)transcendingtheordinaryfearofviolence,and(3)
usingcompetitivetechniquesofviolence.
Keywords Interpersonal conflict . Violence . Crime . Youth culture . Ethnography .
Socialphenomenology
Watching from a safe distance, physical fights can appear inhuman and animalistic, group
fightsespecially.It canbe hardto tellwho isfighting whom,muchless why. Arms swing
andheadsbounce.Projectilesfly.Peoplerunaroundfrantically.Andthenoises—soundsone
neverknewhumanscouldmake.Everydaylanguageaptlyconveysthissenseofchaosand
disorder. Fights are called “free-for-alls,” “dust-ups,” and “knock-down, drag-out brawls.”
They“erupt”and“breakout,”likeforcesofnature,asifbeyondthelimitsofsocialorder—a
viewsustained bymanypsychologicaland biologicaltheories ofviolence,and onlyrarely
challengedbysociologists.
C.Jackson-Jacobs(*)
DepartmentofCrime,Law,andJustice,UniversityofIllinoisatChicago,Chicago,IL,USA
e-mail:[email protected]
24 QualSociol(2013)36:23–52
Whattomakeofthesebeastswithfour-fists?
Looking more closely, fights are prime sites for studying what is most human about
humans: social interaction that is thoroughly meaningful and organized at each moment
(Blumer1969;Garfinkel1967;Goffman1967;Katz1999;Mead1934/1962;Schutz1962).
Tocontributetothesociologyofinterpersonalconflictandviolence,Idocumentatheoret-
ically strategic phenomenon: physical fights in a sample of overwhelmingly white, subur-
ban,affluentyouth.
My sample members defined a “fight” much as the broader culture does: a stretch of
serious competitive violence (Jackson-Jacobs 2009).1 This definition served as both an
interpretive lens for defining situations and also a practical guide for organizing action
(Garfinkel 1967; Polanyi 1958; Sacks 1967–1968/1992; Schutz 1962). In the cases I
describe, members specifically meant to do their violence as fights—rather than, say,
unilateral beatings—thus constructing themselves as competitive opponents rather than
sadisticpredators.
Americansociology,likepopularculture,tendstodepictyouthviolenceasadistinctively
“ghetto”phenomenon.Sincethebackgroundfactorsusuallypresumedtocauseviolenceare
absentinmysample,thedataarestrategicallyvaluableforhighlightingthegeneralprocess
of constructing physical fights in face-to-face interaction. Thus, following the tradition of
“interactionist”studiesofviolence(especiallyKatz1988;seealsoCollins2008),Iseekan
explanationthatliesclosertoandwithinthemomentsofviolence.
Although I make general claims about fighting, I report evidence from a single ethno-
graphicstudyfor tworeasons. First, Ireporton this sampletodebunktheperspectivethat
violentyouthculturesareexclusivetocontextsofpoverty.Second,Ipresenttheevidenceas
an empirical contribution to the comparative backdrop of studies that have described
qualitativelysimilarfightsacrossrace,class,andgenderlines,andindiverseneighborhood,
institutional, historical, and geographical contexts (e.g., Anderson 1999; Athens 1997;
Brown 2010; Collins 2008; Conley 1999; Farrington et al. 1982; Garot 2010; Gorn 1985;
Hagedorn1988;HorowitzandSchwartz1974;Jones2010;King1995;Monkkonnen2001;
Polk 1999; Sanders 1994; Short and Strodtbeck 1968; Tomsen 1997; Winlow and Hall
2006). In the spirit of analytic induction (Znaniecki 1934), grounded theory (Glaser and
Strauss1967),andthecomparativemethod(Ragin2008),mypurposeistohighlightwhatis
commonacrosscontextswithoutlosingsightofwhatisunique.
Whether fights occur in settings such as those I describe or in impoverished, working-
class, or “gang” contexts, the actors often pursue them as an opportunity to experience
thrilling“action”(Garot2007a,b;Katz1988,chap.4;seealsoGoffman1967),to“test”or
demonstrate one’s emotional and violent skills (Brown 2010, 186; Garot 2007a; Sanchez-
Jankowski 1991), and to achieve thenarrative payoffs and prestige ofstorytelling (Collins
2008;Jackson-Jacobs2004a;Katz1988,chap.4;Morrilletal.2000).
To be sure, there are differences in the interactional repertoires for provoking fights,
the ways violent emotions are generated, and the bodily techniques of violence across
contests and categories of actors. Gang members may challenge other youth by demand-
ing to know the other’s affiliation (Garot 2007a, 2010). Young men and women living in
impoverished urban neighborhoods may be particularly sensitive to how their violent
performances will affect the “respect” they receive from their peers (Anderson 1999;
1IrefertotheyoungpeopleaboutwhomIwriteasmembersintwosensesoftheterm:asmembersofmy
researchsample,butalsoasmembersofaparticularculture,withitsownboundaries,practices,andshared
knowledge.Asmuchaspossible,Itriedtoorganizemysampletofollownaturalcategoriesofmembershipin
friendshipnetworks.
QualSociol(2013)36:23–52 25
Jones 2010). Women may be more likely than men to tear clothing, pull hair, and strike
each other open-handed rather than with closed fists (Jackson-Jacobs 2011). Yet these
variations fall within the more generic process of socially organizing fights that I describe
below.
Sincefightsinvolvemutualcombatbydefinition,Ianalyzethefightasafundamentally
collective phenomenon. I outline three individually necessary and collectively sufficient
stages inthe processoforganizing a fight—anexplication ofthefighter’stacit knowledge
about how fights work. The model below constitutes a causal “recipe” in two senses
(Gasking 1955): in Schutz’s (1962; Schutz and Luckman 1973) sense of the practical
knowledgeusedtocreateafightininteraction,andinRagin’s(2008)senseoftheconditions
usedtoconstructasociologicalexplanation.
Toconstructandsustainaphysicalfight,opponentsmustdothefollowing:
1. Agreetosolveamutualchallengeto“interpersonalsovereignty”withafight.Whatever
the substantive matter, disputants must transform a conflict into a challenge to sover-
eignty over the self—that is, the right of autonomy over body and identity, and the
responsibilitytodefendone’sselfhood.Toachievethisdefinitionofconflict,disputants
mustcometofeelprovokedbyritualor“remedial”mattersratherthansimplysubstan-
tiveoffenses(Goffman1971).Implicitlyorexplicitly,disputantsmustagreetoresolve
thecrisisofselfhoodwithafight.
2. Transcendthe ordinaryfearofusingviolence. Inordinaryinteraction, virtuallyevery-
one feels considerable tension and fear in anticipation of using violence. Overcoming
the“confrontational tension/fear”(Collins2008)thatsurroundsviolenceisnot simply
an individual phenomenon. Instead, it depends on the disputants creatively exploiting
situationalresources,oftenincollaborationwithaudiencemembers.Totranscendfear,
disputants must provoke one anotherto reinterpret the immediate present as anurgent
“lastchance”crisis—onerequiringviolencerightnow.
3. Usecompetitivetechniquesofviolence.Not any violence will do. To sustain a fight,
it must be performed competitively. Standard competitive bodily practices include
making one’s own body vulnerable, fighting back-and-forth, and stopping upon
victory.
Notonlydomysamplemembers’socioeconomicbackgroundsruleoutvariousexplan-
ations of their violence, but the interactional process itself also demands a refinement of
theory. Prevailing theories portray violence as universally motivated by conflicts that exist
priortoandindependentoftheviolence(e.g.,Black1983,1998),anotionpremisedonthe
view of conflict as motivated by objectively contradictory interests (see, e.g., Schelling
1960). It would be too simplistic, and often inaccurate, to describe conflict as the precipi-
tatingcauseoffightsinmydataset.Inmanycases,memberswentout“lookingforafight”
before any conflict had begun or any opponent been selected. In every case, however,
establishingconflictwasanecessaryingredientinconstructingthemotivationtofight.
Furthermore, generating the necessary emotions was not simply a psychological phe-
nomenon, but an interactional achievement (Katz 1999). Fighters do not simply get angry
and“losecontrol,”butinsteadcollectivelyprovokeviolentemotionsinoneanother(com-
pare to Berkowitz 1989; Dollard et al. 1939; Freud 1907/1959; Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985). Finally, the bodily practices of competitive fighting
challenge the notions that conflict and cooperation are incompatible and that the intent of
violenceisexclusivelytodominateorharm(seealsoConley1999;Labov1972;Lee2009;
Luckenbill1981;Pagliai2000;Simmel1905/1955).
26 QualSociol(2013)36:23–52
SociologyofViolence
Physical fights outside of poverty contexts are novel to the sociological literature but, I
argue, are not empirically unusual. How has such violence gone largely unnoticed by
American sociology? Three interrelated methodological practices have shaped the theory
and imagery of violence, highlighting extreme violent acts and impoverished actors while
renderingtheprocessesofcommonplace,non-poor,non-minorityviolenceinvisible.
1. Focusingon“Serious”Violence
Sociologicalresearchemphasizesthemostextremeformsofviolentcrime(e.g.,homicide,
whichisstronglycorrelatedwithpovertyandminoritystatus),neglectingthemorecommon-
place forms of interpersonal violence that transcend race, class, gender, and neighborhood.
Whenfightsandcompetitiveviolencehavebeenstudiedatall,ithasusuallybeeninwaysthat
eitherseverelylimittherangeofvariationorfailtohighlighttheirdistinctiveprocesses.
Anumberofinteractionally-focusedstudiessuggestthathomicidesoftenbeginasfights,
oratleastwithrelatedphenomenasuchas“victimprecipitation,”“charactercontests,”and
“working agreements” to do battle (Katz 1988, chap. 1; Luckenbill 1977; Polk 1999;
Wolfgang 1957). Yet very few fights end in homicide. Starting the analysis with cases
ending in death and including cases that do not start as fights obscures the more general
socialprocessesofforginganagreementtodobattle,sustainingthatagreement,andending
violence without breaking it (Luckenbill 1977). Fights are distinctively competitive, a
quality absent from enraged punitive attacks and slayings (Katz 1988). Indeed, as I argue
below,themomentwhenafightendsandanimpassionedassaultbeginsisthemomentwhen
competitionisabandoned.
Thequantitativeliteratureissimilarlyorientedtowardextreme,criminalviolence.Hagan
andFoster(2001,879)illustratethetypicalapproach,specificallyexcludingfightsfroman
analysis of youth violence because, they argue, “violence, other than simple fighting, is
relatively infrequent.” However, one might also argue the opposite. If the goal is to
understand the spectrum of violence in social life, then the most common forms deserve
attention,eveniftheyareuncorrelatedwiththemostextreme.
Anotherbodyofsurveyresearch,analyzedmainlywithinthedisciplineofpublichealth,
indicates that fighting is widespread across racial, class, and gender lines. On surveys,
typically between one quarter and one half of American youth report fighting or similar
violenceinthepastyear(CentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention[CDC]2012;Chenget
al. 2003; Espelage et al. 2003; Paschall et al. 1996; Saner and Ellickson 1996). The
proportions do vary by race, class, and gender, but less than commonly presumed. Over
the past 15 years, only about 1.1–1.4 times as many nonwhite and lower-income youth
reported fighting as did white and higher-income youth. In the CDC’s (2012) most recent
surveyofhighschoolstudents,38%ofwhite,44%ofHispanic,and46%ofblackmales
reported a past-year fight. Gender differences are indeed greater, but female fights are not
rareevents,with20%ofwhite,29%ofHispanic,and32%ofblack femalesreportinga
fight. Researchers have nonetheless sustained the view of violence as an impoverished
minority male phenomenon by emphasizing small (relative to public perceptions) but
statisticallysignificantdifferences,disregardingtheirsubstantialsimilarity.
2. SamplingthePoorandMarginal
Though there is evidence of widespread violence in all strata of youth cultures, both
quantitative and qualitative sociologists have disproportionately designed their samples to
QualSociol(2013)36:23–52 27
overrepresent convicts, the poor, and other marginalized groups. Ethnographic studies of
American youth violence have predominantly focused on “gang” styles ofviolence and/or
interpretedviolenceasaresultofpoverty(e.g.,Anderson1999;Hagedorn1988;Horowitz
andSchwartz1974;Jones2010;Sanchez-Jankowski1991;Sullivan1989;seealsoKatzand
Jackson-Jacobs2004).
Infact,innercityethnographershave,attimes,documentedfightsthatarequalitatively
similar to those outside of the ghetto. Anderson (1999, 69-90), for instance, distinguished
betweenplayfights,fairfights,ritualizedgroupbeatings,andseriousassaults.Jones(2010)
describes a similar range of fighting among inner city girls. Both describe fighting as a
manifestation of what Anderson (1999) calls the “code of the street”: The need to present
oneself as willing and able to act violently as a means of personal protection and gaining
respect(butseeGarot2007b).
Themeaningsandconsequencesofsuchinnercityfightsmaydifferfromthoseinother
socialecologies.Anderson(1999),forinstance,arguesthatviolentcontestsin“thestreets”
arezero-sumgames:Thevictorgainsrespect,whilethevanquishedlosesit(seealsoShort
andStrodtbeck1968).2Bycontrast,evenwhenmysamplemembershadclearlylostafight
they oftentimes found some basis for framing the technical defeat as a moral victory
(Jackson-Jacobs 2004a). Many of the more predatory forms of violence described in
research on inner city youth violence, such as homicide, stickup, and kidnapping
(Anderson 1999; Contreras 2013; Garot 2007a, 2010; Sullivan 1989), were absent or rare
inmysamplemembers’lives.Nonetheless,thecategoriesoffightsdescribedinAnderson’s
researchmaybemoregeneralizablethanheacknowledges.Examplesofeacharepresentin
myowndataset.
Themostprominentexceptionstosamplingthepooraredescriptivestudiesofviolencein
skinhead,football/soccer“hooligan,”andpubsubculturesinEurope,Canada,andAustralia
(e.g.,Baron1997;Buford1990;King1995;Marshetal.1978;Tomsen1997;Winlowand
Hall2006).AsinAmericanstudiesofgangviolence,mostofthisresearchdescribesfighting
as totemic of the local culture (Katz and Jackson-Jacobs 2004). That is, the researchers
reportspecificcasesoffightsandexploretheirlocalmeaning,butrarelyattempttoexplain
thegenericprocessoforganizingafightinface-to-faceinteraction(butseeFarringtonetal.
1982;King1995).Byvaryingthesocioeconomiccontext,though,suchstudiesdocontrib-
utetoageneraltheoryoffightprocesses,apointtowhichIreturnbelow.
3. PrivilegingBackgroundoverProcess
Violence research has historically privileged the background of actors over the social
processesoftheviolenceitself.3Inmuchofsociology,thecausesarepresumedtobedistant
from the actual moments of violent action, whether in biographical hardship, subcultural
groupmembership,oratleastinindependent,pre-existing“reasons”forconflict(Schinkel
2010).Evenlesscommonisfocusedattentiontohowthebodyitselfisusedtoconstructthe
meaningofviolence,oneelementofmyanalysis(butseeCollins2008;Katz1988,1999).
Lost in these accounts are the fateful interactional contingencies of “doing” conflict
(Emerson and Messinger 1977; Sacks 1992). One of the interactionist tradition’s major
contributions has been to document a spectrum of violent encounters constituted through
distinctivesituationalandinteractionalprocesses(e.g.,Garot2007a;Jackson-Jacobs2004a;
Katz1988;Luckenbill1977,1981;Newman2004;Sanders1994;seealsoJohnson1995).
2ButseeAnderson(1999,85–87)foranexampleinwhichbotharedescribedasgainingrespect.
3Historicalresearchprovidessomevaluableexceptions(Gorn1985;Monkkonnen2001).Conley(1999),for
instance,describes“theagreeablerecreationoffighting”innineteenthcenturyIreland.
28 QualSociol(2013)36:23–52
To make distinctions between different types—such as impassioned slayings, drive-by
shootings,andrampagekillings—thesociologicalmethodrequiresevidencethattheactors
sociallyorganizethemtobedifferent.
EvidencefromtheEuropeanstudiesilluminatesanimportantqualityofthefightprocess.
Not only are the background factors traditionally associated with violence in American
researchabsent,butsoaretheconventionallyrecognizedreasonsforconflict.Membersof
Farrington,Berkowitz,andWest’s(1982)sampleofBritishdelinquents,forinstance,often
reportedbeingmotivatedbyexcitementandadesiretofightalongsidefriends,ratherthanby
anger or a desire to dominate (contrast with Athens 2005). “Firms” of soccer fans plan to
fight long before encountering their opponents (usually strangers), define the reasons for
violenceinpatentlyarbitraryterms(supportingtheopposingteam),andelaboratelyprovoke
theirrivalsintoattackingthemselves(Buford1990;Collins2008;King1995;Marshetal.
1978). As Katz (1988; Katz and Jackson-Jacobs 2004) argued of youth street gangs, by
creatingmutuallyopposedbutotherwisesimilarteams,thefirmsinvitetheconclusionthat
thepurposeoffightingisnottoresolveormanageconflict,butinsteadthatthepurposeof
conflictistojustifyfights(comparetoBlack1983,1998).
Fightshaveadistinctivelycompetitive,negotiatedcharacterthatisdifficulttoreconcile
withtheoreticalperspectivesthatpresumeviolenceis“pure”conflict(Simmel1905/1955).
Athens (2005), for instance, has critiqued Goffman (1967), Luckenbill (1977; see also
1981),andothersfordescribingviolenceassometimesinvolvingcooperationand“character
contests,” rather than as universally oriented toward dominance. Black (1983, 1998) has
classifiedvirtuallyallviolenceas“self-help;”thatis,socialcontrolorconflictmanagement
thatpunishesdeviance(seealsoCooney1998).
Mysamplemembers,however,routinelyplannedtogetintofightslongbeforeactually
choosing someone with whom to fight, much less a reason to fight. Then, oftentimes, the
ostensiblereasonswouldbedeliberatelycontrived(e.g.,“accidental”bumps;seeKatz1988,
chap. 3). Rather than saying violence was enacted to resolve independently existing con-
flicts, in many cases, it would be more accurate to say conflicts were manufactured to
resolvethechallengeoffindingafight.Memberswerecognizantofthisprocess.Rick,one
of the most active fighters in my sample during his teens and twenties, used to call the
conflictan“excuseforabuse.”InSchinkel’s(2010)terms,thisviolencewasatleastpartly
“autotelic”(i.e.,doneforitsownsake)or,morecolloquially,“recreational”(Conley1999;
ZimringandZeuhl1986).
ThemostextensivetheoreticaldiscussionoffightsmaybeCollins’(2008)broadstudyof
violent situations. Collins documented several phenomena that overlap with the fights I
describe, including “carousing violence,” or fights “as fun” and “entertainment,” and “fair
fights.”Idrawonhiscentralclaimthatanyprocessoforganizingviolenceconsistslargelyof
circumventing “confrontational tension/fear.” There is, however, an important difference
between my analytic strategy and Collins’. Collins focused on situational conditions that
disproportionately lead to violence, thus setting aside the phenomenological differences
between fights and other violence. My analysis more closely follows the methodological
approachofKatz’s(1988)phenomenologicalstudiesofviolence,focusingontheinterpre-
tive,emotional,andpracticaldimensionsofinteraction.
Sample,Setting,andDataset
IbeganthisresearchwiththepremisethatIhadaccesstoastrategicsamplethatwouldbe
novel to the existing literature (Merton 1987). As a high school student growing up in
QualSociol(2013)36:23–52 29
Tucson, Arizona, I knew many young men and women who regularly got into physical
fights,mostfromanaffluent,suburbanneighborhood.Duringmostofthefieldworkperiod
(December,1999–June,2004)IlivedinLosAngeles(500milesaway),soItookfrequent
tripstoTucsonoverweekendsandbreaksintheacademiccalendar.Tostart,Iaskedseveral
young adults (aged about 18 to 22) with whom I was still in contact to participate in a
sociologicalstudyoffighting.Ihungoutwiththemattheirhomesandatbarsandparties,
whereIthenmettheirfriends,siblings,andromanticpartners,networkingthesampleoutto
includemembersofoverlappingfriendshipcircles.
Irecordedfieldnotesonand/orinterviewswith86individuals,thoughIfocusedparticularly
onacoresampleof29menandsixwomenwhoformedamoreorlessstableandcoherent
primarygroupoffriendsduringtheirteensandtwenties(aged18to28duringmyresearch).My
interviewscoveredthemembers’livespriortofieldwork,extendingtheperiodofresearchback
intimetochildhoodandadolescentexperiences.Inthecoresample,89%(31outof35;26out
of29men,5outof6women)claimedtohavebeeninvolvedinatleastonefightbetweenthe
timetheystartedhighschoolandthetimethatIendedmyfieldwork.
Eighty percent (28 out of 35) of core sample members defined themselves as “white-
alone;” 11 % (4) as white/Latino; and 3 % Asian alone (1), Asian/white (1), and Latino/
Native American (1).4Of thosefor whom I recorded parental occupation,halfhad at least
one parent either in a professional career (10 out of 26; e.g., attorneys and physicians) or
whoownedabusiness(threeoutof26).Allbutonegrewupinaneighborhoodwithsomeof
theTucsonarea’shighestpropertyvaluesandaprestigious—somewouldsaypretentious—
reputation.
Asteenagerstheyviewedthemselvesasarebelliousandtroublemakinggroupoffriends,and
wereapparentlyviewedassuchbyschoolofficials.Atleast11droppedoutofhighschoolorwere
expelled,andtwoothersgraduatedfromanalternativeschool,whosestudentshadquitorbeen
kickedoutofregularhighschool.Evenso,atleast16attendedfour-yearuniversitiesduringmy
fieldwork,includingthreeofthehighschooldropoutsandbothalternativeschoolgraduates.At
leastfiveattainedadvanceddegreesinlaw,business,socialwork,andsocialscience.
Duringlate youth (roughly,ages 16-25)they proudlysawtheir extended network asan
eclectic group of “hip” and tough, but sometimes “square,” social types, including college
students,punkrockers,somewhodabbledingangmembership,and,towardtheperiphery,a
fewmembersofskinheadgroups(thenonracistkind;somewereLatinoandatleastonewas
black;twowerewhitewomen,bothofwhomcontributedfirsthandaccountsofviolenceto
my dataset).5 All of the core members led active social lives organized around regular
routinesofdrinkingandpartying,atleastintotheirtwenties.Mostusedillegaldrugsatsome
point and all had at least a few friends involved in some degree of criminality (e.g., drug
dealing,robbery,passingfakecurrency,illegalgambling).
They appreciated the incongruity between their “deviant” activities and conventional
backgrounds, viewing fighting as an important mark of distinction. Dramatizing and tran-
scendingtraditionalstatusdifferenceswascentraltotheirculturalhabitus,amatterofpride
andprestige(Bourdieu1984;seealsoCollins2008,chap.7;Grazian2003;Katz1988,118–
128;Jackson-Jacobs2004b).Itwasimportanttomembersthatthegroupbeinternallydiverse.
4ThepopulationofPimaCounty,inwhichTucsonislocated,was61%non-Hispanicwhite-alone,29%
Latino(ofanyrace),and3%blackinthe2000Census.
5Those unfamiliar with skinhead cultures may not recognize that they are far more heterogeneous than
commonlyperceived(seeSarabiaandShriver2004).Thereisevidencetosuggest,infact,thatAmerican
skinheadsbeganasanonracistyouthmovement(Wood1999).TheskinheadsIknewclaimedtohavehad
occasional encounters with racist or Neo-Nazi skinheads at concerts and other public events, typically
resultinggroupfightsorattacksagainsttheracistskinheads.
30 QualSociol(2013)36:23–52
Attheextreme,therewasatimewhenonememberwasservingonanIvyLeaguelawreview
whileanotherserved18monthsinanArizonastateprison.Eventwopeopleinsuchdistant
circumstancessharedacommonbondoforganicsolidarity(Durkheim(1893/1997):Bothhad
atleastonegoodfriendattheoppositeendoftheinstitutionalhierarchyofrespectability.
Interaction-LevelDataset
Iaccumulatedaninteraction-leveldatasetof189firsthandaccountsofparticipationinviolence
and51near-violentsituations,basedlargelyontape-recordedinterviews,butalsoincluding26
casesofviolencethatIobservedfirsthand.6Thegreatestlimitationoftheinterviewdatamaybe
that accounts most directly reflect linguistic codes, storytelling practices, and cultural myths
aboutfighting(Labov1982;Morrilletal.2000;Schegloff1987).Itriangulatedaccounts(Webb
etal.1966)bycomparingrecollections,observations,and,for23fights,betweentwoandseven
interviewsfromdifferentactors.Mostofmydirectobservationsofviolence(21outof26)took
placepriortofieldwork.Asapilotproject,Iwroteretrospectiveobservations(seeFerrell1997,
2012; Lyng 1998; see also Athens 1997) on all violence I could recall witnessing or being
involvedinduringtheprevioussevenyears.7
Inanexploratory,inductivefashion(GlaserandStrauss1967;Katz1988,2001),Icoded
allviolentsituationsasincludingafight(122cases),otherviolence(94),and/orboth(27);
hence, the numbers add to more than 189. Since the meaning of a situation is always
contingent on what is happening right now, I did not assume that the same label should
applyfrom“start”to“end.”Thus,Iidentifiedfights-turned-“jumpings”(i.e.,groupbeatings)
asoneimportantphenomenontoexplain.
Iusedthelogicofsamplingthemostqualitativelydiverserangeofcasespossible,ratherthan
collectingarandomsampleorcompletecensusofviolentexperiences(seeGlaserandStrauss
1967). Therefore quantitative inferences based on these data would be less reliable than the
qualitativeinferencesIemphasize.Todocumenttheprocessofconstructingafight,Iusedthe
methodofanalytic induction (Katz 2001; see alsoBecker 1953; Cressey 1953; Garot 2010;
Katz1988,1999;Lindesmith1947;Znaniecki1934).Incontrasttoprobabilisticmethodsand
some comparative techniques (see, e.g., Epstein and King 2002; Ragin 2008), in analytic
induction one alternately revises both outcome and hypothesis until the explanation fits all
knowncases.Thusexplanationsareintheformofnecessaryandsufficientconditions,andofan
exploratory rather than confirmatory nature. Through this process I reached an explanation
specifictofighting,ratherthanageneraltheoryofviolence(seeAthens2005)
TheProcessofOrganizingaFight
Howdoesadisputeturnintoaphysicalfight?Whydoesthefightbeginnow?Howdoesit
end?Howdosomefightsleadtomore“serious”violence?
Theprocessofcreatingandsustainingafightunfoldedoverthreeindividuallynecessary
and collectively sufficient steps: (1) establishing a provocative challenge to interpersonal
sovereignty,andagreeingtofightasasolution;(2)transcendingtheordinaryfearofusing
6Unlessnotedasafieldnote,directquotesarefromtranscriptsofaudiorecordings.
7Irecordedfieldnoteobservationsontwofull-blownfights,threecasesofotherviolence,and13nearfights.I
wrote retrospective observations on 18 fights that happened prior to the fieldwork, three cases of other
violence,andfournearfights.IwroteallretrospectiveobservationsinOctober1999,andpreservedthemas
originallywritten.
QualSociol(2013)36:23–52 31
violence;and(3)usingcompetitivebodilytechniquesofviolence.Membersusedtheirtacit
knowledgeofthisprocessasapracticalguidetoaction.
1.AgreeingtoSolveaChallengetoInterpersonalSovereigntywithaFight
Fightsalwaysinvolveconflict,butnotjustanyconflict.Whatmattersisnotthesubstantive
topic, but a particular turning point in the course of the dispute. However they began,
conflictsleadingtofightscametoposeaprovocativechallengetoeachdisputant’srightto
control one’s own self—one’s body and identity—that is, the sovereignty of the self.
Achieving this definition of a conflict requires a specific transformation of meaning, from
viewing the situation as a substantive trouble to viewing it as a ritual insult and fateful
existentialdilemma—adareto“dosomething,”todefendone’sclaimtoselfhood(seealso
Emerson and Messinger 1977; Goffman 1971). The challenge poses a discrediting, humil-
iating threat should one “back down.” At the same time, it also poses an aggrandizing
opportunityto“standup”foroneselfandclaimextraordinarypersonalcompetence.
To resolve the crisis of selfhood, directly or indirectly, one party proposes to fight and
anothermakesamovetoaccepttheproposal.Typically,agreementstofightarenegotiated
verbally over several turns of challenge and counterchallenge—what my sample members
referred to as “talking shit.” Disputants might also provoke one another with aggressive
gesturesandinvasionsofpersonalspaceor,inthecaseofeyecontact,unwelcomeintrusions
threateningtherightoffreedomfromscrutiny.Membersoffightingculturesconsidertalking
shitapreludeandimplicitagreementtomutualviolence.
ChallengingSelfhood
Homicideresearchersroutinelycommentthatseriousviolencefrequentlyfollowsutterlytrivial
disputes(e.g.,Katz1988,chap.1;Luckenbill1977;Monkkonnen2001;Polk1999;Wolfgang
1957;seealsoConley1999;Gorn1985).Tounderstandinterpersonalviolenceonemustconfront
bothitsgravityanditsabsurdity.Peoplekilleachother,forinstance,afterarguingaboutparking
spacesorbarbecuedfood(Katz1988).Butthecontentoftheconflictsismisleading.
Thereisalwayssomethingimportantatstakewhenpeopleuseviolence(Girard1977).In
righteously impassioned punitive attacks, it is the defense of some version of “The Good”
(Katz1988).Incompetitivefights,itisthecombatants’claimtointerpersonalsovereignty:
Disputantscometofeelthattheirrightsofselfhoodhavebeenattacked,thattheyhavebeen
daredtoescalatetheconflict,andthatthemoralfoundationsoftheselfareontheline(see
Anderson1999;Goffman1967;Garot2007b,2010).AsIexplainbelow,althoughaggres-
siveinstigatorsmayhaveinitiatedadisputedisingenuouslyjustmomentsbefore,theymust
nonethelesscometofeelauthenticallymotivatedbyit.
Acriticalturningpointarises:Disputantscometofeelprovokedbyprocedural,remedial
matters rather than simply by substantive offenses—that is, by how the other is disputing,
rather than what they are disputing about (Goffman 1971; Labov 1982). The present
situation is no longer a specific insult, but represents a violation of “general principle,” a
phrasefamiliarinsome“street”circles(seealsoKatz1988).
Case#60,basedoninterviewswithonecombatant,fourwitnesses,andlimited,corrob-
oratingqueriesoftheothercombatant,8illustratesthispoint.Whentheywere22yearsold,
8Tellingly, the “victor,” Chad, was reluctant to provide an interview, apparently ashamed or regretful of
havingbeatenaclosefriend.
32 QualSociol(2013)36:23–52
Jerry and Chad got into a fight after arguing over a carne asada burrito and guacamole.9
They were at Justin and Will’s apartment late at night drinking with friends, celebrating a
barroom brawl already gotten into with several strangers earlier in the evening (Case #4).
Jerry and Chad drove to Nacho’s Tacos, Tucson’s beloved late-night Mexican fast food
restaurant(andfavored“stagingground”forfights[Anderson1999]).Chadhadasensitive
stomachandparticulartastes,soheaskedfortheguacamoleandotherdressingstobeserved
on the side. Jerry ordered the food, so Chad insisted that he make it a special order. Upon
returning to the apartment, Chadsat downon the couch and opened his Styrofoam box of
food.Heinspecteditforamoment.Theguacamolewasintheburrito.AccordingtoJerry,
Chadthoughthe“orderedhisfoodwrong.AndIthoughtIordereditrightandtheymessed
up.Sowestartedarguingaboutit.”
Standingtensionsintheirrelationshipmayhavebeenrelevant.AccordingtoJerry,they
already had a “history.” Being “two of the biggest guys in the group,” Jerry explained,
“We’rekindofcompetitive….Like,before,we’vecomesortofclosetofighting.Justover
stupidstuff.”Theyhadn’tactuallyfought“forreal,”buttheyhadengagedinplayfulfeatsof
strength,includingwhatJerrycalled“wrestlingmatcheswhereeveryonewatched.”
The previous day they had spent at least twelve hours in a car together on the drive to
TucsonfromSanFrancisco,whereJerrywasstudyingphilosophyataprivateuniversityand
Chad was working full-time as a plumber. According to their friends, Chad felt Jerry had
been acting academically superior. This wouldn’t have been an entirely unusual complaint
duringJerry’s“metaphysicalphase”(atthetime,suchcomplaintswereoccasionallyvoiced
againstmanyofthoseattendingcollege,probablyincludingmyself).
A critical turning point came when Chad and Jerry started to view the argument as
personallyinsulting,possiblyinlightoftheseprevioustensions.CarolinerecalledthatJerry
was shouting something along the lines of “Don’t tell me how it comes” and Chad was
yellingthingslike“I’mnotstupid”(emphasisadded).Bythen,itseems,eachsawtheother
as unfairly challenging his personal competence, and both were attempting to negate the
challengetoselfhoodinincreasinglyhostilefashion.
Jerry attempted a face-saving move.Tosimply walk away wouldhave been too humil-
iating—animplicitadmissionthat,notonlycouldhenotdefendhisownclaimsofpersonal
competenceandautonomy,butalsothathehadunfairlychallengedChad’s.So,instead,as
Jerry told me, he announced, “Well, I’m leaving. Cause otherwise I’m gonna have to kick
yourass,”andwalkedoutoftheapartment.
Jerry’s move was a more complex solution to the dilemma than it might appear at first
glance (even if a misguided one, given the outcome below). He was willing to exit the
situation without a fight if he could have the last word, but his last word was an indirect
proposal to fight, thus leaving Chad in an immediate crisis: Either accept the proposal to
fightpromptly,orsuffertheenduringhumiliationoftakingtheinsult.
Chadtookaquickmomenttoconsiderhisnextmove,silentlylookingathisburritowhile
Jerry walked out. As fighters see it, failing to respond to an insult or challenge, in effect,
admits to being unwilling or unable to defend one’s right to dignity. What to do? Chad
picked up the burrito, stormed outside, and shoved it right in Jerry’s face. This was also a
subtler move than one might think. It symbolically reversed their relative standing in the
situation. Jerry had used the burrito to humiliate Chad and challenge his “face,” in the
figurative sense (Goffman 1967). Now, Chad was humiliating Jerry with the same burrito,
stuffingitbackintoJerry’sface,literally.10JerryimmediatelygrabbedChadinaheadlock.
9Iusepseudonymsandconcealexactlocations.
10SeealsoFoucault(1977,chap.1)andKatz(1988,34–36).