Aristotle and Plotinus on Being and Unity

346 Pages·2014·11.39 MB·English

ARISTOTLE AND PLOTINUS ON BEING AND UNITY
ARISTOTLE AND PLOTINUS ON BEING AND UNITY

By

GEOFFREY SCOTT BOWE, B.A(HONS), M.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University

© Copyright by Geoffrey Scott Bowe, September 1997
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (1997) McMaster University
(Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario
TITLE: Aristotle and Plotinus on Being and Unity
AUTHOR: Geoffrey Scott Bowe, B.A. (Hons) (Memorial University
of Newfoundland), M.A. (University of Windsor)
SUPERVISOR: Dr. S. Panagiotou
Number of pages: vi, 339
ii
DEDICATION

For my parents, who taught me, and continue to teach me about
kindness, decency, hard work, and respect. Without their
support I could not have done this. Without their love it
means nothing.
iii
ABSTRACT

This dissertation discusses how being and unity are
related in the metaphysical systems of Aristotle and Plotinus.
I suggest that Aristotle's metaphysical position contrasts
with what I call the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy, a
general trend in Platonism to place being in a dependent
relationship to unity, and particular things in a dependent
relationship to being. Aristotle, by contrast, sees being and
unity as dependent on particulars. Understanding Aristotle
against the backdrop of the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy is
of some assistance in understanding his critique of Plato, and
his own position in the Metaphysics regarding substance,
cosmology and first principles. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is
substance par excellence, and stands as an exemplary cause for
the First Moved Mover, guaranteeing the motion necessary for
the generation of other particulars, but it does not provide
them with being and unity. This is because being and unity are
dependent on, and logically posterior to, particulars. I also
examine some of the difficulties in Aristotle's system which
Plotinus takes up in the Enneads. Plotinus, in trying to
remain true to his understanding Platonism, rejects
Aristotelianism, and posits instead, a revised version of the
Platonic metaphysical hierarchy. In addition to examining
Plotinus' critique of Aristotle, I examine some of Plotinus'
other influences. These include Parmenides, Plato, Albinus and
Numenius, in order to provide some grounding in understanding
Plotinus' own philosophy. I conclude with an examination of
Plotinus' metaphysics that shows its consistency with the
general direction of Platonism, if in a different, hypostatic
system. Plotinus' first principle, the One, is a synergy of
negative and positive theology, grounded in the belief that
being and thinking are extensionally the same in his second
principle, Nous. That being and thinking are multiple
necessitates the positing of a principle of unity which is
"EmKEtV<X 't"T]c; ouatac;," (beyond being) a phrase which Plotinus
takes over from Plato's Republic in the service of his own
philosophy.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and
guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Spiro Panagioutou, without
whose patience and help the preparation of this thesis would
not have been possible. My second reader, Professor Brian
Calvert from the University of Guelph provided knowledgeable
and insightful comments on drafts of the thesis which were
invaluable. I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Constantine
Georgiadis, whose kindness and willingness to take up the
position of third reader late in the production of the thesis
were extremely generous. In addition, Dr. David Hitchcock's
comments on the first half of the thesis were remarkably
astute and detailed, and I am very grateful for his advice.
The reference staff at Robarts Library at the University of
Toronto was also extremely helpful. I should also thank Dr.
Wil Waluchow, Philosophy Department Head, for other
assistances rendered. A special note of thanks is owed to Mr.
Brian Hendrix, who provided logistical support while I was in
South Korea.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
PART I - ARISTOTLE
I - The Platonic Metaphysical Hierarchy
II - Being and Unity
III - Movers
IV - Theology or Ontology
PART II - PLOTINUS
Introduction to Plotinus
V - Plato and Parmenides
VI - Developments in Platonism
VII - Aristotle
VIII - "Axioms" of Unity
IX - Unity
vi
PART I - ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER I - The Platonic Metaphysical Hierarchy
1. Introduction
In this first chapter, I want to look at some of
the comments Aristotle makes in his criticism of Plato,
primarily in Book A of the Metaphysics, but also in N. I
will attempt first to identify and explain what I call
the "Platonic metaphysical hierarchy" that conceptual
scheme which Aristotle seems to attribute to the
Platonists. 1 This "metaphysical hierarchy" places being
in a dependent relation to unity, and particulars in a
dependent relation to being. From there I identify three
main concerns: 1) first principles (the order of the
kosmos), 2) metaphysics (being and the unity of
1Given the cumbersome nature of the investigation, it is
more efficient for my purposes to refer to the object of
Aristotle's critique as "Platonism," instead of distinguishing
between Plato and the Platonists. Aristotle does make
distinctions between the two; he talks about an "original
theory of forms," meaning presumably Plato, and he refers to
Speusippus and Xenocrates, and "the Platonists." Since I am
dealing with conceptual schemes, the distinctions are (for the
most part) less important than they might otherwise be. To my
mind, Aristotle's conceptual scheme is incommensurate with all
of these people or positions, and all of these people or
positions are, to a greater or lesser degree thinking in terms
of the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy.
2
3
particulars) and 3) physics (motion and change). These
concerns are significant for my project of identifying
Aristotle's own metaphysical scheme, which I call loosely
"convertibility." In Aristotle's scheme, being and unity
are on equal metaphysical footing (i.e. they do not stand
in a hierarchical relation to one another), and both
stand in a dependent relationship to particulars.
Of the three concerns which I identify, the first
deals directly with the implications of the Platonic
metaphysical hierarchy, and the second two deal with the
separation (XCOptcrµoc;) 1 that the Platonic metaphysical
hierarchy involves, and the necessity of participation
as a way of "connecting" what has been
"separated". Participation raises ontological concerns
for concrete particulars, and further concerns with
regard to motion and change. The way Aristotle frames all
three of these concerns (first principles, metaphysics
and physics) points to his conception of substance as an
antidote. My contention is that the Platonic metaphysical
1Given the analysis of the Platonic metaphysical
hierarchy which follows, by separation I mean the separation
of being and unity and the separation of Forms and
particulars.