Table Of ContentMelpomeni Vogiatzi
Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric
Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca et Byzantina
Quellen und Studien
Edited by
Dieter Harlfinger, Christof Rapp, Marwan Rashed,
Diether R. Reinsch
Volume 8
Melpomeni Vogiatzi
Byzantine
Commentaries on
Aristotle’s Rhetoric
Anonymous and Stephanus, In Artem Rhetoricam
Commentaria
ISBN 978-3-11-062675-9
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-063069-5
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-062863-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019940105
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The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
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Contents
1 Introduction | 1
1.1 Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 1
1.2 Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 4
1.2.1 Introduction to the commentaries: intentions, interests, style | 4
1.2.2 The commentaries and their philosophical and rhetorical
background | 9
1.2.3 Dating the commentaries | 12
1.2.4 Authorship | 18
1.2.5 Anna’s circle | 31
1.3 Methodology | 33
2 Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric | 35
2.1 Introduction | 35
2.2 Enthymeme | 36
2.2.1 Anonymous’ Commentary | 43
2.2.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 54
2.3 Rhetorical Topoi | 63
2.3.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 70
2.3.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 77
3 Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric
II.24 | 80
3.1 Fallacy depending on the expression | 80
3.1.1 Anonymous’ Commentary | 82
3.1.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 89
3.2 Fallacy due to homonymy | 92
3.3 Fallacy due to combination and division | 97
3.4 Fallacy due to exaggeration | 112
3.5 Fallacy due to sign | 114
3.5.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 118
3.5.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 120
3.6 Fallacy from the consequence | 124
3.6.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 126
3.6.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 127
3.7 Fallacy from accident | 130
3.7.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 132
3.7.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 134
3.8 Non Causa pro Causa | 135
3.9 Fallacy from the Omission of When and How | 138
VI | Contents
3.10 Secundum Quid et Simpliciter | 139
3.10.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 140
4 Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric | 143
4.1 Introduction | 143
4.2 Happiness | 145
4.2.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 147
4.2.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 149
4.3 The Good | 151
4.3.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 153
4.3.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 158
4.4 Virtue | 160
4.4.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 163
4.4.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 167
4.5 Pleasure | 168
4.5.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 171
4.6 Conclusions | 172
5 Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric | 175
5.1 Introduction | 175
5.2 Stephanus on Emotions | 176
5.2.1 Introduction to the second book — Summary of the first book | 176
5.2.2 Second Chapter: anger — other pathe | 179
5.2.3 Conclusions | 185
5.3 Anonymous on Emotions | 185
5.3.1 Judgement | 186
5.3.2 Appearance | 201
5.3.3 πάθος – ἦθος | 209
5.4 Conclusions | 215
6 The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III | 217
6.1 Introduction to lexis | 217
6.1.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 222
6.1.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 235
6.2 Introduction to the account of metaphor | 239
6.2.1 Anonymous’ commentary | 243
6.2.2 Stephanus’ commentary | 252
7 Conclusions | 255
7.1 Summary | 255
7.2 Main features of the commentaries: similarities and
divergences | 257
Contents | VI
Bibliography | 259
Index | 267
1 Introduction
In order to understand the context in which the two Byzantine commentaries on
Aristotle’s Rhetoric were written, and their interpretation of the main issues raised
in the Aristotelian treatise, we need to examine two sorts of sources. First, we need
to present briefly (1) the circumstances under which Aristotle’s Rhetoric itself was
composed, namely, its relation to the previous rhetorical theories, (2) the main top-
ics discussed in the treatise, and (3) the Rhetoric’s relation to other Aristotelian trea-
tises. Second, we need to view the circumstances of the composition of the two
commentaries, namely the commentators’ background, sources, and interests as
well as to examine the identity of the two commentators.
1.1 Aristotle’s Rhetoric
The construction of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is immediately connected to the rivalry be-
tween rhetoric and philosophy, which was represented in the 4th century BC mainly
by Plato and Isocrates. The Rhetoric is in fact usually thought to be the philoso-
pher’s response to the Platonic criticism of sophistic rhetoric, which one can grasp
by reading the dialogues Gorgias and Phaedrus. In the Gorgias, Plato’s Socrates
argues that rhetoric unlike philosophy is not an art, but a mere skill based on expe-
rience, since it possesses no true knowledge of the thing in question and aims at the
pleasant rather than at the good. Socrates also criticises rhetoric’s disconnection
from morality, and argues that only in connection with philosophy can rhetoric be
used for the good. Rhetoric is therefore presented as mere flattery used for one’s
own advantage. A less strict criticism of rhetoric is expressed in the Phaedrus, where
Plato focuses on a rather philosophical type of rhetoric, and hence presents proper-
ly-practiced rhetoric as being identical with philosophy. However, rhetoric as usual-
ly practiced in his time is still criticised for lacking both knowledge of the nature of
the soul and an understanding of what is good for the soul. This popular conception
and practice of rhetoric is therefore distinguished from philosophy in both dia-
logues, mainly due to the different goals the two disciplines pursue: while philoso-
phy aims at the knowledge of what is best, rhetoric aims, according to Plato, at
providing pleasure through flattery and at persuading at all costs (even at the price
of untruthfulness). Moreover, rhetoric is also criticised because of the method it uses
to reach this goal, namely, the sophistic method. Given that the addressees of this
criticism are mainly the sophists, it is clear that Plato rejects the sophistic rhetorical
practice (especially of Gorgias) due to its lack of any systematic procedure and its
use of mere commonplaces aimed at arousing emotions.
In response to this criticism, Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric addresses each of
the above-mentioned points: on the one hand, his presentation of rhetoric makes
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2 | Introduction
use of concepts that turn rhetoric into a systematic tool, that is, into an art with its
own principles and method, while, on the other hand, it provides the orator with a
description of ethical and psychological notions necessary for understanding the
components that contribute to persuasion. These issues ought to be examined in
detail, since the study of Aristotle’s views on the relation between the rhetorical art
and philosophy (or other arts and sciences) is connected with and can contribute to
our understanding of the position of the Rhetoric within the Aristotelian corpus,
which in turn will be relevant to our discussion of the commentators’ understanding
of the Rhetoric.
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains that the art of rhetoric consists of two branch-
es, one which is closely related to dialectics, whereas the other is an offshoot of
ethical science, particularly of politics (1356a25-27). Rhetoric’s connection to each of
them becomes clearer in the first two chapters of the treatise (I.1-2). On the one
hand, rhetoric shares with political or ethical science its interest in characters and
emotions. The orator, says Aristotle, must have a grasp of characters, virtues and
emotions, namely, what each one of them is and in what way each comes about, so
that the orator will be able to persuade the audience. However, after stating this
similarity between ethics and rhetoric, Aristotle immediately makes clear that, alt-
hough rhetoric resembles politics, it differs from it insofar as it does not provide any
knowledge of its subject (1356a27-30). The same idea seems to underline the initial
discussion of the Nicomachean Ethics I, where Aristotle introduces the topic of the
treatise and states that rhetoric, among other arts, is a branch of politics (1094b1-3).
Similar to the discussion in the Rhetoric, it is also implied here that the two disci-
plines differ with respect to their goals and precision: if the goal of ethical science is
the ultimate goal of human life, that is, happiness, which is achieved through a long
procedure of habituation in virtuous actions, it becomes evident that the achieve-
ment of this goal or the education of the audience with respect to this goal cannot be
the task of the orator, who, as explicitly stated in the Rhetoric, aims at finding avail-
able means of persuasion (and not at educating the audience). Moreover, although a
study of politics and ethics cannot be as precise as other disciplines since they con-
cern things that are not always true, the ethical philosopher will be as precise as his
subject matter allows and will try to approach the principles of his science as exact-
ly as possible. Conversely, the rhetorician does not deal with any specific subject
matter, is not looking toward the principles of any science, and can also argue in-
discriminately for what is true and not true.
This last feature of rhetoric, which separates it from ethical science, is what
makes it more similar to dialectic. The exact relation between the two is not clear,
rhetoric is said to be either counterpart (ἀντίστροφος) or a part (μόριον) of dialec-
tics, but their common features are discussed in length. Besides their use of syllo-
gismoi and topoi, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 below, the two disci-
plines are similar in respect of their lack of specific subject matter as well as in
respect of their ability to formulate arguments in favour of any side of opposite
