Table Of ContentS T - L O
(7 July -19 July 1944)
American Forces in Action Series
Historical Division
WAR DEPARTMENT
AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES
To Bizerte With the II Corps
Papuan Campaign: The Buna-Sanananda Operation
Salerno: American Operations from the Beaches to the Volturno
Volturno: From the Volturno to the Winter Line
Merrill's Marauders
Fifth Army at the Winter Line
Omaha Beachhead
The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division
Guam: Operations of the 77th Division
The Capture of Makin
Small Unit Actions
Facsimile Reprint, 1984, 1994
CMH Pub 100-13
Center of Military History
United States Army
Washington, D.C.
For sale by the U$ Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documentll, Mail Stop: SSOP. Washington, IX: 20402-9328
11
FOREWORD
In a nation at war, teamwork by the whole people is necessary for victory.
Bt/t the issue is decided on the battle field, toward which all national effort
leads. The country's fate lies in the hands of its soldier citizens; in the
clash of battle is found the final test of plans, training, equipment, and
above all-the fighting spirit of units and individuals.
AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES presents detailed accounts
of particular combat operations of United States forces. To the American
public, this record of high achievement by men who served their Nation
well is presented as a preface to the full military history of World War II.
To the soldiers who took part in the perations concerned, these narratives
0
will give the opportunity to see more clearly the results of orders which
they obeyed and of sacrifices which they and their comrades made, in per
formance of missions that find their meaning in the outcome of a larger
pla1l of battle.
~7,u~A.··t.Ht
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Chief of Staff
111
WAR DEPARTMENT
Historical Division
Washington 25, D. C.
21 August 1946
Twelfth in the series of studies on particular combat operations, St-Ld
is the story of a corps in First Army during the bitter July battle that led up
to and made possible the great breakthrough from the Normandy beach
heads. This was the period of the most intense hedgerow fighting. XIX
Corps' part in it has been chosen to illustrate this type of combat. The record
of other First Army units in this operation have been covered only in outline.
This study is based upon a first narrative by 2d Lt. David Garth, prepared
in the field from military records and from notes and interviews recorded
during the operation by members of the 2d Information and Historical Service
Detachment. The manuscript of this historical officer has been edited and
partially rewritten with the help of additional documentation by Col. Charles
H. Taylor of the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff. As it is
true of all combat accounts, available information is uneven in coverage, and
field records are not free of minor errors. The results of this will be apparent
to men who participated in the action. In order that the more definitive
history of tllis operation may be as complete and correct as possible, readers
are urged to send all comments, criticisms, and additional data to the Historical
Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.
All photographs were taken by members of the
U. S. Army Signal Corps or other Army personnel.
DISTRIBUTION:
WDGS Divs (ra); WDSS Divs (ra); AAF (ra); AGF (ra); T (10);
Adm Sv (10); Tech Sv (10); MDW (10); GH ea 25 beds (inel TjO
& E) (1); A (10); D (I&E 0) (1); R (I&E 0) (1); S En (I&E 0)
(1) ; Special distribution.
For explanation of distribution formula, see FM 21-6.
iv
CONTENTS
Pag~
THE JULY OFFENSIVE
I
First Army's Problem . .............................................. .. .
XIX Corps' Problem.... . ........... . 5
The Enemy Side ................. . 7
XIX CORPS ATfACKS WEST OF THE VIRE (7-11 July) ...... .... . 9
The Opening Assault (7 July). 9
The //3th Cavalry Group cnters the Bridgehead (7-8 July). . ...•..... '9
Coordination Troubles (8 luly). .. . ..... _. .•.... _. 20
More Coordination Troubles (9/uly). . ........... _. . _. .............. __ .
EDort Toward Hauts·Vents (10 July) ...... ' ........ " .............. .
The Counterattack 01 Panur uhr (// July) . ..... . _. ... _. ......... _. . _. ....... .
Hauts-V",ts is Taken (// July). ........ . ................................. .
Action West 0/ the Taute (7-11 July). . .............. .
OPENING ATTACK ON ST-LO (II July). 51
The 29th Division Starts Wel/. 54
The 2d Division Takes Hill 192. 58
The 35th Division Enurs the Fight. Ii9
II Parachute Corps, II July ..... 70
XIX CORPS HAS SLOW GOING (12-14 July). 72
Limited Gains East 0/ SI·Lo (29th Division) 75
Stalemate North 0/ St-L6 (35th Division). 80
The Salient West of the Vire (30th Division) 86
First Army Progress, 11-141uly ........ . 91
LAST PHASE OF THE BATfLE ('5-20 July). .... ...... 95
Progr,'ss West 0/ the Vire (15-19/uly). . .... ... -.. _.................. 95
East of the Vire: the Attack 0/15/uly. ......... ........ 102
The Battle on Martinville Ridge (16-17 July) 107
Capture 0/ St-L6 (18-19 July) ... _. .... __ . . ...... _. .. ....... .. __ ... . . . . .. . . . " 5
ABBREVIATIONS .. ...... .. _. .... _. ... __ .. .. __ .. _. ....... _. .... __ ........ __ ..
125
CONCLUSIO r ........... _. _. .......... __ ..... _. ...... ___ ..... .
128
v
Illustrations
Pagl:'
First Army's Leader
Field Intersection 3
Group 0/ Commanders. 5
Assault Crossing Siu J2
The Bridge at St-Fromond 13
Vire-Taute Canal ......................... . 16
Commanding General, 3d Armored Division. . ....... . 17
Tangled Traffic 21
Hedgerow Gaps. 26
Close Country Favored the Defense 27
Afler the Counterattack 30
Rouu 0/ Task Foru Y ... 30
The Highway to Pont-H~bert. 34
Poor Country lor Tanks. . ...... . 39
A Pair 01 Panthcr Tanks ....... ......... . 40
The Hauts-Vents Crossroads... . ............ . ...... . 43
View West From Hauts-Vents .......... . . 45
German Mark V (Panther) Tank 46
Hedgerow Battlefield. . ...... . 47
Railway Station in Stow 49
Looking North Across St-L6 ..................................... .
52
29th Division Commander 54
Prongs lor Hedgerow Work 56
Coming Through the Gap 56
Fixiflg Demolitions. 57
View North From Hill 192. 61
German Shelter. 64
A Min.·field Casualty 66
35th Division Commander 69
German Antitank Guns 71
An Individual Firing Position .... .......... ... . 73
Martinville Ridge 77
Communications Problems 80
M achi71e·Gu71 Position. 81
Hedgerow Defenses 83
German Machine-Gun Position. 83
Sunkcn Road. 84
View From a German OP. . ........... . 85
The Pont-Hebert Bridge ....... . 90
lump·OU Ground lor COBRA ........ . ......................... . 92
VII Corps Commander ....... ... . ................................ . 96
German Mark IV Tank . . .. . . . ........... ....... . . ................. , . 99
A Dc/ended Lanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . .. . . . ....... . 101
The Martinville Ridge ........... .......... . .... ... ...... ....... . 104
Village 0/ Emetic . . . . . . . .. . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . 105
La Madeleine Crossroads . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . .. . ...... ..... ........ . 1I2
Every Hedgerow was Defended ... ........ . ... .............. ..... " .. ... ...... . "3
Going Alter Snipers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ................. ..... ... . ....... . Il6
Entry Into St-LO . .. . ... .. . . .......... ......... . ll8
Action in St-w. . . . . . . . .. . ............................... ............ ....... _ . " 9
Ruins 0/ St-LO. . .... ... ...... ... _ . . . .... ... . . ...... . 120
Honor to a Leader ......... . 121
The Shell 01 a Norman City 122
Communications Through St-La. 12i
vi
Maps
No. Pag~
I Plan 0/ Attack, Joth Division, 7 July 1944. 10
2 Vire Crossing, 117th Inl. Positions at noon, 7 July 1944 ... ........ . 11
3 The First Day's Bridgehead, Night positions, 7 July 1944 ........... . 14
4 The Bridgehead, 8 July, Positions at the end 0/ the day ................ , .... . 18
5 Attack 01 9 luly, 30th Division. 24
6 German Counterattack. Afternoon of 9 July 1944· 28
7 Panzer Lehr Counterattack, 10-[ I July 1944. 32
8 Capture 0/ Hauts-Vents, II July 1944. . ... 44
9 29th Division Attack. I I July 1944 .......... . 55
10 The Attack on Hill 192, 2d Division, 1J July 1944 ... ..................... . 59
II 23d Inlantry at Hill '92, Ii July '944.. . . ......... . 60
12 35th Division Attock, II July 1944 .......... . ........... . 68
13 29th Division, 12 /uly 1944. . .. . . ............................... . 74
14 29th Division, J 3 July 1944· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . 78
15 35th Division, 12-14 /uly.. ....... . . .................. . 82
16 German Positions on 10 Mare-Ie Carillon N . . . . . .......... . 85
17 W<st 01 th< Vir<, 12-14 luly 1944 88
18 West of the Vire, 30th Division, 15-16 Ju/y 1944· 94
19 Final Gains, 30th Division, 17-191uly 1944. 98
20 Bottl< East 01 St-Le, 15-16 July 1944. 103
21 35th Division, 15-18 July ... 106
22 Fall 01 St-Le, 17-18 Jtlly 1944· III
Maps I-VII are in attached envelope
[ Normandy Front, 2 July 1944
II First Army Zone, 2 !uly 1944
//I XIX Corps Z01l<, 6 luly 1944
IV First Army Zon<, ]-11 July 1944
V XIX Corps, 11-14 Jtlly
VI XIX Corps, 15-20 July
VII First Army Zone, /J-20 luly
vii
I
FIRST ARj\IY'S LEADER in the July oDensive that culminatcd in
destructioll of German Seventh Army: Lt. Gen. Ornor N. Bradley.
THE JULY OFFENSIVE
ST-LO, capital of the department of Manche, hedgerow battle can be used to illustrate, in tac
can be used as one symbol for First U. S. tical detail, the character of the larger action.
Army's victory in a most difficult and bloody The advance which reached St-Lo is tl,e story
phase of the Campaign of Normandy: the "Battle of XIX Corps, aided by the action of the 2d
of the Hedgerows," during the first three weeks Division of V Corps on its left flank.
of July 1944. Other names figure in this battle.
La Haye-du-Puits, Periers, Hill 192, like St-L{"
First Army's Problem
will be remembered by First Army soldiers fwm
a background of stubborn struggle for gains too During the period required for VII Corps to
often measured in terms of a few hundred yards, capture Cherbourg and clean up the Cotentin
or of two or three fields, conquered against a bit Peninsula, the Allied line to the south had re
terly resisting enemy. mained relatively stable. To tlre east, British Sec
Much more was at stake in the Battle of the ond Army was still fighting toward Caen against
Hedgerows than possession of a communications heavy concentrations of enemy armor (seven divi
center on the Vire River. In June, First Army sions as of 30 June), employed in frequent coun
and British Second Army had won their beach terattacks. From Caumont to Carentan, and west
heads and had captured Cherbourg (26 June). across tlre peninsula, First U. S. Army had been
Supplies and reinforcements were building up for holding the positions gained by 20 June and re
a powerful offensive, designed to break out of the grouping forces as the build-up increased them.
Normandy pocket and scheduled to be mounted (See Map I at end of book.') To critics who
in the First Army zone. But more room and bet were ignorant of General Eisenhower's plans and
ter jump-off positions for the crucial offensive tlre immense problems of supply and build-up,
were needed before this blow could be delivered. it appeared that the Allied attack had lost momen
The attack that began in early July was planned tum and tlrat Allied forces were becoming in
to gain this ground, on a front of 25 miles. Four volved in the type of static warfare which they
corps, employing ultimately 12 divisions, were in had sought to avoid. Such critics were hardly
volved in the effort. All these units faced similar reassured by the progress of First Army's offen
problems of advance, and all contributed to the sive after it opened on 3 July. The fact that this
measure of success achieved. Therefore, in the offensive had limited objectives, and was a pre
larger tactical sense it would be unfair to identify liminary for a definitive breakthrough effort,
the Battle of the Hedgerows with St-L{, and later would only be shown by future developments.
military studies, treating the Campaign of Nor The map of First Army's zone (Map II) shows
mandy in different scope, will give the operation clearly some of the considerations which dictated
in truer proportions. Here, one phase of the
Maps numocred in Roman arc found at the end, in sequence.
1
I
