bda: anglo-american air intelligence, bomb damage assessment, and the bombing campaigns ...

704 Pages·2005·5.73 MB·English

BDA:
ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR INTELLIGENCE,
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT,
AND THE BOMBING CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GERMANY, 1914-1945

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Robert S. Ehlers, Jr.

*****

The Ohio State University
2005

Dissertation Committee:
Approved by
Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Adviser

Professor Allan R. Millett
__________________________________
Professor Alan D. Beyerchen Advisor
Graduate Program in History

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the United States Air Force,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

ii
ABSTRACT

The Anglo-American bombing campaigns against Germany during the world wars
relied on air intelligence for targeting information and bomb damage assessment (BDA)
reports. These gave airmen key insights on the effectiveness of aerial bombardment. Air
intelligence emerged as a new specialty during the Great War. By 1918, an intellectual
infrastructure with organizational and technological components had developed in the
British and American air arms. The organizational elements included air staffs with
intelligence specialists assigned to provide BDA reports to senior airmen, and unit-level
intelligence sections to assess the effects of individual bombing raids. The technologies
included reconnaissance aircraft and cameras to collect BDA photographs on the effects
of bombing raids. Although bombing and BDA capabilities remained rudimentary during
the Great War, they set a precedent for World War II.
During the interwar period, despite organizational retrenchment, technology,
especially cameras, made rapid advances. In addition, the emergence of a strategic
bombing doctrine and a four-engine bomber, the B-17, in the United States, heralded the
arrival of a mature bombing capability. In Great Britain, the threat of war prompted
leaders to begin building a new BDA intellectual infrastructure.
Although early British bombing operations were ineffective, they allowed BDA
experts at the Central Interpretation Unit, Ministry of Economic Warfare, and Research
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and Experiments Division to learn their trade. The combination of these organizations
with new technologies, including reconnaissance Spitfire and Mosquito aircraft with
advanced cameras, resulted in superb BDA capabilities. Once American personnel and
reconnaissance aircraft began arriving in 1942, an Anglo-American intellectual
infrastructure emerged.
After the Allies gained air supremacy, bombers engaged in three campaigns of
decisive importance for Allied victory, first against French and Belgian railroads to
isolate Normandy from German reinforcements and re-supply, then against Germany(cid:146)s
oil industry, and finally against Germany(cid:146)s railroads and inland waterways. Air
intelligence officers played a crucial role by giving airmen accurate insights on the
effectiveness of these campaigns. The first campaign played a vital role in the collapse of
German resistance in Normandy. The second had disastrous effects on fuel production
and thus on the combat power of the German military from July 1944 to VE Day. The
third undermined Germany(cid:146)s war economy. In each campaign, BDA experts gave
targeting committees the insights required to recommend the most lucrative targets for
attack. The results were cataclysmic for Germany(cid:146)s war effort. By approaching these
campaigns from an air intelligence perspective, rather than a purely operational one, this
fact becomes abundantly clear.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my adviser, Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr., for his tireless support,
superb insights, and infinite patience as I produced this work. His ethic of service,
learned as a young man in very demanding circumstances, is still very much alive.
My deep thanks go as well to the other members of my committee, Professor Allan
R. Millett and Professor Alan D. Beyerchen, both of whom took a good bit of time out of
their very busy schedules to review this work and offer valuable insights, and to give me
the basic understanding of military and European history necessary to bring this work to
completion.
Special thanks go also to Colonel Thomas E. Griffith, Jr. and Professor Stephen D.
Chiabotti at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Professor Chiabotti gave me
a great deal of encouragement throughout the Ph.D. program. His insights on bomb
damage assessment as currently conceptualized and practiced by the Air Force played a
vital role in my decision to make this my dissertation topic. Colonel Griffith and
Professor Chiabotti also supported my dissertation research from the first, funding visits
to the Air Force Historical Research Center, the Air Force Academy Special Collections
Branch, The National Archives in London, the National Archives in College Park,
Maryland, and the Library of Congress. They have been true champions from the outset.
Finally, I wish to thank my family for their patience and devotion as I spent many
long days at the computer completing this work.
v
VITA
1986(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133) B.A. International Studies, minor in History,
The Ohio State University

1987(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133) Commissioned Second Lieutenant,
United States Air Force (USAF)

1987-1991(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).. Operational Assignments, USAF

1992(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133) M.A., African History and African Studies,
University of Florida

1992-1995(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)... Associate Professor of History,
United States Air Force Academy

1995-2002(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)... Operational Assignments, USAF

2002-Present(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133) Ph.D. Student and Candidate,
USAF-Sponsored,
The Ohio State University

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Area of Emphasis: Military History

Minor Field: Modern European History

Minor Field: African History

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Disclaimer(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).....ii
Abstract(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)iii
Acknowledgments(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).v
Vita(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...vi
List of Figures(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...xi
List of Abbreviations(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...xii

Chapters:

1. Bomb Damage Assessment in Its Historical Context(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)1

1.1 Allied Aerial Bombardment in World War II: Contrasting Views(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..1
1.2 The Central Role of Air Intelligence in Allied Bombing(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).7
1.3 Western Rationalism, the Scientific Method, Air Intelligence, and BDA..(cid:133)11
1.4 Key Attributes and Results of Allied BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).16
1.5 Allied Bombing, BDA, and Combined Operations(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).....19
1.6 The Unique Difficulties of Air Intelligence and BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).....23
1.7 Allied BDA: Strategy, Synergy, and Serendipity(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)27
1.8 Scope of the Study and Varieties of BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...31
1.9 Organization of This Work(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..35

2. The Great War and the Beginnings of BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..42

2.1 Bombing and BDA: Rudimentary but Evolving Capabilities(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).42
2.2 Bombing as Artillery: The Effects on BDA Development(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).47
2.3 BDA and the First British Strategic Bombing Campaign(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...58
2.4 German Bombing, the Smuts Report, and the Creation of the RAF and IF(cid:133)62
2.5 The Development of an Intellectual Infrastructure for BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...64
2.51 Technological Advances(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)65
2.52 Organizational and Training Improvements(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..76
2.6 Putting BDA Capabilities to Work: The Final Allied Bombing Campaigns...86
2.7 Conclusions: BDA at the End of the Great War(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..99
3. Lessons Learned, Unlearned, and Forgotten: Analyses of Aerial
Bombardment in World War I and Their Consequences(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).101
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3.1 The Tiverton-Trenchard Debate and Its Effects on BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).102
3.2 The Tiverton-Gorrell Connection and American BDA Development(cid:133)(cid:133)..110
3.3 The Post-World War I Bombing Surveys and Wartime BDA Compared(cid:133).112
3.4 Conclusions: The State of BDA at the End of the First World War(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..120

4. Retrenchment and Advance: BDA in the Early Interwar Period, 1919-1933(cid:133).122

4.1 Context: The Retreat of All Things Military(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).122
4.2 Retrenchment and Advance in the Early Interwar Period, 1919-1932(cid:133)(cid:133)..127
4.3 Doctrinal Development: The American Experience(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..129
4.4 Doctrinal Development: The British Experience(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...141
4.5 Improving Aerial Photography: F. C. V. Laws and George Goddard(cid:133)(cid:133)...146
4.6 The Emergence of New Intelligence Agencies(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..169
4.7 Bombs, Fuses, and Bombing: Interwar Inertia(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..171
4.8 Air Intelligence, Targeting, BDA, and the Drift towards War(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..174

5. The Pace Quickens: BDA in the Late Interwar Period, 1933-1941(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).176

5.1 British Rearmament and the Bombing Committee(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)176
5.2 The First Glimmerings of a New BDA Intellectual Infrastructure(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)185
5.3 Aircraft and Cameras: On the Threshold of Revolutionary Change(cid:133)(cid:133)......204
5.4 Bombing, Bombs, and Navigation: Continued Stagnation(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)209
5.5 British BDA Capabilities at the End of the Interwar Period(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)......210
5.6 BDA in the Late Interwar Period: The American Experience(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...211
5.7 Bombardment Doctrine and Training: America(cid:146)s Strong Suits(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).212
5.8 Targeting and BDA: America(cid:146)s Weak Suits(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..214
5.9 Aerial Photography, Photoreconnaissance, and Photointerpretation(cid:133)(cid:133).....218
5.10 Continuing Improvements in American Bombs and Fuses(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).230
5.11 BDA at the End of the Interwar Period(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)232

6. BDA Grows to Adolescence: British BDA Development, 1939-1941(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...235

6.1 Early Bombing and Photoreconnaissance Efforts, 1939-1940(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..235
6.2 Photographic Development Unit and Photographic Interpretation Unit(cid:133)....239
6.3 Organizational Innovation: Ties between Air Ministry, MEW, and CIU(cid:133)..263
6.4 Assessing a Key Nazi Vulnerability: BDA and the First Oil Campaign(cid:133)...270

7. The Shift to Night Area Bombing: BDA, Doctrinal Evolution, and
Operational Change, 1941-42(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..293
7.1 British Bombing in Crisis: BDA and an Awareness of Inaccuracy(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...293
7.2 The Oil-versus-Night Bombing Debate, The Butt Report, and BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)....294
7.3 Air Intelligence and City Bombing: BDA Moves in a New Direction(cid:133)(cid:133)..307
7.4 Organizational Innovation: RE8 and Detailed BDA Reports(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)319
7.5 The Search for More Destructive Munitions: Better Bombs and Fuses........330
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7.6 The Yanks Arrive: Early Operations and BDA Integration(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..338
7.7 Combined BDA Efforts at the end of 1942(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...349
8. BDA at Maturity: The Intellectual Infrastructure,
January 1943 - January 1944(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...352

8.1 City Bombing, Operational Frustrations, and the Limits of BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)352
8.2 A Combined Capability: American Arrivals and Improved BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)373
8.3 The ACIU at Maturity: Key Work Sections and Their Duties(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..380
8.4 The Intellectual Infrastructure: Gauging Effects and Effectiveness(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..387
8.5 Finishing Touches: The Joint Photographic Reconnaissance Committee(cid:133).401
8.6 Technologies, Technicians, and Techniques: The Sinews of BDA(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..405
8.7 A Mature Intellectual Infrastructure and Prospects for Allied Bombing(cid:133)..412
9. The First and Second Transportation Campaigns: Bombing, BDA, and
the Defeat of German Armies in France, 1944(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)...415

9.1 Prelude: The Defeat of the Luftwaffe and Intensification of Bombing(cid:133)(cid:133)415
9.2 The Bombing of Italy, BDA, and Plans for Bomber Support to Overlord...421
9.3 Applying Lessons Learned: Transportation Attacks and Overlord(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..446
9.4 The Bombing-SAS-BDA Feedback Loop: Increased Effectiveness(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)468
9.5 Transportation Campaigns, BDA, and the Iterative Learning Process(cid:133)(cid:133).472
9.6 Verifying BDA: Allied Ground-Survey Teams and Iterative Learning(cid:133)(cid:133)472

10. The Attack on Oil, April (cid:150) December 1944: Bombing, BDA, and the
Beginnings of German Defeat in the Field(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..482

10.1 Keeping an Eye on Oil: Assessing Its Importance and Vulnerabilities(cid:133)...482
10.2 Oil Attacks Begin: Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Raids on Ploesti(cid:133)...493
10.3 The Campaign Intensifies: BDA and Raids on German Oil Plants(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).500
10.4 New Allied Bombing Directives: Staying the Course(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).524
10.5 The Targeting-Bombing-BDA Feedback Loop: Oil and the CSTC(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)527
10.6 The Disaster Builds: Oil Attacks and German Operational Difficulties(cid:133).532

11. Endgame for the German War Effort, November 1944 (cid:150) May 1945: BDA,
the Final Destruction of the Third Reich(cid:146)s Oil and Transportation
Assets, and the Defeat of the Wehrmacht in the Field(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)549

11.1 Transportation Attacks on the Third Reich: Decisive, Flawed, or Both?...549
11.2 Targeting Railroads and Canals: Tedder(cid:146)s Transportation Plan(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).554
11.3 Convergence: Synergy between the Oil and Transportation Offensives(cid:133)574
11.4 Contributions of Ex Post Facto BDA: The German View(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).606

12. BDA in Retrospect(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133).619
12.1 Summation: The Scope and Intensity of Bombing Operations(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)(cid:133)..619
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