Can Franks' Practical Anarchism Avoid Moral Relativism?

18 Pages·2010·0.25 MB·English

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AnarchistDevelopmentsinCulturalStudies
“Post-Anarchismtoday”
2010.1
Can Franks’ Practical Anarchism
Avoid Moral Relativism?
∗
Thomas Swann
Abstract
BenjaminFranks’recentcontributiontothefieldofanarchistpolitical
philosophy,whathecalls‘prefigurativeorpracticalanarchism’,is
introducedpartlyinresponsetothecritiqueof‘metanarratives’made
bywriterssuchasToddMayandSaulNewman.Metanarratives,they
argue,areboth,intheory,epistemologicallysuspectand,inpractice,
repressiveofalternativeconceptionsofthegood. Thisisbecause
metanarrativesassertthevalidityofonegoalorendforhumansoci-
etyand/orindividualsandonemorallyjustifiablemodeofactingto
achievethis,thusriskingtheexclusionofothergoalsandformsof
moralagency.Framingsocialandpoliticalactionwithinmetanarra-
tivesofhumannatureisregardedbyMayandNewman,thefounders
of‘postanarchist’theory,asanessentialcharacteristicoftheclassical
anarchismsofthenineteenthcentury.WhileFranks,alongwithmany
others,iscriticalofthepostanarchistattackonclassicalanarchisms,
henonethelesssharestheirrejectionofmetanarrativesandteleology.
Thepracticalanarchismheproposesaimstobesympathetictothis
concernanddoessobyadoptingandmodifyingthesocialpractice
theoryfoundintheworkofAlasdairMacInture.Thismaycomeasa
surprisegivenMacIntyre’spositionasoneofthestrongestcontempo-
rarydefendersofthenotionofatelosofhumanlife(i.e.,thathuman
lifehasanaturalandrightend),butitisthisexactfeaturethatFranks’
accountofsocialpracticeseliminates.Thepurposeofthispaper,there-
fore,istoassesstheconsequencesoftherejectionofmetanarratives
andtelosforFranks’practicalanarchism.Ultimately,Iwillshowthat
withoutateleologicalapproach,practicalanarchismcollapsesinto
moralrelativismandweakensthedefinitionof‘anarchism’tosuch
anextentthatitbecomesuseless.
∗
ThomasSwanniscurrentlyapostgraduatestudentatRadboudUniversity,Nijmegen,
TheNetherlands.
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Introduction
Inarecentcontributiontothefieldofanarchistpoliticalphiloso-
phy,BenjaminFranksintroduceswhathedescribesas“aprefigura-
tiveorpracticalanarchism”(Franks,2008: 147),intendedpartlyasa
responsetothecritiqueofmoralandpoliticaluniversalismmadeby
postanarchistwriterssuchasToddMay(1994)andSaulNewman
(2001). Universalism,whichcanbeunderstoodasameta-ethicalcom-
mitmenttooneover-archingmoralstandardagainstwhichclaimsof
whatis‘good’and‘bad’canbejudgedtobe‘true’or‘false’,isargued,
bythepostanarchists,tobebothintheoryepistemologicallysuspect
andinpracticerepressiveofalternativeconceptionsofthegood. Ex-
plainingsocialandpoliticalactionwithinauniversalistframework
ofhumannatureisregardedbyMayandNewmanasanessential
characteristicoftheclassicalanarchismsofthenineteenthcentury.
WhileFranks(2007), alongwithothers(e.g., Cohn, 2002; Cohn&
Wilbur, 2003; Glavin, 2004), is critical of the postanarchist attack
onclassicalanarchisms,henonethelesssharesintheirrejectionof
moraluniversalism. Thepracticalanarchismheproposesaimstobe
sympathetictothistypicallypoststructuralistconcernwhileatthe
sametimeprovidingafoundationforethicalaction,andhedoesso
byadoptingthesocialpracticetheoryfoundintheworkofAlasdair
MacIntyre. ThismaycomeassurprisegivenMacIntyre’sposition
(1999: x)inrecentyearsasastaunchdefenderoftheideaofmoral
universalism,basinghisaccountonaformofbiologicalessentialism
wherebyhumanbeingsareunderstoodashavinganaturaltelos,an
end towards which their actions ought to aim. However, Franks
takeshisinspirationinsteadfromMacIntyre’sinitialworkonsocial
practicetheory,whichechoespoststructuralism’srejectionofclaims
touniversalmoraltruth(Franks,2008: 138).
Inthisarticle,Iintendtodiscusstheimplicationsoftherejection
ofmoraluniversalismforasocialpracticebasedaccountofanarchist
ethics. Ifitisthecase,asthelaterMacIntyreargues,thatsuchan
ethical theory is left lacking without a universal teleology that is
commontoallsocialpracticesandwhichinformstheethicalactions
oftheagentsinvolvedtherein,thenFranks’spracticalanarchismwill
beopentocritique. Ultimately,Iwillshowthatwithoutanappeal
touniversalism,practicalanarchismcollapsesintomoralrelativism
and,inaddition,weakenstheverydefinitionof“anarchism”tosuch
anextentthatitbecomesuseless.
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CanFranks’PracticalAnarchismAvoidMoralRelativism? 201
1. SocialPracticesandtheRejectionofMoralUniversalism
MacIntyre(1985: 187)describessocialpracticesinthefollowing,
oft-quotedway:
By ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex
formofsociallyestablishedcooperativehumanactivitythrough
whichgoodsinternaltothatformofactivityarerealizedinthe
courseoftryingtoachievethosestandardsofexcellencewhich
areappropriateto,andpartiallydefinitiveof,thatformofac-
tivity,withtheresultthathumanpowerstoachieveexcellence,
andhumanconceptionsoftheendsandgoodsaresystemati-
callyextended.
ThetwomostimportantaspectsofthisdefinitionforMacIntyre’s
ethicsasawholeare,firstly,thenotionofgoodsinternaltopractices
and,secondly,thestandardsofexcellenceappropriatetothepractice.
Thesecondofthese,thestandardsofexcellence,arespecificvirtues
whichethicalagentscandisplay. Thefirst,theinternalgoods,are
certain objectives of the practice which can only be achieved by
the agent displaying a virtuous character. MacIntyre (1985: 191)
writes,“Avirtueisanacquiredhumanqualitythepossessionand
exerciseofwhichtendstoenableustoachievethosegoodswhich
areinternaltopracticesandthelackofwhicheffectivelyprevents
usfromachievinganysuchgood.”Thegoalofthisarticleisnotto
assesstheconceptofvirtueorinternalgoodinMacIntyre’sorFranks’
ethics,butrathertoexaminewhatbothauthorsappealtoinorder
toshowhowcertainvirtuesandcertaininternalgoodsarejustified
morally. Inordertodoso,itisnecessarytotakealookathowsocial
practicesoperateinthesocialworldofhumanbeings. Onewayto
understandwhatMacIntyremeansbysocialpracticesistoexamine
theparallelarguments,madebyLudwigWittgensteinamongothers
(Midgely,1974;Winch,1958),thatthesocialworldiscomposedofa
seriesofformationswhichhavemuchincommonwithgames.
Wittgensteinfamouslycriticisestraditional,representationalist
accountsoflanguagewhichhaveitasacollectionofwordswhich
derivetheirmeaningthroughlinkinguptothingsintheworld;in
otherwords,thatwordsarenamesforobjectivelyexistingmeanings.
Allinstancesoflanguage,onthisaccount,canbeunifiedbecause
they all represent the world, and the difference between two lan-
guagesisthesameasthedifferencebetweentwosetsoflabels: they
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canbothbereducedtorepresentingthesamemeanings(Quine,1968:
186). Incontrasttothisrepresentationalism,Wittgensteinproposes
thatlanguagebeunderstoodasoperatingasaseriesofgames,by
whichhemeansanumberoflocallanguagecommunitiesinwhich
meaningisdeterminednotbyhavingwordslinkupwithobjective
reality,butbytacitagreementamonglanguageuserssuchthatthe
useofwordsbyanyonememberofthecommunityisunderstood
byanyother. Thisrelativismalsoappliestopracticesofjustification,
whichmaybeappealedtointheeventofdisputesaboutmeaning;if
languageusersdisagreeaboutthemeaningofastatement,thenthe
justificatorypracticestheyappealtoaresimilarlyagreedontacitly
andhavenospecialclaimtoobjectivetruth. Thecrucialpointtotake
fromthisisthatastatementisnottobeseenassomethingwhichcan
bejudgedas‘true’or‘false’inreferencetosomeexternalruler(i.e.,
objectivereality), butwhichachievesatruthvaluedependingon
thespecificlanguage-rulesofthecommunity,orlanguagegame,in
whichthestatementismade. Whatwarrantsthesesocialformations
beingcalledgamesisthattheyoperateaccordingtoaspecificset
ofrulesandthat,invirtueofthis,theyaresocialaffairsinvolving
morethanonelanguageuser(Wittgenstein,2001: §256–71;Winch,
1958: 24–65).
Socialpractices,forMacIntyre,sharethekeyfeaturesoflanguage
games;namely,theyoperateaccordingtoaspecificsetofrules(spe-
cific,thatis,tothatpractice),theyarenecessarilysocialandthey
involvealocalorcontextualaccountoftruth. Acomparisoncanbe
drawnbetweenMacIntyre’saccountofpracticesandthatofnarra-
tivescommontotheworkofmanypoststructuralistandpostmodern
writers. Forexample,Jean-FrançoisLyotard(1984:xxiv)writesthata
definingfeatureofthecontemporary,‘postmodern’ageisarejection
ofthebeliefinanyoneover-archingsystemthatcanjustifyclaims
abouttruth. Thesegrandsystemshecalls‘metanarratives’. Inplace
ofmetanarratives,likethatofrepresentationalism,postmodernism
andpoststructuralismtheorisethesocialworldasapatchworkof
localnarrativesinwhichtruthandjustificationoperateinthesame
wayasinWittgenstein’slanguagegames. Whatisconsideredtrue
inonenarrativeisonlyassessablewithinthejustificatorypractices
ofthatnarrative,whicharebaseduponthetacitagreementofthe
membersofthatnarrativecommunity,andnotinreferencetoameta-
narrative. Lyotard(1984: xxiv)describesthispictureinexplicitly
Wittgensteinianterms: “Therearemanydifferentlanguagegames—
aheterogeneityofelements.”Whatisparticularlyinterestingabout
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CanFranks’PracticalAnarchismAvoidMoralRelativism? 203
thetreatmentofmetanarrativesbypoststructuralistwritersisthe
focusontheirethicalandpoliticaldimensions. Essentially,theysee
the critique of metanarratives of justification as applying to both
ontologicaltruthclaimsandmoraltruthclaims. Thus, moraluni-
versalism(wherebystatementsaboutwhatis‘good’and‘bad’can
beassessedinlinewithauniversalprinciple,suchasinthecaseof
utilitarianismorthatofdeontologicalethics[see,e.g.,Franks,2008:
138–40])isrejectedandreplacedwithaviewaccordingtowhich
moraltruthisspecifictolocalnarratives.
Thisfocusonmoralrelativismisimportantbecauseitisthisfea-
turewhichiscentraltoMacIntyre’searlyaccountofsocialpractices,
represented best by his book After Virtue (originally published in
1981). MacIntyreagreesherewithboththelanguagegametheorists
andthepoststructuraliststhatthesocialworldiscomposedofmul-
tiplepracticeswithpotentiallyirreducibledifferences, andwhich
cannotbesubsumedunderonemetanarrativeofmoraljustification.
Afterprovidingexamplesofcompetingmoralclaimsaboutjustwar,
abortionandprivateeducationandtheargumentsusedtojustify
thoseclaims,hewrites(1985: 8):
Everyoneoftheseargumentsislogicallyvalidorcanbeeasily
expandedsoastobemadetobeso;theconclusionsdoindeed
followfromthepremises. Buttherivalpremisesaresuchthat
wepossessnorationalwayofweighingtheclaimsofoneas
againstanother. Foreachpremiseemployssomequitedifferent
normativeorevaluativeconceptfromtheothers, sothatthe
claimsmadeuponusareofquitedifferentkinds.
Thus,themorallandscapeofsocietyisoneinwhichdifferentnar-
rativescontaintheirownjustificationsofmoralclaims. Forexample,
onenarrativemayneverjustifywarfareasmorallygood,whilean-
othermayjustifyitasgoodifandonlyifitiswagedwiththeaim
ofliberatingoppressedgroups(MacIntyre,1985: 6). Thisisnotto
say,ofcourse,thatmoralagreementbetweennarratives(eventhose
separatedhistoricallyand/orgeographically)isimpossible,onlythat
whenagreementisreached,itisonlycontingentandnotfounded
uponsomeobjectivelyexistingmoralreality.
Inhisearlywritingsonsocialpractices, MacIntyrearguesthat
morality,ratherthanbeingbasedonsupposedlyuniversalprinciples,
shouldtakerootintheteleologiesthatarefoundindifferentprac-
tices. Hisclaimisthateverypracticeentailsateleologicalconception
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oftheagentsengagedthereinandthatthoseagentscanthuslyact
inamoralway. Inactingtorealisethegoodendofhumanlife,“hu-
man-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-telos”,agentscanactina
morallypraiseworthyway. ThisdrawsonAristotle’sunderstanding
oftelos,wherebythe‘good’endforhumanlifeissomethingnatural
andcommontoallhumanbeings: telosisapropertyofa“metaphys-
icalbiology”(MacIntyre, 1985: 162). However, fortheMacIntyre
of After Virtue, this deep metaphysical commitment is misguided
(asIwillhighlightbelow,MacIntyrehasretractedthispositionin
recentyears). Instead,telosistobeconsideredapropertyofagents
onlyinsofarastheyareengagedinpractices. Inonepractice, a
particularformofagencyisconstituted, inanotherpractices, the
formofagencyconstitutedmaybequitedifferent. Thesepractice
basedformsofagencyincludeaparticulartelosfortheconstituted
agent. Thus, a human being will, as they move from practice to
practice,engageinthemasdifferentformsofagencywithdifferent
telē. TouseMacIntyre’sexample(1985: 188),whenengagedinthe
practiceofchess,apersonwillhavetheagencyofthechessplayer,
withwhichcomesaparticulartelos,thatofdoinggoodintherole
ofthechessplayer. Whatthisdoinggoodinapractice-specificrole
consistof,accordingtoMacIntyre,isactingvirtuously. Therefore,
ratherthanholdtoafixedtableofvirtues,MacIntyre’saccountofso-
cialpracticesentailsdifferenttablesofvirtuesfordifferentpractices,
eachinformedbythetelosspecifictotheformofagencyinvolvedin
thatpractice(1985: 162–3). Whereateloscanbesaidtotranscend
individualpractices,itisstillcontingentandapropertyofanagency
commontoanetworkofpractices(MacIntyre,1994: 288). Thislatter
pointwillprovetobeimportanttoFranks’practicalanarchism.
2. TelosorTelē
Therejectionofasingle,fixedtelosissomethingMacIntyre’sand
Franks’accountsofsocialpracticeshaveincommon. Franks’practi-
calanarchismshareswithMacIntyretheperspective“thatthesocial
worldisconstructedoutofintersectingsocialpracticeswiththeir
ownhistoriesandtraditions”(Franks,2010: 155). Franks’(2008: 147)
descriptionofpracticalanarchismisasfollows:
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CanFranks’PracticalAnarchismAvoidMoralRelativism? 205
Practicalanarchismisbasedonasocialaccountofthevirtues
(basedonarevisionofMacIntyre’svirtuetheory). Thisiden-
tifiesgoodsasbeinginherenttosocialpractices,whichhave
theirownrules, whicharenegotiableandalterovertime. It
stressestheimmanentvaluesofparticularpracticesratherthan
theexternallydecided(consequentialist)valuesthatwillaccrue.
Inadditiontotherejectionofanover-archingteleologyofhuman
life,therefore,practicalanarchismshareswithMacIntyre’saccount
of social practices the idea of there being goods that are internal
to practices. Franks writes too that “each anarchist practice pro-
duces[its]ownstandards”,andthiscanbetakenasreferringtothe
standardsofexcellence(virtues)inMacIntyre’stheory. Thus,both
accountsofsocialpracticesalsoincorporatethenotionofvirtuous
behaviour, the successful display of which can be seen in agents
achievingthosegoodsthatareinternaltoaparticularpractice. To
seetheimportanceofthisaccountofsocialpractices,andinparticu-
larthenotionofteleologywhichiscentraltoit,itmaybehelpfulto
rehearseFranks’argumentsagainstholdingasingle,fixedteleology;
forhedoesnotfollowthelaterMacIntyreof,forinstance,Dependent
RationalAnimals(1999)inreinforcingthenormativeforceofsocial
practicetheorywithareturntoanAristotelianmetaphysicalbiology
(MacIntyre,1999: x).
Franks,inspiredbypostanarchistwritersbutalsoearlytwentieth
century anarchists such as Errico Malatesta (e.g., 1977: 267) who
arguessimilarlyagainstanyteleologicalaccountofhumanbeings,
rejectstheideathatthereisonetelosagainstwhichallactioncan
be judged as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Instead, as the above section shows,
hearguesformultipletelēsuchthatdifferentsocialpracticesand,
asthecasemaybe, contingentnetworksofsocialpractices, have
internalgoodsthat,fortheirachievement,demandthattheagentact
virtuously. Thevirtuouscharacteristheteleologicalendformoral
agency within that practice. Franks’ argument against positing a
single,fixedteloscomesinthreeparts. Firstly,hearguesthatevenif
therewereanobservableteleology,amoraluniversal,itwouldbe
undesirableasitwouldlimitthemoralagencyofpeopleandgroups,
andpotentiallyimposethecoercionthatanarchiststraditionallyseek
toeliminate. Indeed,auniversalistaccountmakesroomfortherole
ofmoralauthorities: individualsorgroupswhoareabletoindicate
tootherswhatinternalgoodsandstandardsofexcellenceshouldbe
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pursued. Itischaracteristicofanarchisms(bothclassicalandcontem-
porary)thatsuchauthorityberejected,regardlessofmeta-ethical
commitmentstouniversalism. MikhailBakunin(1973: 134–5),for
example,whoarguesfortheauthorityofscienceasamirrorofthe
naturallawfoundinnature,stillrejectstheauthorityofscientists. “If
thereareuniversal,setstandards,”writesFranks(2008: 141),“then
moral agents would have to live up to these, and thus be denied
thefreedomtodeterminetheirownvalues.”Thesecondargument
madebyFranksagainsttheteleologicalpositionisthatitentailsthe
potentialfortheintroductionofamoralhierarchy,becauseifthere
isauniversalstandardofmoralconduct,andsomeagentsaremore
capableofmeasuringuptothatstandardthanothers,theywillbe
privileged. “Ruleswhichapplytoallregardlessofcontextignore,
andthereforedisadvantage,thosewhoareinanunequalpositionto
beginwith”(Franks,2008: 142).
Thesefirsttwoargumentsaremoralinnature. Thefinalargument,
on the other hand, is that a teleological and universalist position
fallsonepistemologicalgrounds(Franks,2010: 144):
A fixed concept of what it is to be human is epistemologi-
callysuspect,asthereseemstobenoappropriatemethodology
fordiscoveringwhatconstituteshumanity’suniversalquintes-
sence. Noristhereanyagreementamongthosewhocommit
toessentialismonwhatconstituteshumankind’sfundamental
nature.
ThisfinalargumentechoesthatofMacIntyreagainstthepositing
ofasingletelos. Hewrites(1985: 162–3)thatuniversalism“ignores
theplaceinourculturalhistoryofdeepconflictsoverwhathuman
flourishingandwell-beingdoconsistin[.]”Indeed,MacIntyre(1985:
181–6)highlightsthenumerousaccountsofthegoodlifethatcanbe
foundindifferentperiodsofhumanhistory. Withthesearguments
in place, Franks rejects the universalist position that the internal
goodsandvirtuesofparticularpracticescanbejustifiedinlinewith
anobjectivemoralreality.
However, as noted above, MacIntyre has, in the last ten years
orso,performedanabout-faceontheissueofteleologyandnow
arguesthatcontext-specifictelēarenotenoughtoprovidethemoral
guidance agents require in dealing with conflicting practices and
virtues(MacIntyre,2006: 262):
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CanFranks’PracticalAnarchismAvoidMoralRelativism? 207
[I]tisonlybecausehumanbeingsasrationalanimalshavethe
specificendthattheyhavethatquestionsabouthowtheshould
acthavedeterminateanswers, answersthataretrueorfalse.
Withdrawtheconceptofanendandthosemoraljudgements
thatformerlypresupposeditwillcontinuetomimicjudgements
thataretrueorfalse,butwillinfactonlyfunctionasexpressions
ofattitude. [...]Tospeakoftheendofhumanbeingsistospeak
ofthegoodstowhichtheyaredirectedbytheirnature[.]
MacIntyre’scurrentposition,therefore,isthatforsocialpractice
theorytoavoidmoralrelativism,wherebystatementsaboutwhatis
rightandwronghaveasmuchclaimtoobjectivetruthasstatements
aboutwhatisfashionableinclothingormusic(i.e.,theirtruthvalue
isdeterminedbycontingentagreementamongthemembersofthe
practice-community),itmustpositauniversaltelosforhumanbe-
ings in general. This telos can thus be used to help agents decide
definitivelyandcorrectlybetweenpracticesandvirtuesthatmay
conflict. Franks’ practical anarchism, given that it rejects such a
universalism,wouldseemtobeopentothechargeofrelativism. I
willnowattempttoshowthatthisisinfactthecaseand,further-
more,thatthisposesapotentialproblemfortheadoptionofanon-
universalistsocialpracticetheoryasananarchistethics.
3. MoralRelativism
WhileFranksrejectsasingletelosthattranscendsdifferentprac-
tices, he also notes that for deliberation in ethics to exist in any
meaningfulwayatall,theremustbe“asharedmoraldiscoursethat
canevaluateandselectbetweenrivaltacticaloptions”(Franks,2008:
145). Theproblemisthathisrejectionofateloscommontoevery
agentoreverycontextisthatthismoraldiscoursebecomesincredi-
bleproblematic. Toseewhythisisthecase,Iproposetointroduce
anexample. Supposethatananarchistcollectivewhichrunsaso-
cial centre comes to a disagreement in the course of one of their
monthlymeetings. Someofthemembersclaimthatthecollective
should provide a subsidy to a direct action group involved in the
animal rights movement, while the others claim that the subsidy
shouldgotoananti-racistorganisation. Eachoptionentailsadif-
ferentinternalgoodandsoadifferentvirtue. Iftheuniversalistis
rightandthereisafixedtelos(orsetoftelē),andthemembersof
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thecollectiveareawareofthistelos(orsetoftelē),thentheywillbe
abletomeasuretheconflictinggoodsagainstthisobjectiveyardstick
anddecidewhichgoodtakespriorityatthattime. However,without
suchanexternalguide,deliberationseemsmeaningless. Ifthefirst
groupclaimsinsupportoftheirpositionthatitmeasuresuptothe
contingenttelosthatsolidarityshouldbeprimarilywiththeanimal
rightsmovement,andthesecondgroupclaimsthattheirsmeasures
uptothetelosthatsolidarityshouldbewithanti-racism,thenthere
isnowayforagreementtobereached. Itisimpossibletoorderthe
potentialgoodsofpractices. Furthermore,evenifsomeagreementis
made,wereathirdpartytoquestiontheprioritisingofoneinternal
goodoveranother,nosupportcouldbegivenexceptfromwithin
thepractice,whichbegsthequestion.
Ultimately,itwouldseem,thereisnowayofresolvingconflict
betweengoodsandvirtues, orbetweenpractices. Thishighlights
thepracticalproblemwithrejectionanobjectivetelosintheway
thatpracticalanarchismdoes. Theethicaldimensionsofthistheory
arereducedtomoralrelativism. Frankswantstoproposeapoint
betweenmoralrelativismandmoraluniversalism,butitseemsthat
this point isn’t to be found. Of course there can be a telos that
spansseveralinterconnectedpractices,butthiswouldbesimilarly
contingentandwouldstillnotaidtheagentindecidingwhetherto
engageinonegroupofpracticesoranother.
This last point is especially pertinent to Franks’ practical anar-
chism, because in some places he seems to arguing that certain
practiceswillshareacommonteleologythatdistinguishesthemas
anarchist practices; namely, that they aim to challenge and elimi-
natehierarchicalandcapitalistrelationships. Forexample,hewrites
(2010: 146) that “anarchist prefigurative methods are identifiable
astheyarethetypesofpracticesthatwouldcollectivelybuildup
tocreatetheiranti-hierarchicalversionoftheflourishingsociety.”
Indeed,heoffersadefinitionof“idealtype”anarchismasinvolving
therejectionofcapitalismandthefreemarketandhavinganinterest
inthefreedomofothersaspartofcreatingnon-hierarchicalsocial
relations(2006: 112–13). However,heisconsistentwithMacIntyre’s
earlytakeonsocialpracticesinthathestressesthatthissharedtele-
ologyiscontingent,andnotsomethingnecessaryorevenessential
tothosepractices(2010: 142):
Thisisnottosaythatanidenticalteleologyexistsacrossthe
rangeofanarchisms;indeedacarefulreadingwouldidentify
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