Weak Signals for Strategic Intelligence: Anticipation Tool for Managers

238 Pages·2011·6.13 MB·English

by  Humbert Lesca

Weak Signals for Strategic Intelligence
Weak Signals for
Strategic Intelligence
Anticipation Tool for Managers
Humbert Lesca
Nicolas Lesca
Firstpublished2011inGreatBritainandtheUnitedStatesbyISTELtdandJohnWiley&Sons,Inc.
AdaptedandupdatedfromLessignauxfaiblesetlaveilleanticipativepourlesdécideurspublished2011
inFrancebyHermesScience/Lavoisier©Lavoisier2011
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Adaptionandrev.of:Lessignauxfaiblesetlaveilleanticipativepourlesdecideurs.2011.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-1-84821-318-0
1.Strategicplanning.2. Management. I.Lesca,Nicolas.II.Lesca,Humbert.III.Title.
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Table of Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Chapter1.Concepts,IssuesandHypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.Introduction:governanceandradar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1.Steeringtheship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2.Corporategovernanceandstrategicdecision-making . . . . 2
1.1.3.Theship’sradar(radiodetectionandranging) . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.4.Theorganization’s“radar”,atoolforitsgovernability . . . 6
1.2.Theorganization’senvironmentanditsgovernance
througha“storm”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1.Theship,theocean,andanydangertobefaced . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2.Theenterprise,itsenvironment,uncertainty,hazards,
andopportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3.Scrutinizingandinterpretingtheenvironment. . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.Anticipation(actoflookingforward). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.1.Anticipating:definitionandexamples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.2.Donotconfuseanticipationwithforecasting . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3.Anticipationandscenario-basedprospective:possible
complementarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.4.Anticipatingoddevents,discontinuities,anomalies,etc. . . 22
1.4.Anticipativeinformation:twotypes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1.Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2.Differencebetweenstrategicinformationand
day-to-daymanagementinformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.3.Twotypesofanticipativeinformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5.Weaksignals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5.1.Definitionofaweaksignal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.2.Anexampleofweaksignalasthetriggertoawarning . . . 27
vi WeakSignalsforStrategicIntelligence
1.5.3.Shouldweprefera“strong”butbackward-looking
signal,ora“weak”butforward-lookingsignal? . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.4.Conversion,transformationofaweaksignalintoan
earlywarningsignal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.5.Shouldwerefertoa“signal”ora“sign”?Intentionality
ofthesender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.6.Weaksignals…ordecoys,deceptions,andinformation
asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.7.Characteristicsofaweaksignal:“stealthyinformation” . . 36
1.5.8.Sourcesemittingweaksignals:examples. . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.6.Detectingweaksignals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.6.1.Individualintelligence(intheLatinsenseoftheword):
adefinition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.2.Cognitivestyleofaperson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.3.Individualcognitivebiases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6.4.Fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7.Interpreting,amplifyingandexploitingweaksignalsto
supportstrategicdecisionmaking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7.1.Needforcollectiveintelligence(CI)forinterpreting
weaksignals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.7.2.CM:justification
anddefinitionoftheprocess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.7.3.DefinitionofCIastheemergenceofCCM . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.7.4.FromCCMtoknowledge
management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.8.Puzzle®methodfortheoperationalizationofCCM . . . . . . . 59
1.8.1.Issue:whythepuzzlemetaphor? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.8.2.DefinitionofthePuzzle®method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.8.3.FundamentalhypothesesofthePuzzle®method. . . . . . . 67
1.8.4.WorkgroupandCI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.9.GlobalVASICprocessfordetecting,recognizingand
utilizingweaksignals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.9.1.Targetingofanticipativescanningandinformation
sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1.9.2.Trackingandindividualselectionofweaksignals . . . . . . 73
1.9.3.Escalatinginformation,collective/centralized
selectionandstorage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.9.4.Disseminationandpreparationofinformationfor
CCMsessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1.9.5.Animation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1.9.6.Measurements:performanceindicatorsof
theVASICprocess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
TableofContents vii
1.10.Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.10.1.ResultsoncompletionofChapter1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Chapter2.Detecting,RecognizingandCorroboratingaWeak
Signal:Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.1.Recognitionofaweaksignal:examples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.1.1.Aladyheadingupthepurchasingfunctionatacar
equipmentmanufacturer?Howbizarre!. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.1.2.Whenaweaksignalisdisplayedonasigninthestreet! . . 88
2.1.3.AresearchcenteratEADS:whySingapore? . . . . . . . . . 90
2.1.4.Danone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.2.Makinganewweaksignalreliable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.2.1.Reliabilityoftheinformationsource. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.2.2.Comparingtheweaksignalwithotherinformation
obtainedpreviously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.2.3.Consultingwithan“expert” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.2.4.Feedbackfromtheanimatortothegatekeeperwho
providedtheweaksignal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.3.Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.3.1.Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Chapter3.UtilizationofWeakSignals, CollectiveCreation
ofMeaning:Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.1.TheRogercase:shouldwefearthisnewentranttoour
industry?(thebankingsector) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.1.1.IssuesforRogerasacompany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.1.2.Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.1.3.Codexi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.1.4.Informationtobeused. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.1.5.Conductofthecollectiveworksession . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.1.6.Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.2.Thecasefor“valorizingCO asacommodity”:
2
apreliminarystudyfortheselectionofanewstrategicdirection . . 119
3.2.1.Themainproblem:howto“givebirthtoanidea”
withintheBoardofDirectors(BoD)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.2.2.Challenge:arousingtheinterestoftheBoD . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.2.3.Preparingforthesession(whichwillprovetobe
thefirstsession). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.2.4.Backgroundoftheexperiment(firstsession) . . . . . . . . . 121
3.2.5.Conductofthesession(firstsession) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.2.6.Secondsession,threemonthslater. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.2.7.Conclusionandpost-scriptum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
viii WeakSignalsforStrategicIntelligence
3.3.TheDanonecase.Theministryisworried:aretheresigns
showingthatcompanieswilldestroyjobsoverthenext
twoyears?CouldDanoneleaveFrance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.3.1.Theissueathand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.3.2.Freshinterestinweaksignals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.3.3.Background:lackofcross-disciplinarity . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.3.4.Organizationandconductoftheexperiment. . . . . . . . . . 134
3.3.5.Targetingofafieldofstudy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.3.6.SelectionofDanoneasanagent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.3.7.ConductoftheCCMexperiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.3.8.Conclusionatthecloseofthelastsession:huge
plausibleriskonthehorizon! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.4.TheOpelcase:initiatingcollectivetransversalintelligence
toaidstrategicdecision-making. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.4.1.Issuesandbackground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.4.2.CI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.4.3.Organizationalcontext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.4.4.PreparatorystepupstreamofthefirstCCMsession . . . . . 149
3.4.5.ConductoftheCCMsession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.4.6.Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.5.Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.5.1.Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Chapter4.PreparationofWeakSignalsforSessionsin
CollectiveCreationofMeaning:Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.1.Introduction:twostartingsituations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.2.TheRogercase(continued):howarethenewsbriefsused
intheRogerCCMsessionprepared?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.2.1.PreparationofthenewsbriefsusedintheCCM . . . . . . . 170
4.2.2.Thesearchforrawdata:asubstantialtask . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.2.3.Extractionofnewsbriefs:atime-consuming,
delicatetask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.2.4.TheInternettrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.3.CO valorizationcase:automaticsearchfor“newsbriefs” . . . 174
2
4.3.1.Guidingidea:“FULLtext”distillation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.3.2.Stepsinthesearchfor“possibleweaksignal”
newsbriefs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.4.TheDanonecase:preparationoftheweaksignals . . . . . . . . 181
4.4.1.“Manual”search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.4.2.“Manual”extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.4.3.Automaticnewsbriefssearchandextraction . . . . . . . . . 183
TableofContents ix
4.4.4.Conclusionsonthe“CO valorization”and“Danone”
2
casesusingtheApproximaprototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.5.Softwaremodulesforassistingintheautomaticsearchfor
newsbriefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.5.1.Lookuptableofcharacteristicwordsforthefieldbeing
explored.Continuationofthe“CO valorization”case . . . . . . . 185
2
4.5.2.Enhancingtheanticipative-andcharacteristic-word
bases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.5.3.Semanticsproblems:synonyms,polysemesandrelated
matters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.5.4.Softwareenabling“eventsearches” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.5.5.Integrationplatformforcommerciallyavailable
softwaremodules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.6.Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.6.1.Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Introduction
Why take an interest in weak signals? Weak signals are a means of
helping managers of businesses (or other organizations) anticipate, in order
to make strategic decisions in the context of a turbulent environment that
requires them to “see things coming early enough”. Numerous recent
examplesintheworldofindustryandfinance,aswellasinthepublicsector,
have shown that this ambitious objective is more pressing than ever, given
the characteristics of the economic, technological, social, and political
environment. The central concept is that of a “weak signal”, the first
concreteexampleofwhichisprovidedattheverybeginningofthisbook.
How should we go about it? A concept is not sufficient to act; it is not
operational. This book chiefly proposes actionable knowledge, that is, a
method and some tools to search for, identify, and interpret weak signals.
These were gradually constructed within the scientific context of CNRS and
university research. They have been applied and validated in the field on
numerousoccasions.
NOTE.–The phrase “weak signal” has been retained for historical
reasons; we are actually dealing with early warning signals, harbingers of
changesthatmattertothedecision-maker.
I.1. Introductory example: a surprising encounter on the corner of an
alley:Tata
ThefollowingisnarratedbyA,asalesengineeremployedbytheGerman
carmanufacturerX,whoispassingthroughCuneo(Italy).
xii WeakSignalsforStrategicIntelligence
Cuneo is a city in Piedmont of which few foreigners have heard,
includingnon-PiedmonteseItalians. Still,thiscity and its provinceare rather
wealthy: agriculture, viticulture/enology, many SMEs in various industries.
Itiscertainlynotseenasa“showcase”byItaliansorforeigners.Andyet...
I.1.1.SalesengineerA,onaJuly2006morning
“Departing entirely from habit, I go through one of Cuneo’s side streets,
inaratherremotedistrict,togoandvisitsomeonewhohasbeenhospitalized
in that neighborhood’s hospital. As I am about to cross the street and enter
thehospital,ashopsigncatchesmyeye,aTatasign.
Surprised, I cross the street again to have a closer look at it. It is a Tata
cardealership.Icannotresistgoingintolookaround.Thepremisesarequite
small, with three cars on show. The attendant looks at me and smiles
politely.
Iask:
−“Haveyoubeenhereforlong?”
−“It’llbeayearinafewdays.”
I go out of the shop and, finally, into the hospital opposite. My mind is
quiteintrigued.
I remember, as any European very well knows, that Fiat has been on the
brink of economic disaster, arguably in a worse situation than its European
peers/competitors.
On leaving the hospital, I deliberately pass through the Cuneo business
park in search of a Fiat dealer. I go in and, after a short while, I ask the store
managerwhetherheisawareoftheTatabrandbeingpresentinthecity:
− “Yes”,hereplies.
−“That’sanewcompetitorforyou,right?”
−“Yes,butwe’renotoverlyworried.TataisunknowntoItalians.Infact,
Idoubtthatshopwillsurvivemuchlonger,especiallyinthatlocation!”