Table Of ContentNEWSLETTER
NEWSLETTER
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CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY
Foreword
Thisinauguraleditionofthe CivilSupportandtheU.S.ArmyNewsletter isintendedtoprovideaforum
forongoingdiscussionsandeffortsbalancingtheinvolvementandparticipationoftoday’sfederaland
statemilitaryforcesonthe“homelandbattlefield.”The“homelandbattlefield”couldbeacoastalcityhit
byacatastrophichurricane,alocationontheU.S.border,acontainerandshipyard,astreetriotinmajor
city,achampionship-levelfootballgame,abridgecollapse,orevenapoliticalparty’sconvention.
FollowingaMay2009FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)meeting,PresidentObama
stated,“Truepreparednessmeanshavingfederalandstateandlocalgovernmentsallcoordinating
effectively.”Whatcouldoncebecharacterizedasa“hand-waverelationship”betweenthemilitaryand
federal,state,andothercivilianagenciesandfirstrespondersfordisastersorshort-durationeventsnow
hasbecomeafullembracetofacilitatevictoryandsurvival.Additionally,since9/11,theDepartmentof
Defensewastaskedto“...provideforcesandcapabilitiesinsupportofdomesticchemical,biological,
radiological,nuclear,high-yieldexplosiveconsequencemanagement,withanemphasisonpreparingfor
multiple,simultaneousmasscasualtyincidents.”
Thiscollectionofarticlesisasamplingofcivilsupport,hot-buttontopicsandwillexposesomeofthe
differencesamongvariousfederal,state,othercivilianagenciesandfirstresponders,andthediverse
challengeseachfaceintheirareasofresponsibility.
Theprimaryaudienceforthisnewsletterincludes:Armyleaders,planners,andoperators;the
DepartmentofHomelandSecurity;U.S.NorthernCommand;U.S.ArmyNorth;FEMA;theNational
GuardBureau;andotherlocal,state,andfederalgovernmentalagenciesexecutingdefensesupportof
civilauthoritiesoperations.Formationofnewpartnershipsandrelationshipsmustoccur,alongwiththe
creationofnewproficienciesintraining,rehearsals,andcollaborativecommunications.These
partnershipsandrelationshipswillpromoteanenhancedunderstandingoforganizationalcapabilities
andlimitations.
Futurevolumesofthisnewsletterwillcontinuetocaptureandsolicitarticleshighlightinghigh-quality
examplesofcivilsupportwithoutinhibitingdiscussiononareasneedingimprovement. Itrustyouwill
findthesearticlesinformativeandconsiderusingthemasdeskreferencesonthesecriticalissues.
ThankyouforyourinputstodateandIlookforwardtoyourfuturecivilsupportcontributions.
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CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY
Civil Support and the U.S. Army Newsletter
TableofContents
Introduction 1
DepartmentofDefenseSupporttoDomesticIncidents 3
ArmyPostureStatement2009Extracts 9
CommandandControl:CommandandControlofMilitaryForcesintheHomeland
13
JeffreyW.Burkett
U.S.NorthernCommand&DefenseSupportofCivilAuthorities
25
ColonelR.BarryCronin
U.S.ArmyNorth:We’reHereToHelp
33
LTGTomTurner
JointTaskForceCivilSupport(JTF-CS):ANationalAsset
35
MSgt(Ret)MichaelEck
SupporttoDisasterResponse:TheScienceandArtofDisasterResponsebythe
NationalGuard 39
LTGCharlesG.Rodriguez,BerndMcConnellandLTCKristineShelstad
“GoldenGuardian2006”U.S.ArmyNorthPreparesforDisasterResponse
45
ScottR.Gourley
SupporttoLawEnforcement/ForceProtection:TheNationalGuardTransforming
toanOperationalForce 49
LTGH.StevenBlum
TheRoleofStateDefenseForcesinHomelandSecurity
57
COL(Ret)JohnR.Brinkerhoff
TheRoleofFederalMilitaryForcesinDomesticLawEnforcementTitle
63
COL(Ret)JohnR.Brinkerhoff
DomesticOperationalLaw:ThePosseComitatusActandHomelandSecurity
73
COL(Ret)JohnR.Brinkerhoff
Chemical,Biological,Radiological,andHigh-YieldExplosivePreparationand
Chemical,Biological,Radiological,andHigh-YieldExplosiveConsequence
81
ManagementResponseForce:PreparednessforaCBRNEEvent
ZygmuntF.Dembek
CCMRFandUseofFederalArmedForcesInCivilSupportOperations
87
MGJeffreyA.Jacobs
FirstBrigadeThirdInfantryDivisionastheInauguralTaskForceOperationsfor
the2009Chemical,Biological,Radiological,Nuclear,andHigh-YieldExplosives
ConsequenceManagementResponseForce 91
COLRogerCloutier,MAJ(P)JasonGarkey,MAJMarcBouth,MAJSteveRanieri,
andCPTErikGemza
iii
CENTERFORARMYLESSONSLEARNED
CenterforArmyLessonsLearned
Director ColonelRobertW.Forrester
DivisionChief LarryHollars
CALL Analysts William “Bill” Smith
JohnHopson
ProductionCoordinator KristineBell
Editor MichaelBrooks
GraphicArtist EricEck
DistributionManager CandiceMiller
TheSecretaryoftheArmyhasdeterminedthatthepublicationofthisperiodicalisnecessaryinthe
transactionofthepublicbusinessasrequiredbylawoftheDepartment.
Unlessotherwisestated,wheneverthemasculineorfemininegenderisused,bothareintended.
Note:Anypublications(otherthanCALLpublications)referencedinthisproduct,suchasARs,FMs,
andTMs,mustbeobtainedthroughyourpinpointdistributionsystem.
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CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY
Introduction
Thefollowingcollectionofarticles,reports,andinterviewsfocusesoncivilsupportandtheU.S.Army.
Thesearticlesarecategorizedinthefollowingareas:backgroundinformation;commandandcontrol;
supporttodisasterresponse;supporttolawenforcement/forceprotection;domesticoperationallaw;and
chemical,biological,radiological,nuclear,high-yieldexplosive(CBRNE)preparationandCBRNE
consequencemanagementresponseforce.Thesearticlescoverawiderangeofissuesrelatingto
supportingcivilauthoritiesandincludesuchtopicsas: possecomitatus;bordersecurity;disaster
response;Title10versusTile32statutes;homelanddefenseandsecurity;andjoint,interagency,
intergovernmental,andmultinationalpartnerships.Thisnewsletterisnotacomprehensiveor
all-inclusivecollectionofcivilsupportarticles.Insomeinstances,theinformationmaybeslightlydated
butmanyofthetopicsandlessonslearnedareenduring.Thisnewslettercapturesrelevantarticles
publishedinrecentprofessionaljournalsandfromtheCenterforArmyLessonsLearned(CALL)
archivestoshowthecomplexityofcivilsupportandprovideahistoricaldocumentforfuturereference.
Inmanyinstances,theideaspresentedinthesearticlesarepersonalopinionsandinsomecasesnot
approvedArmydoctrine.Additionally,someofthesearticlesmaystiremotionaswellaspoliticalrigor,
especiallywhenU.S.armedfederalforcesareusedinsupportoflawenforcementand/orinhomeland
securityduties(namelyforborderprotectionandfightingthewarondrugs).Manyofthesetopics
continuetoevokehigh-leveldiscussionswithintheDepartmentofDefenseandwithinallbranchesof
federalandstategovernment.Therecommendationsinthesearticlesshouldalwaysbevalidatedwith
thelatestapprovedArmydoctrineandtactics,techniques,andprocedures.
CALLacknowledgesandthankstheprofessionaljournalsandauthorswhopermittedthereproduction
ofthesearticlesandinsomeinstanceswerepersonallyinvolvedinassistingCALLintheformatting
process.
PleasenotethatminormodificationstoformatweremadetosupporttheCALLnewsletterformat.
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CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY
Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents
From the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Homeland Defense and America’s
Security Affairs, January 2008:
<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/DOD_SupportToDomesticIncidents.pdf>
TheprimarymissionoftheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)anditscomponentsisnationaldefense.In
someinstances,nationaldefenseassetsmaybeavailabletosupportcivilauthoritiesforroutineand
catastrophicincidents.DefenseSupportofCivilAuthorities(DSCA)referstosupportprovidedbyU.S.
militaryforces(Federalmilitary,Reserve,andNationalGuard),DODcivilians,DODcontract
personnel,DODagencyandDODcomponentassets.
DODnormallyprovidesDSCAinresponsetorequestsforassistance(RFAs)fromotherFederal
departmentsoragencies,orinsomecases,local,tribalorStategovernments.Supportprovidedin
responsetosuchRFAsmayhelpcivilauthoritiespreparefor,prevent,protectagainst,respondto,and
recoverfromdomesticincidentsincludingterroristattacks,andmajordisasters.Suchassistancemay
alsobeusedtosupportdomesticspecialeventsofnationalimportance,suchasthenationalpolitical
conventions.DODassetsareusuallyrequestediflocal,tribal,State,andotherFederalassetsarenot
available.However,DODresourcesarenottypicallyrequiredtomitigateeverydomesticincident.For
example,ofthe65disastersPresidentiallydeclaredasmajordisastersoremergenciesin2005,DOD
respondedtoonlythree.
DefenseresourcesarecommittedafterapprovalbytheSecretaryofDefenseoratthedirectionofthe
President.ManytypesofDODsupportcanbeprovidedbyindividualDODComponentsunderseparate
establishedauthorities.WhendecidingtocommitDODresources,considerationisgiventomilitary
readiness,cost,lethality,risk,appropriateness,andwhethertheresponseisinaccordancewith
applicablelawsandregulations.ContinuouscoordinationwithFederal,State,tribal,andlocal
authoritiesbefore,during,andafteraneventisessentialforefficientandeffectiveDSCA.
Withtheexceptionofimmediateresponseauthoritiesandsupportprovidedundermutualaid
agreements,whicharedescribedbelow,DODdoesnotprovidefirstrespondersupporttocivil
authorities.Whenplanningorconductingexercises,civilianrespondersmustunderstandthatDOD
resourcesmaynotbeimmediatelyavailableduetotheDepartment’sprimarymissionandshouldbe
preparedtoconducttheinitialresponsewithlimitedDODassistance.DODassetsmayrequiresome
timetomobilize,train,anddeploytorespondtoaRFA.
DODisafullpartnerintheFederalresponsetodomesticincidentsandtheDODresponseisfully
coordinatedthroughthemechanismsoutlinedintheNationalResponseFramework(NRF).Inproviding
DSCA,theSecretaryofDefensewillalwaysretaincommandofDODpersonnel,withtheexceptionof
NationalGuardforcesunderthecommandandcontroloftheGovernors.NothingintheNRFimpedes
theSecretaryofDefense’sstatutoryauthoritypertainingtoDODpersonnelandresources.
Conceptsof“command”and“unityofcommand”havedistinctlegalandculturalmeaningsformilitary
forcesandmilitaryoperations.FordeployedFederalmilitaryforces,commandrunsfromthePresident
throughtheSecretaryofDefensetothecombatantcommandertotheDODon-scenecommander.The
civiliancommunity’sIncidentCommandSystem(ICS)definitionof“unifiedcommand”isdistinctly
differentfromthemilitarydefinitionofthisterm.DODresourceswillsupporttheIncidentActionPlan.
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CENTERFORARMYLESSONSLEARNED
CATEGORIESOFCAPABILITIES:Ifrequested,DODcouldprovidethefollowingcategoriesof
capabilities:
a)Transportation–air,ground,andmaritime
b)Damageassessment–Rotaryandfixedwingaircraftequippedwithimageryandfull motion
videocapabilities
c)Evacuationplanningandsupport,includingtransportationassetsforpatientmovement
d)Communications
e)Debrisremovalalongemergencyevacuationroutes
f)LiaisonandCoordination(DefenseCoordinatingOfficer/DefenseCoordinatingElementand
EmergencyPreparednessLiaisonOfficers)
g)Supporttotemporaryshelters
h)MilitaryinstallationsforMobilizationCentersandOperationalStagingAreas
i)Fueldistributionpoints
j)Temporarymedicaltreatmentfacilities
REQUESTFORASSISTANCE:Inmostinstances,DODprovidesDSCAinresponsetoRFAsfrom
anotherFederalagency.DSCAnormallyisprovidedwhenlocal,tribal,State,andFederalresourcesare
fullycommittedorwhenacapabilityuniquetoDODisrequired.DODtypicallyprovidesDSCAona
reimbursablebasis,asrequiredbytheappropriatestatutoryauthorities.
CRITERIA:UponreceiptofanRFA,DODusesthefollowingcriteriatoevaluatetheRFAfor
supportability:
(cid:129) Legality(compliancewithlaws)
(cid:129) Lethality(potentialuseoflethalforcebyoragainstDODforces)
(cid:129) Risk(safetyofDODforces)
(cid:129) Cost(whoisfundingtherequest;impactonDODbudget)
(cid:129) Appropriateness(whethertherequestedmissionisintheinterestofDODtoconduct)
(cid:129) Readiness(effectontheDOD’sabilitytoperformitsprimarynationaldefensemission)
Onceapproved,DODwillprovidetheassetstofulfilltherequest.HowquicklyDODsupportcanbe
applieddependsonseveralfactors:
(1)assessmentoftherequirementandtheappropriatemilitaryassettomeettherequirement
(2)identification,availability,andmobilizationofassets
(3)training
4
Description:U.S. Northern Command & Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Colonel R. Avenger Air Defense Artillery, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit, Tactical Fire Truck, Smoke. Generator Golden Knights Parachute Team demonstration. 10 . cooperation over command and control (C2) authority.
