Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics

233 Pages·2008·0.75 MB·English

by  Achtenberg, Deborah.

COGNITION OF VALUE
IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

COGNITION OF VALUE
IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
Promise of Enrichment,
Threat of Destruction
Deborah Achtenberg
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS
Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2002 State University of New York
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Achtenberg, Deborah, 1951–
Cognition of value in Aristotle’s ethics : promise of enrichment, threat of destruction /
Deborah Achtenberg.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-5371-5 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-5372-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Aristotle—Ethics. I. Title.
B491.E7 A245 2002
171'.3—dc21
2001055011
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
In memory of
Gail and Irving Achtenberg

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1. Valuable Particulars 13
2. Ethics and Moral Theory 19
3. Ethics and Metaphysics 61
4. The Mean 97
5. Analogy, Habit, Beauty, Unexpectedness 123
6. Emotions as Perceptions of Value 159
Conclusion: Imaginative Construction 179
Notes 191
Bibliography 207
Index 215
vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I have worked on this book for many years. It has been a solitary pro-
ject, reflecting interests and concerns that have appeared to be my own.
Still, there are some people whose responses to parts of this project have
aided or encouraged me.
First, I would like to thank Stewart Umphrey for working with me
on previous stages of this work when I was a student at the Graduate
Faculty of the New School for Social Research. Thanks also to the orga-
nizers of the Conference on the Virtues at the University of San Diego
for showing interest in the first essay I wrote on the topics discussed in
this book, and to Alasdair MacIntyre for the interest he showed in
aspects of my work that relate to his project and Martha Nussbaum for
encouraging comments on the original sketch of this project.
Emily Hauptmann’s comments on an essay that was a spin-off of this
book while it was in progress were insightful and helpful. Charles Young’s
comments on chapters 2, 3, and 6 were incisive and usefully critical. I
wonder if I have responded well enough to them. Alasdair MacIntyre’s
comments on chapter 3 were thought-provoking. I hope I have answered
his questions about that chapter in the other chapters of the book.
I do not think that any author is fully responsible for the contents
of his or her work, since I do not think culture works that way. Instead,
I think culture creates a work as much as a work contributes to culture.
To the extent, though, that an author is responsible for what he or she
writes, I, and none of those just mentioned, am responsible for the guid-
ing themes, claims, and intellectual preoccupations in this book. Because
I took them to be different enough from those found in other recent
books on Aristotle, I set out to write this book, little knowing the num-
ber of topics I would have to consider in order to bring the book to what
counts for a conclusion.
ix