Table Of ContentOther titles of interest
BROWN, L. B.
Psychology in Contemporary China
CHEN, T. H.
Chinese Education since 1949
DJERASSI, N.
Glimpses of China from a Galloping Horse
LOZOYA, J.
Asia and the New International Economic Order
MAXWELL, N.
China's Road to Development, second edition
POSTLETHWAITE, T. N. and THOMAS, R. M.
Primary and Secondary Education in the ASEAN Countries
RODZINSKI, W.
A History of China, Vols. 1 and 2
SIGURDSON, J.
Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China
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CHINA'S
CHANGED ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT
Edited by
NEVILLE MAXWELL
Contemporary China Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, UK
and
BRUCE McFARLANE
University of Adelaide, Australia
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First edition 1984
Reprinted 1986
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
China's changed road to development.
(Pergamon international library of science, technology,
engineering, and social studies) Bibliography: p.
1. China — Economic conditions — 1976 —
— Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. China — Social
conditions — 1976— —Addresses, essays, lectures.
3. China — Economic policy — 1976— —Addresses,
essays, lectures. 4. China — Social policy —
1976— —Addresses, essays, lectures.
I. Maxwell, Neville George Anthony.
II. McFarlane, Bruce J. III. Series.
EC427.92.C46465 1984 338.951
83-23679
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
China's changed road to development.
1. China — Economic conditions — 1976—
I. Maxwell, Neville II. McFarlane, Bruce
330.951'057 HC427.92
ISBN 0-08-030849-X (Hardcover)
ISBN 0-08-030850-3 (Flexicover)
Printed in Great Britain by A. Wheaton & Co. Ltd., Exeter
Preface
NEVILLE MAXWELL
Contemporary China Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, UK
BRUCE MCFARLANE
University of Adelaide, Australia
There is sharp disagreement among Western towards socialism are seen as inseparable and
observers about the new course China has taken mutually reinforcing. The differences between
since 1976, and how to evaluate it. That China the two schools are more than tactical, since the
radicals hold that policies which fail to consoli-
has quit what used to be called 'the Maoist road
date and advance socialism for that reason under-
to development' is evident, but the disagreement
mine it — that policies which encourage the re-
begins with efforts to describe China's 'new
assertion of individualism and its offspring, privilege
road' and to discern its destination. Considera- and hierarchy, in effect work towards restoration
tion of the nature of what the post-Mao Chinese and the emergence in China of a class society on
leadership describes as 'pragmatic reforms' Soviet lines. A fundamental ideological divide
turns to their social implications and thence to thus underlies differences over development
the political ideology they express. Here the strategy. This means that the changes of course,
system's self-definitions cease to serve, so a the angles in the zigzag, are abrupt and politically
convulsive; while the current ideological expression
broader question may be posed. For whom?
will always repudiate that of the previous phase,
For whose benefit is China's development
and denigrate its economic achievements.
now being planned? And then, perhaps, by
whom? In the periods of Mao's predominance It was already apparent in 1979 that another
development planning by specialists was repu- change of course in China was in the making,
diated; the answers would, it was maintained, only the sharpness of the turn was still in
be thrown up by the experience, the practice, question. Would that come to be seen as a
of China's working multitudes, organized in 'right turn', corrective of Maoist emphases now
the countryside in their new cooperative com- judged 'ultra left'? Or would it go much further,
munities, in the industrial sector in factories as some evidence already suggested, and become
under varying degrees of worker control. Now a U-turn — not just a correction of course, but
that the specialists and the managers have a reversal? Those questions are still at issue, so
come triumphantly back into their own, are sharply indeed that, after a rare period of con-
the interests of the great majority of the sensus in the field of China studies that began
Chinese as well served as they were? Or, as in the early 1970s, approaches and positions
those who speak for China's new order claim, are now again becoming conflictual. So the
better? Conference convened in September 1982 by
Four years ago, in the Preface to a previous the Contemporary China Centre at Oxford had
collection of papers on 'China's Road to as its purpose the clarification of such conflict-
Development',* Maxwell wrote: ing views, and, if possible, their harmonization.
The Conference was therefore given the title,
China's road to development has followed a 'China in Transition', and in the opening
zigzag course. The alternate stretches can be
session, the question was put, 'Transition —
signposted 'right' or 'left' in terms of the priority
from what? to what?'
given to economic over political goals. On right-
ward stretches, under the direction of the group
From an ultra-left phase of Maoist excesses that
in the Chinese Communist Party whom Western had left the Chinese people wounded and their
observers call 'moderates', priority is given to economy stagnant; to a corrective period of prag-
economic growth, and the implementation of matic reforms, in which yesterday's maxims can
socialist values is made a long-range objective.
On the leftward stretches, when 'radicals' are
in control, economic development and progress * Second edition (Pergamon Press, 1979).
v
vi NEVILLE MAXWELL AND BRUCE MCFARLANE
be dismissed as shibboleths, and the revolutionary with the State and 'enriching' themselves, but
leadership concentrates on policies aimed at birth control policies have been disrupted
improving the economic condition of the masses? (Croll), education policy for rural people
Or . . .
seriously undermined (Keating) and control
From a period in which the Maoist leadership
over movement of peasants to towns weakened
sought and struggled for a social and economic
(Blecher).
strategy that would consolidate the revolution by
carrying it onward to a further stage, in the direction In the management of more modern sectors
of greater equality and fuller participation by the of the economy profound changes in attitudes
people in China in controlling and managing their in political economy may be detected. Selden
own lives; to a phase of reversal that reflects the argues these were necessary to end excesses of
restoration to power of the emergent elite chal- various speed-up campaigns and 'Left turns';
lenged in the Cultural Revolution, which has re- McFarlane shows the impact of political as well
formed economic strategy to serve its own class
as economic cycles on the broad course of
interest?
social development; Ishikawa lays out the
Such was the formulation that informed conditions under which centralized and de-
discussion around the papers submitted for centralized models can succeed in avoiding
the Conference, the majority of which are structural disequilibrium of the economy and
included in this collection. establishing a reasonable long-term growth
The papers published in this book cover the rate.
issues one needs to make an informed judg- What were the reasons that prompted major
ment about the very different attitudes to changes in trie organization of the economy, of
social and economic development that have its major sectors and China's basic social
emerged in China since 1978. The authors tell policies? The authors of this book show they
us the details about the new policies in the derived from the actual experience of centrali-
economy, agriculture, industry, as well as new zation of economic and political power in the
measures in relation to population, education, Mao period — experiences which promoted a
income distribution and political power. They thirst for decentralization, even if the practical
also indicate how much of the Marxism of Mao, consequences of this change were not fully
and, indeed of Marxism itself, has been jetti- thought out.
soned to fit in with new precepts and an Arising from the studies here by Pairault,
alternative 'vision' as to how Chinese society White and Lockett-Littler is the obvious link
should operate. which has eluded the planners of China in the
A common theme in most of the papers past — that between price policy and decentral-
that follow is that the process of transition ized economic mechanisms. If output decisions
from capitalism to socialism has, from the are decentralized, knowledge of the global
beginning, been complicated by the fact that situation can only be transmitted by price
the overwhelming majority of the population indicators (whether these be actual transactions-
has consisted of peasant households, and those prices or accounting prices). What comes
employed in industry; science and technology through in the surveys of the Chinese debates
only a small (if compact) minority. The four published here is that 'economic reformers' in
modernizations aim to bring a quick, even that country, in their opposition to continuance
abrupt change in this situation by 2000 AD. of the centralized planning system, often do
This would mean that ideologies and policies not distinguish the many different kinds of
based on priority to socialization within agri- prices (with different functions) in a socialist
culture ('narrowing the three great differentials', economy. They adopt a simpliste attitude to
rural egalitarianism within communes) would this question and often make uncritical use of
become less relevant. It would mean that a analogy with a free market economy. Yet our
serious challenge would be mounted to the authors also show that the debate in China is
contention that under socialism markets and vigorous, that a kind of revival of the NEP of
market-relations would disappear — important Soviet Russia of the 1920s is under way and
political ideas dominant 1968—76. that broader questions of workers' rights and
It is shown in the essays of Watson, Blecher, self-management in economic units are beginning
Keating and Croll that economic and social to be seriously discussed.
policies related to agriculture have been over- The political implications of changes in the
turned in the years since Mao's death. Not only degree of decentralization in the economy are
has the Chinese Communist Party and State important. Kraus shows that new privileged
tolerated a massive flight from communes to social strata are the strongest proponents of
a system of peasant households contracting the reforms. Saich indicates how the Chinese
PREFACE vii
Communist Party is having to learn how to The international shock-waves of this new
share power with state institutions, managers course have been felt on many overseas left
and even peasant associations, and to change its movements and countries, and, as Kim con-
style of work. Accompanying these, as Brugger cludes, has brought into question the policy
and Mackerras indicate, there has been an of self-reliant development in Third World
ideological re-vamping of Chinese Marxist countries and China's alliance with Western
precepts, including re-evaluation of key elements and Eastern radicals opposing 'dependency'
in the thinking of Mao and a re-writing of the by the Third World on European and Japanese
history of the Party and of China's post- centres of economic power.
revolution experience.
The Logic-and Limits-of Chinese
Socialist Development
MARK SELDEN*
Department of Sociology, State University of New York, Binghamton
Summary. - In many ways 1949-55 was a golden age of Chinese socialism because progress in
cooperation was achieved with minimum violence. When the pace was forced after that, peasant
mistrust grew. Successes in the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution were short-lived,
illusory, or at best in the earlier period there were fewer zig-zags in ideology and in economic
policy of the sort which came with the Great Leap. However, wild swings of this kind are apt to
divert us from the continuities which come out of the power structure, the class structure and
the decision to promote a rapid rate of economic growth. These include the institutional
transformation of the economy; economic planning; expanded state welfare functions; the
effort to avoid foreign dominance; elimination of exploitation and of certain kinds of social
inequalities. The limits to socialist development appear to be set by the size of agricultural
surplus that can be extracted without exacerbating tensions and the high rate of investment
that industrialization requires. On the political front, the limits are set by peasant attitudes to
government policy, the power of structural hierarchies (and their associated vested interests)
and excessive Party interference in areas of social life best left to more democratic decision-
making processes.
How are we to comprehend the sharp swings economy centred in state and co-
of the policy pendulum which stand as the most operative (or collective) institutions;
distinctive feature of China's socialist develop- 2. Planned economy;
ment since the 1950s? The present essay seeks 3. Expanded political, economic, educa-
to identify sources of this pattern of dramatic tional and welfare functions of the
and often quite unexpected changes with respect Party-state, penetrating and trans-
to the rural areas where the Chinese Communist forming economy and society.
Party had developed its most distinctive ap- B. Rapid economic development and the
proaches to revolutionary change, where many improvement of the livelihood of the
believe it to have achieved its most impressive people. Industry, particularly state-owned
feats but where, as recent events make plain, heavy industry, would lead the way, but
the problems have been and remain formidable. agricultural development was vital to the
Before turning to the tensions and conflicts achievement of national goals.
which have produced the zig-zags alluded to C. Breaking the fetters of foreign domina-
above, we note certain structural and policy tion and the achievement of worldwide
continuities, some so axiomatic as to be beyond recognition of the Chinese nation. China
debate or challenge by major groups within would emphasize self-reliance while seek-
the Party-state, throughout these tumultuous ing appropriate allies.
decades. D. Elimination of exploitation and of certain
The following explicit core goals of China's inequalities, notably:
socialist development have been shared by all 1. Those exploitative relationships asso-
significant elements of the Chinese leadership ciated with the landlord, capitalist and
throughout the People's Republic. merchant classes;
2. Relations of inequality between women
and men, minority and Han, and
A. Institutional formation and transforma- *I am grateful for the critical comments of Victor
tion, including: Nee on the draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer
1. Ownership and management of the is particularly apt in this case.
1
2 MARK SELDEN
(eventually) those between rural and First, thorough-going institutional transforma-
urban people. tion coincided with, even contributed to, rapid
economic recovery and growth, the expansion
These goals, lent urgency by the formidable
of state sector administrative and industrial
economic and political tasks following decades
jobs, the reduction of property-based forms of
of national humiliation, foreign invasion and
inequality, and improved living standards for
social disintegration, provided a basis for a
most rural and urban people. Second, the
national leadership consensus around core
changes rested on high levels of consensus
propositions of socialist development. Beneath
within the Party-state leadership with respect
the surface, however, lay profoundly different
both to long-term goals and concrete policy
assessments of the relative priority of these
measures for their step by step achievement.
sometimes conflicting goals, different ap-
proaches to their realization, and the clash of Chinese rural policy in the early years of
interests of groups and sectors within the the People's Republic marked a striking depar-
Chinese polity. ture from the Stalinist strategy which sacrificed
the countryside in the course of imposed col-
In retrospect, what seems most extraordinary
lectivization to developmental goals centred on
is the broad unity within the Chinese leader-
heavy industry and the cities. The distinctive
ship and its ability to forge a popular consensus
features of Chinese practice, building on
as it initiated the re-fashioning of the Chinese
important lessons derived from the symbiotic
state and society. Beginning with land reform,
relationship of Party and rural producers estab-
initiated in 1947 in the midst of civil war,
lished during the years of anti-Japanese resis-
continuing through the formation of new Party
tance and civil war, included the following: first,
and state institutions and the promulgation of
social change could proceed no faster than
the fundamental laws of the People's Republic
popular consciousness of and desire for change.
by 1950, it included the initial stages of institu-
This was the basis for mobilization of the rural
tional transformation, involving the restructur-
majority in land reform and in state supported
ing of the class relations in agriculture, industry
efforts to promote small-scale mutual aid teams
and commerce. These changes were not affected
and cooperatives. Second, popular support
without conflict. The early land reform in
rested on implementation of policies which
particular involved intense struggle and resulted
boosted the incomes of most rural producers.
in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Neverthe-
This was realized both during the drive in the
less, beginning in the late 1940s the passage to
early 1950s to encourage households to enrich
state ownership of vital sectors of national
themselves and in the explicit promise of early
industry and commerce, the beginnings of
cooperatives that they would ensure mutual
mutual aid and cooperation in agriculture and
prosperity (gongtong fuyu). Third, local innova-
handicrafts, and the creation of a rudimentary
tion and adaptation was encouraged so that
planning network, proceeded without serious
new cooperative forms would be suitable to
disruption. The bases for a national consensus
local conditions and local preferences. Fourth,
rested on the Communist Party's demonstrated
the leadership achieved fair success in imple-
achievements during the anti-Japanese resistance
menting gradual, voluntary institutional develop-
and civil war, the widespread recognition of
ment by stages. The long-term vision of collecti-
the bankruptcy of the earlier social order, and
vized agriculture on the Soviet model would be
the perception that state policies were working
achieved, according to the leadership consensus
to the advantage of the great majority including
of the early 1950s, in conjunction with mechani-
the rural and urban producers and intellectuals.
zation, a process requiring a minimum of several
Particularly important is the fact that the
five-year plans to complete. In this view,
major changes — including some involving
technological advance would demonstrate to
direct conflicts of interest - produced improve-
rural producers the material benefits of large-
ment in the livelihood of the majority of people
scale collective agriculture, and the collectiviza-
in the initial stages of institutional transforma-
tion process, building on decades of small-scale
tion, planned accumulation, and industrial 1
cooperation, would then permit a voluntary
growth. Remarkably, all this was accomplished
transition.
while China fought a draining civil war followed
almost immediately by the Korean War and in If these points constitute a leadership con-
the face of blockade and economic boycott by sensus on principles of rural development in the
the United States and other leading powers. early 1950s, in practice sharp conflicts developed
To sum up, the achievements in the transi- centred on competing conceptions of sectoral
tional years from the civil war to the early investment priorities (agriculture, light industry
People's Republic rested on two foundations. and heavy industry), rates of accumulation, the
THE LOGIC - AND LIMITS - OF CHINESE SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT 3
appropriate speed of viable institutional trans- In relation to the landlords and the capitalists our
formation, and the role of market and plan in aim is to complete expropriation. But we shall not
tolerate any violence towards the middle peasantry
the national economy.
. . . coercion would ruin the whole cause. What is
Three important sets of policy decisions
required here is prolonged educational work. We
implemented in 1954, in the autumn of 1955 have to give the peasant, who not only in our
to the spring of 1956, and in 1958-60, initiated country but all over the world is a practical man
a course which undermined both in practice and a realist, concrete examples to prove that
and in theory the above-stated core principles, cooperation is the best possible thing . . . coopera-
set the state on a collision course with the rural tives must be so organized as to gain the confidence
population, destroyed the leadership con- of the peasants. And until then we are pupils of
sensus and eventually sowed the seeds for the the peasants and not their teachers. . .. Nothing is
2 more stupid than the very idea of applying coer-
collapse of collective agriculture which is in 3
cion in economic relations with the middle
progress in the early 1980s.
peasants.
As China embarked on her first five-year
plan in 1953, the state imposed high rates of There is abundant evidence from the internal
accumulation on the countryside for investment and public policy debates on cooperative trans-
in the urban industrial sector. Heavy industry formation that the Chinese leadership recognized
was the focus of national investment, and rural the necessity to adhere to policies which pro-
handicrafts and private markets were deliber- tected the interests not only of the poorest
ately constricted as both competed with the strata but also of the middle peasants as well to
state for resources. The heart of the problem ensure the creation of cooperatives which could
was the conflict between a state bent on ensure both equitable growth and rising rural
centralizing resources for modern processing incomes.
and export, and rural handicrafts and private In the summer of 1955, two events set China
marketing which could contribute to expanding on a new course. First, the five-year plan, with
incomes and a pattern of decentralized rural its ambitious targets and focus on heavy industry
accumulation. The state won. In 1953 —54, the to the detriment of light industry and agri-
combination of state controls on marketing and culture, was finalized and published. And
handicrafts and excessive tax and grain sales second, with Mao Zedong throwing his authority
quotas (forcing Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and behind a new drive, plans for gradual voluntary
other leaders to apologize and re-allocate grain cooperation were discarded. In a matter of
to the countryside) cut into rural incomes in months, large collectives were being organized
ways that set back the contemporary drive everywhere. Collectivization was virtually com-
to build cooperation on foundations of mutual pleted throughout the Chinese countryside in
prosperity. Meanwhile differences grew over the just six months, that is at a speed far greater
pace of cooperative formation with some leaders than that achieved in the Soviet Union. Several
urging acceleration but the majority in the features of China's instant, imposed collectivi-
Central Committee and Politburo contending zation bear note. Mao Zedong put forward
that cooperation had proceeded too fast so that three important reasons for abandoning previous
some units existed in name only or could be cooperative principles. These were, first, the
sustained only by means of coercion. By the necessity for decisive action to assure that the
spring of 1955, backlash against excessive ambitious production targets of the five-year
state procurement and pressures toward co- plan would be reached; second, the perception
operative formation had produced a leadership that growing class polarization in the rural areas
consensus to ease the financial and organiza- jeopardized the entire process of socialist
tional pressures on the countryside. It appeared transformation; and finally, that the poor
to represent a return to first principles. peasants were urging, even demanding, collecti-
From Marx and Engels through Lenin, Stalin vization as the only way forward. In addition
and leaders of several socialist states, we note a to these factors, a fourth which was undoubtedly
recognition of the sensitivity of the 'agrarian important in securing the support of grassroots
problem', that is of integrating rural producers cadres, was the fact that these cadres faced
into a socialist developing society. But it was a great difficulties in coping with the complexi-
sensitivity which would more often than not be ties of a mixed private—cooperative economy.
honoured in the breach as it conflicted with Close reading of the contemporary docu-
more pressing goals. Lenin once put the point mentation reveals that already by the summer
at issue well in a prescient statement which also of 1955 it had become clear that in the absence
sheds light on the most glaring failures of subse- of a dramatic change, China would indeed fall
quent Soviet collectivization policy: far short of unrealistically high plan targets.
4 MARK SELDEN
Collectivization did, moreover, increase state tion in the fields. But those achievements were
access to the agricultural surplus, but only at won at a very high price, including betrayal of
a very heavy cost to the countryside, to rural promises to rural producers of gradual, volun-
producers, and to future production. Second, tary cooperation. The large new collectives
although we can find examples of some peasants lacked the experience and technological founda-
losing their land and others prospering through tion for outproducing the smaller-scale pro-
the market, the weight of evidence convincingly ducers, and above all they lacked an effective
presented by Vivienne Shue and others suggests system of incentives which would encourage
4
that policies of gradual transition were curbing collective members to surpass the economic
rural inequalities. Third, there is abundant performance of private farmers and smaller
evidence of peasant willingness to participate in cooperatives. The Party-state and China's
well-run small cooperatives which boosted hundreds of millions of rural producers were
household incomes, but I have been able to moving toward an antagonistic relationship.
find no credible evidence of the demand by But if China's imposed collectivization pro-
poor or any other rural producers for collecti- duced major problems, the fact is that the pro-
vization which involved the transfer of land cess was not only completed with extraordinary
and other resources from the household to speed but (it appears) in the absence of major
village-wide or even multi-village units and violence. To be sure, millions of pigs and cows
required large-scale organization of agriculture were slaughtered and eaten, but damage to
for which there was little precedent. As we will livestock and other property was on a scale far
note, resistance to the change — by no means smaller than that in the Soviet Union, and
confined to the prosperous — strongly suggests agricultural production did not collapse. The
otherwise. Fourth, imposed collectivization differences lay above all in the credibility of
simplified rural organization in the sense of the Chinese leadership after several decades
establishing a single administrative and owner- of successful rural work, and the high degree
ship pattern across the countryside, but it also of state penetration to the village level well
presented immense organizational hurdles in- before the collectivization drive. Yet, if our
volved in non-mechanized farming on a scale analysis is correct, a collectivization process
dozens or hundreds of times larger than that of which turned its back on promises of volun-
the household which had previously been its tary participation, which ignored the wide
locus, and in a virtual absence of technical and range of experiences of diverse communities
administrative preparation for the changes. and imposed a single administrative model,
Although the model regulations for rural co- which placed particularly heavy burdens on a
operatives issued on 17 March 1956 stipulated large middle peasant stratum, which sought to
that 'the only way to ensure that the peasants organize rural production on a large scale in
take the road of cooperation voluntarily is by the virtual absence of modern inputs, and which
adherence to the principle of mutual benefit', provided a vehicle for siphoning the rural sur-
in 1955—56 the reality was an instantaneous plus out of the countryside, created formidable
process of state-imposed collectivization problems.
throughout the countryside. Recent research, and the release of important
One of the most deeply entrenched myths Chinese documentation, have clarified important
about the transformation of the countryside elements of the Great Leap Forward, particularly
is that China carried to its logical conclusion the price it imposed on the countryside. Here
gradual, voluntary cooperation culminating we wish to emphasize the ways in which the
6
in 1955-56 in the 'high tide' and the rapid leap built on and extended tendencies and
advance to full-scale collectivization. The approaches which took shape during the
reality was quite different. Nationwide col- collectivization drive. In the leap the Chinese
lectivization eliminated the largest remaining leadership carried to new heights the logic of
property-based income differentials between large-scale collectivization and elimination of
prosperous and poor households within each the market and the private sector; it encouraged
community, essentially completing the egali- ultra-accumulation and virtually limitless de-
tarian redistributive logic set in motion in the mand for labour while in practice flagrantly
land reform. It eliminated the fragmented land disregarding the livelihood of rural producers.
tenure system based on private ownership which The promises of the leap that all would realize
land reform had actually strengthened. It the fruits of abundance in a few short years as
opened new possibilities for coordinated agri- China zoomed past the most advanced industrial
cultural planning and modernization in such powers quickly gave way to the reality of mass
areas as water conservancy and capital construc- hunger, starvation and economic collapse with
