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Twelve Fragments on Cypriotism
Antonis Pastellopoulos
#1 ethnic nationalist formulation, embracing what
The year 1974 is marked as the traumatic event for remained of the Republic of Cyprus as the state of the
Cyprus in the 20th century. For the society of the post- Greeks of Cyprus. The romantic dream of national
partitioned Republic of Cyprus, 1974 was experienced completion, the imagined nationalist Utopian Telos of
as a catastrophe, an event giving effect to inter¬ Cypriot history was abandoned, replaced by the
connected crises in the state, the military, the (refugee) demand to reconstitute the past, to return to the
population, the economy and the dominant Christian conditions preceding the traumatic event. The policy
morality. An additional effect has been a crisis in and slogan “I do not Forget (Aev Eexvw)” became the
ideology. symbolic affirmation of the new ethnic nationalism,
1974 signifies at the very same moment, the death of attempting to preserve a frozen image of the
the dream of Enosis and the materialization of Taksim. Republic’s lost territory; in the collective cross-
In the face of this materialization, Enosist Greek generational consciousness of society. In a parallel
Cypriot ethnic nationalism was replaced by a new shift the AKEL party, in its declaration that the socialist
transformation of Cypriot society was unachievable Cyprus therefore remains rooted in privileging
without a resolution of the Cyprus Dispute, negated ethicized subjects as the driving force in Cypriot
the Marxist-Leninist Utopian Telos of a classless history and politics.
egalitarian society from the politics of the institutional #4
left. In the dominant ideologies of the post-partitioned Cypriotism is primarily a state-oriented ideology. In
Republic of Cyprus, Utopia is dead; and Utopia contrast to the various expressions of ethnic
remains dead. nationalism in the island, Cypriotism identifies Cypriots
The post-1974 period is characterized by the in relation to their citizenship status in a potential bi-
emergence of new political ideologies, attempting to communal state. It is therefore a classic expression of
formulate a logos and praxis outside of the constituted civic nationalism - the political identification of the
ideological parameters of Greek Cypriot politics. The individual is mediated through the direct identification
appearance in the following decades of Trotskyism, with the state, rather than with the nation, of which the
Maoism, anarchism, feminism, modern liberalism, state is seen as its expression in ethnic nationalist
ecologism, LGBT activism and anti-militarism indicate discourses. The identity of the Cypriot, as the
that ethnic nationalism was never able to return to its privileged citizen of a Cypriot state, is transformed by
pre-partition point of hegemony. From all these new Cypriotism from a claimed monopoly of a single ethnic
ideologies, however, it is Cypriotism that has had the category, to the monopoly of two equal ethnic
most lasting effect, with its emergence reconstituting categories.
the very Left - Right division of Cypriot politics. Cypriotism is therefore the ideological expression of a
#2 potentially reunified, bi-communal Cypriot state. In this
Cypriotism is intrinsically bi-communal. Only a few respect, Cypriotism could have served as the
radical positions have ever advocated a multicultural hegemonic ideology of the constitutional order of the
or a multi-communal understanding of Cyprus, Republic of Cyprus. It failed however to materialize in
attempting to synthesize in their political, social, the face of dominant ethnic nationalisms that aimed,
historical and cultural understandings the complex and succeeded in destroying that very constitutional
heterogeneity of the contemporary and historical order. It is therefore unsurprising that Cypriotism
experience relating to the island. For the purpose of emerges systematically as a political position only
semantics, these positions could be referred to as after the catastrophe of 1974 and not before it, being
Cypriotist, it is however more accurate to collectively the direct result of the deterioration of the old
refer to them as multicultural Cypro-centrism. hegemonic ideologies of Enosis and Taksim in the
#3 face of the immediate and long-run effects of the war.
Cypriotism is an ideological expression of the prospect #5
of a return to a bi-communal state, which within the Cypriotism is not Cypro-centrism, although the two
context of post-1974 Cyprus, refers to the formation of positions are linked and interconnected. The later
a bi-communal federation. Cypriotism does not prioritizes the geographical space of Cyprus as its
advocate for the formation of a Cypriot ethnic category, starting point of reference, while the former prioritizes
nor does it negate the Turkish Cypriot and Greek the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities as its
Cypriot ethnic categories which are socially pivotal point of reference, producing a discourse and a
reproduced throughout the island; and legally politics which positions these two ethnic communities
entrenched within the constitution of the Republic on an equal representation, negating any social,
Cyprus. It in fact depends on those very categories for political, economic or cultural remainders outside of
its discourse, political expression and activism. the categories themselves. While Cypriotism is also
Cypriotism attempts to negate mono-communal Cypro-centric, one can be Cypro-centric without being
ideologies, by elevating both ethnic identities on an a Cypriotist.
equal political footing, under the non-ethnic category of #6
the Cypriot citizen, in the context of an envisioned bi- Cypriotism is not an ideology without any connections
communal state. Cypriotism does not attempt to re¬ to our material conditions, the result of mere political
narrate the historical and contemporary Cypriot propaganda or merely a naive fantasy. It expresses
experience outside the binary of conflicting ethnic the hope and desire for a reunified Cyprus, perceived
identities, but itself re-enforces that very narration, in here as possible only through the formation of a bi-
its attempt to transcend it. The representation of communal state, primarily in the context of a
federation. It therefore has both an ideological content Cypriotism, which advocates human rights and the
in relation to political, cultural and social identities in formation of a stable, principled bi-communal liberal
Cyprus, as well as an Imagined historical Telos, a civic society, feminist Cypriotism, which emphasizes
Utopia. the collaboration of women from the two ethnic
#7 communities against sexism and patriarchy, often
Cypriotism is the teleological identification with the two connected with the hegemony of ethnic nationalism;
constitutional ethnic categories of the Republic of and even an anarchist Cypriotism, advocating for bi-
Cyprus. On this basis it emphasizes the commonality communal political actions and the formation of a bi-
of those two ethic categories, focusing on cultural, communal federation as a necessary step in the
social, traditional and linguistic common characteristics process of social autonomy and social emancipation.
perceived as forming the universal essence of the While a number of the above positions are
(non-ethnic) Cypriot identity. The narration of history, ideologically contradictory and adversarial to each
culture, society and tradition is thus shifted from a other, they all prioritize, organize and express their
mono-communal to a bi-communal one, attempting to discourse and political action based on the
trace and subsume identified common features under prioritization of the two ethnic communities as the
this perceived Cypriot identity. In this process, primary subjects of political, cultural, historical and
Cypriotism re-produces the constitutional logic of the social representation and agency in the island of
Republic of Cyprus, where the cultural and ethnic Cyprus.
heterogeneity of the Cypriot social fabric is #9
systematically subsumed under the two constitutional Leftist Cypriotism prioritizes the working classes of the
communities, making social heterogeneity invisible in two ethnic communities, rather than the totality of the
discourses of representation. This process is made working class in the island of Cyprus. This realization
possible precisely because Cypriotism, in supporting is important in the context of Cyprus, where the
uncritically bi-communalism, allows for the extreme economic exploitation of the non-native
reproduction of the representation of the two proletariat is fundamental in the organization,
constitutional communities as internally homogeneous functionality and social reproduction of the Cypriot
categories, negating the multiethnic, and by extension capitalist economy on both sides of the green line.
multicultural reality internal to the constitutional Leftist Cypriotism silences and negates the non-native
categories themselves. To clarify the point: the proletariat from the Cypriot political sphere in the
constitutional category of the Greek Cypriot community process of advocating, organizing and emphasizing its
of the Republic of Cyprus alone includes, among bi-communal working class struggles.
others, citizens with Lebanese, Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, #10
Filipino, British, Kurdish, Pontic, Armenian, Maronite, Cypriotism has acted, and will continue to act as a
Russian, Romanian and Serbian ethnic backgrounds, progressive socio-political force in the context of a
their ethnicity is here however, constitutionally Greek. divided Cyprus, assuming the continuation of the
Through the simple process of legal and linguistic current status quo and the continuation of the political
subsumption, the community's external representation hegemony of ethnic nationalism. On a minimal level,
remains homogeneous while its actual internal Cypriotism entails elements of anti-racism, social and
heterogeneity is discursively negated. political liberalism and anti-militarism. Situated at a
#8 structurally counter-hegemonic position, Cypriotism
Cypriotism is not a holistic ideology and it therefore attacks and disturbs ethnic nationalist hegemony
does not address directly broad social, political, or throughout the island, with actions ranging from mere
economic issues. As Cypriotism is concerned primarily cultural events to bi-communal activism and political
with the Cyprus Dispute and its resolution, rather than protests. Ideologically Cypriotism is not however an
with the broader socio-economic antagonisms often expression of humanism. It does not concern itself
associated with ‘modernity’, it is easily compatible with with the totality of the people living in the island, but
multiple ideological viewpoints. One can therefore strictly with the categories of the Turkish and of the
subdivide Cypriotism into multiple ideological Greek Cypriot communities, it is constituted on a
positions: Leftist Cypriotism, which focuses on a bi- fundament point of exclusion. This point of exclusion
communal working class movement (rather than an exposes its emancipatory limitations.
internationalist, class-oriented one), (neo)liberal
#11 hegemony on any side of the green line, or in a
In the case of a lasting bi-communal federal solution, reunified Cyprus. At a position of hegemony, it will be
Cypriotism is bound to become trapped within its own utilized to reproduce most of the social, political and
logic of exclusion, a logic emerging from its economic inequalities and modes of exploitation
fetishization of bi-communaiism. Identifying and existing currently in the island, in the same manner
expressing the two ethnic communities as the true that ethnic nationalism has successfully executed in
Cypriots in its politics of representation, it produces at the past. Such a development would mark the shift of
the same time the social Other as the exception from the Cypriot ruling class ideology from ethnic
this perceived Cypriot commonality. It is therefore not nationalism to bi-communal civic nationalism.
surprising that a civic nationaiism, once hegemonic, #12
itself reproduces ideologically the binary of the Cypriotism is constituted as the shadow of ethnic
cultured, superior native, contra the marginalized nationalism; it is constantly formed in a dialectical
internal and external Other situated outside the relation to it. This relation reproduces the Cyprus
imagined body politic. Dispute as the dominant politics of Cypriot society, a
By prioritizing the two Cypriot ethnic communities politics of ethnic binaries, of homogenization of
within the meta-ethnic identity of the Cypriot citizen, identities, fixated points of exclusion, subsumption of
connected to a bi-communal Cypriot citizenship of an heterogeneity and the downgrading of social
imagined reunified Cypriot federal state, Cypriotism stratification. It reproduces the Cyprus Dispute as
neither addresses nor reconstructs the broader socio¬ ideology, overshadowing broader socio-economic
economic hierarchies of exploitation within the island. antagonisms integral to Cypriot society, allowing for
At the point of hegemony, Cypriotism will reconstitute their reproduction in the island of Cyprus as a whole.
its Orientalized, uncivilized, shadowy and socially Cypriotism must be recognized as an embedded part
hidden Others in the presence of those social groups in this process, as an integral element in the dominant
left outside of the bi-communal Cypriot identity: the politics of representation. Its abandonment as a
religious group member, the Romani citizen, the starting point of analysis remains a necessity for the
migrant worker, the half-Cypriot, the Turkey-originated formulation of a Critique able to identify, deconstruct
settler, the non-native citizen and the non-native and address the complex interplay of power relations
refugee. situated in the experience of contemporary Cyprus.
Cypriotism needs to be understood as a reactionary Such a Critique must ‘let the dead bury their dead’ -
ideology in a possible context of it reaching lasting and Cypriotism certainly deserves a requiem.
GRAVITY
Andy Pashali
Frogs are gone, especially green frogs, snakes too-
When I was younger, the area I grew up was an
alive I mean. It’s been years since I last saw any of
intermediate of a city and a village, now it is just
these species. Yellow butterflies also. I assume plants
cement, preferably grey. Along the sidewalk following
and flowers are gone too but I can’t remember their
a river (without water cause it rarely rains) through
names. It was a greener area when I was growing up
Nicosia, I used to go for jogging, there still was free
along with the camping place I used to spend summer
vegetation and some wild birds like partridges. Not
holidays, a golf resort now - or something like that.
anymore, they are building new houses (keep
That seaside area was destroyed in the sake of
wondering who is going to buy though we are in a
“modern tourist industry” or “progress” which in my
deep economic crisis) and leaving rubbish
country usually translates into deforestation of any
everywhere. For some this is post-colonial economy
kind. Hotel complexes were built on the beach
after all, but the sad truth is that British colonialists are
minimizing the distance between sea and “civilization”.
long gone and we replace them in success.
“Restart the economy”, politicians say and they usually
mean “let’s build” something terrible on a wildlife area.
