Table Of ContentAristotle and Moral
Realism
Robert Heinaman
Editor
WESTVIEW PRESS
Aristotle and
moral realism
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Aristotle and
moral realism
EDITED BY
Robert Heinaman
University College London
WESTVIEW PRESS
Boulder • San Francisco
First published in the UK in 1995 by UCL Press.
UCL Press Limited
University College London
Cower Street
London WC1E6BT
The name of University College London (UCL) is a registered
trademark used by UCL Press with the consent of the owner.
First published in the United States by
Westview Press
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Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Aristotle and moral realism / [edited] by Robert Heinantan,
p, cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 0-8133-9104-0
1. Aristotle—Ethics, 2. Ethics, Greek. 3. Realism.
I. Heinaman, Robert.
B491.E7A75 1995
],71'.3'092—dc20 9547199
CIP
Typeset in Palatine.
Printed and bound by
Biddies Ltd, King's Lynn and Guildford, England.
Contents
Preface vii
Introduction Robert Heinaman I
Acting as the virtuous person acts Bernard Williams 13
The virtuous agent's reasons: a reply to Bernard Williams
Rosalind Hursthouse 24
The twofold natural foundation of justice according to
Aristotle Pierre Aubenque 35
Justice at a distance - less foundational, more naturalistic: a reply to
Pierre Aubenque Troels Engberg-Pedersen 48
Testing the limits: the place of tragedy in Aristotle's ethics
Jonathan Lear 61
Tragedy, reason and pity: a reply to Jonathan Lear Stephen Halliwell 85
Outline of a response to Halliwell Jonathan Lear 96
Aristotelian ethics and the "enlargement of thought"
Sabina Lovibond 99
Pitfalls in doing post-Hegelian ethics with Aristotle: a reply to
Sabina Lovibond Troels Engberg-Pedersen 121
Aristotle and modern realism David Charles 135
Aristotle and the explanation of evaluation: a reply to David Charles
Stephen Everson 173
Eudaimonism and realism in Aristotle's ethics
John McDowell 201
Eudaimonism and realism in Aristotle's ethics: a reply to John McDowell
David Wiggins 219
Index of persons named 233
Index of passages cited 235
V
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Preface
Since 1981, an annual S, V. Keeling Memorial Lecture has been given
at University College London,1 The same anonymous donor whose
generosity founded that series has now further benefited University
College London by establishing the S. V, Keeling colloquium in
ancient philosophy, which is to be held regularly in coming years. To
him, all students of ancient philosophy owe a great debt.
The present volume contains the proceedings of the first Keeling
colloquium which took place at the Warburg Institute in London from
February 16 to 18, 1994. The theme of the conference was Aristotle
and moral realism, examining Aristotle's views on the objectivity of
morality, and the connection of his views to contemporary discus-
sions of moral realism. We were fortunate in being able to attract a dis-
tinguished group of speakers and commentators: Bernard Williams,
Rosalind Hursthouse, Pierre Aubenque, Troels Engberg-Pedersen,
Jonathan Lear, Stephen Halliwell, Sabina Lovibond, David Charles,
Stephen Everson, John McDowell and David Wiggins, 1 would like to
thank them all for making the colloquium a success, and especially
Stephen Everson and Stephen Halliwell for stepping in as commenta-
tors at the last minute. 1 also thank Roger Jones from the UCL Press
for his unfailing assistance.
Robert Heinaman
May 1994
I, Those given between 1981 and 1.991 have now been published in Modern think-
ers and ancient thinkers, R. Sharpies (ed.) (London: UCL Press, 1993).
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Introduction
ROBERT HEINAMAN
In this introduction I will very briefly discuss a few of the philosoph-
ical views associated with the topic of the colloquium, and summa-
rize the main points contained in the principal papers,
Questions connected with the issue of moral realism fall into the
branch of ethics known as meta-ethics, which deals with foundational
issues in moral philosophy. One of these issues is the question of how,
if at all, morality can be justified.
Although one might try to "justify" morality in other ways, moral
realism attempts to do so by showing that it is objective. To explain
what this involves, the moral recilist must address several questions,
including:
-What is the meaning of statements to the effect that something is
morally right or wrong, or of (non-moral) value?
-Are judgements that positively assert that something is valuable,
or morally good or evil, ever true?
-If so - as the moral realist will assert - what kind of fact is
reported by such a true statement, and how can we acquire
knowledge of it?
-What precisely does ethical objectivity consist in, and how can
the belief in objectivity be maintained in face of the seemingly
irresolvable disagreements about value between different socie-
ties and individuals?
However, the label "moral realism" can be taken to suggest not
merely the idea that morality is objective, but the further claim that
there are moral properties "out there" that may be correctly attrib-
uted to objects by true moral statements. Some philosophers regard
morality as objective but reject this sort of metaphysical commitment.
For example, some think that the objectivity of morality can be estab-
lished on the basis of explaining what counts as a good reason for
action. Here the objective truth of an ethical claim such as "1 ought to
1
