The Politics of Social Protection in Rural India A case study of two Villages in Maharashtra

389 Pages·2012·10.25 MB·English

The Politics of Social Protection in Rural India
A case study of two Villages in Maharashtra
by
Sony Pellissery
St Cross College
University of Oxford
A Thesis submitted to the Social Sciences Division
University of Oxford
In fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Policy
Trinity Term, 2006
Abstract
Title: The Politics of social protection in rural India: A case study of two villages
in Maharashtra
Sony Pellissery
D. Phil. Thesis in Social Policy St Cross College
Trinity Term, 2006 Oxford University
Social protection should ideally create a framework of 'welfare rights' for the
vulnerable individuals and households. The state, through a set of policies of
promotive and protective measures, sets out to achieve this. However, gaining these
welfare rights in a decentralised democratic framework could be a function of the
bargaining power that each individual, household and social group may possess.
Therefore the micro-level interactions involving claimant, bureaucrat and local elites
constitute the key policy process. Study of the process itself can reveal why some
households gain formal social protection and other fail. This study argues that the
local practices and informal rules underlying these public policy processes are
purposively guided by the private interests of the local elites.
At the heart of this dissertation is a comparative case-study of two villages in the
Indian state of Maharashtra, based on eight months ethnographic fieldwork. Bottom-
up evaluation of two social protection programmes, public works (promotive) and
social assistance (protective) programmes shows that 60 per cent of eligible persons
are excluded from welfare rights. The mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion in these
programmes are studied. The study reveals that both eligibility and entitlement to
'welfare rights' are contested within the power structure of the local community. The
social identity of the claimant, and the ability to build a relationship with the local
leaders or labour market managers act as key routes to access welfare rights. The
precedence of informal rules at the stage of implementation of social protection
programmes reproduced the existing social and economic power structures. As a
result, the welfare rights of individuals and households are affected by the competing
forces in the non-state sectors. These non-state actors, through their network, were
able to weaken the administration and fair allocation of welfare benefits.
Through this analysis the thesis contributes to the understanding of the local state, and
decision-making practices over welfare rights in a decentralised context.
11
Acknowledgements
Writing a note of acknowledgement is a humbling experience as I realise the large number of
people who contributed to complete this doctoral project. First of all, this doctoral thesis was
possible because of a generous grant for three years from the Ford Foundation, New York.
More than a grant, this opportunity brought me into a network of a large number of scholars
from various developing countries and constant interaction with them has shaped various
sections of this thesis. Let me express my sincere thanks to the officials of the Ford
Foundation who offered me this opportunity and other Ford Foundation scholars who
provided peer-encouragement and scholarly comments.
The key inspiration that moved this project is a passion for India and community studies.
There was another key person who shared this passion with enthusiasm: George Smith, my
supervisor. His able guidance was particularly useful in designing the survey in the study. He
has not only been a patient reader of my written work, correcting them meticulously, but also
a guardian-friend, especially encouraging me during the tough times of fieldwork. All the
more, my understanding of Indian ethos and culture was enhanced through discussions with
George, who worked in my homeland Before I was born! My analysis of social policy was
sharpened through constant interaction with him and learning about the way social policy was
formulated and implemented in Europe.
I was blessed with a critical reader of this work in the scholar, Michael Noble. He examined
this thesis at various stages, and advised me based on his experience of social protection
programmes in South Africa.
I am grateful to David Washbrook and Barbara Harriss-White who examined parts of this
thesis in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Particularly, Prof. Harriss-White has been very helpful
in allowing me to use her personal library to benefit from her ongoing work on social
protection. She also generously provided time to help me to design the fieldwork, and to
discuss the findings. Her scholarly and critical comments and encouragement are kindly
acknowledged.
I am deeply thankful to a large number of people without whose co-operation my fieldwork
would not have been possible. A good number of the bureaucrats and politicians at the state,
district and tehsil level gave generous amount of time amidst their busy schedules. These
persons in the positions of district collectors, tehsildars, other bureaucratic positions and
MLAs cannot be named for reasons of confidentiality. A good number of village level elites
and my key informants welcomed me into their homes as often as they could and most of
them did not allow me to leave their home without a meal. Apart from their hospitality, this
close relationship allowed me to conduct my fieldwork in an effective manner. Survey
respondents who provided their valuable time, despite illnesses associated with old age or
in
disability are gratefully remembered as I write these words. My thanks are particularly due to
my research assistants (Kamlakar Shinde and Vijay Yadav) who shared small rooms, rough
weather and basic facilities during the fieldwork.
I have benefited through discussions with various persons in different modes, such as
comments on written work, email communications, clarification over doubts, pointing out
recent literature. Though this list is not exhaustive, the following have contributed very
extensively: Fran Bennett, Sylvia Bergh, Sutapa Choudhury, Bharath Dahiya, Tom DeHerdt,
H. M. Deserda, Chris Dibben, David Gellner, Mark Gorman, David Hall-Mathews, Jens
Lerche, Frances Lund, Subrata Kumar Mitra, Jos Moij, Karen Mastouska, Murali Neettukattil,
Divya Rajaraman, Teresa Smith, Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Jo-pei Tan, Federico Veresse, and
Asghar Zaidi. Thank you all. Particularly I like to record my sincere thanks to Martin Urban,
who copy edited the final version of the thesis.
Various sections of this dissertation have been presented in various venues such as the
Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of Manchester, the European Association of
South Asian Studies, University of Leiden, the School of Governance, University of
Maastricht, the Departments of Development Studies and Government, London School of
Economics, the British Association of South Asia Studies annual conference at the University
of Leeds, the Department of Political Science, University of Bristol, the Helpage
International, London, the Human Development and Capability Association, Groningen, the
Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford; and three graduate seminars at the Department
of Social Policy, Oxford University. I have hugely benefited from the discussions during
these conferences and I am very grateful to the participants. A good number of these
conferences were possible through various travel assistance fellowships from St. Cross
College, and I record my gratitude to the college.
Apart from various lectures, seminars, training, presentation and workshops in the
departments/institutes and colleges in Oxford, I have immensely benefited through the
summer schools/workshops at the European Science Foundation's programme at the
University of Slovenia, the Economic and Social Science Research's workshop at the
University of Durham and the summer school at the University of Heidelberg. Some of these
sessions were extremely useful for gaining methodological knowledge, and to interact with
scholars dealing with similar research issues. I thank the organisers of these programmes.
Let me also thankfully remember my parents and siblings who supported my life in a distant
place through their emotional support. The last person to be thanked is the one with whom I
first shared each new thought or insight of this thesis. Leema, my beloved wife, has been a
patient listener and participant through constructive discussion with my research topic.
26/06/2006 Sony Pellissery
Oxford St Cross College
IV
Table of Contents
Chapter One: Introduction 01
1.1 Vulnerability and the response of the state 02
1.2 Research questions 04
1.3 Data Sources 05
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 06
Chapter Two: Towards a politics of social protection in rural India 09
2.1 Social protection: Brief historical survey of its origin 09
2.1.1 Social protection in developing countries: conceptual clarification 11
2.1.2 Types of social protection: promotive and protective 13
2.1.3 Multiple agencies in the provision of social protection 15
2.2 Towards a politics of social protection 23
2.2.1 Political nature of social protection 23
2.2.2 Multi-layered nature of the politics 24
2.2.3 Power and welfare rights 32
2.2.4 Bourdieu-Giddens framework for studying power relations 34
2.3 The nature of politics and State in India 36
2.3.1 Local State in India 39
2.3.2 Local elites 42
Conclusion 43
Chapter Three: Methods 44
3.1 The study design 44
3.1.1 Bottom-up evaluation for studying multiple actors 45
3.1.2 Comparative case study 47
3.2 Method of case selection 48
3.2.1 Maharashtra: A brief introduction 49
3.2.2 Selection of 'local' case area in the multi-layered administration 50
3.3 Pilot study 52
3.4 Methods of data collection 53
3.4.1 Familiarising with the community 53
3.4.2 Identifying the elites 54
3.4.3 Elite and stakeholder interviews 55
3.4.4 Identifying the network of elites 56
3.4.5 Observation 57
3.4.6 Secondary data 57
3.4.7 Sample Survey 58
3.5. Data processing and analysis 64
3.5.1 Data processing 64
3.5.2 Data analysis 65
3.6 Limitations 68
3.6.1 Related to case study approach 68
3.6.2 Assessing eligibility: subjective element 69
3.6.3 Only partial network is measured quantitatively 69
3.6.4 Small sample problem of some of the programmes 69
Conclusion 70
Chapter Four: Social protection policies in India and their performance 71
4.1 Brief overview of re-distributive policies and programmes in India 71
4.2 Decentralised administration and social protection 74
4.3 Promotive programmes 78
4.3.1 Employment generation: one of the promotive programmes 78
4.3.2 Employment Guarantee Scheme 80
4.3.3 Performance of EGS in Bajgaon and Saralgaon 85
4.4 Income maintenance programmes 86
4.4.1 National Social Assistance Programme 87
4.4.2 Maharashtra government's income maintenance programmes 89
4.4.3 Performance of IM programmes in Bajgaon and Saralgaon 91
Conclusion 93
Chapter Five: Power structure in rural Marathwada 95
5.1 Marathwada: the case study area 96
5.1.1 Economy 96
5.1.2 Social structures 98
5.1.3 Political culture and arenas of electoral competition 101
5.2 The context of the local elites 102
5.2.1 Bajgaon and Saralgaon 102
5.2.2 Business, administrative and political organisation of villages 103
5.3 The elites and their network in the villages 106
5.3.1 Elites in the village 106
5.3.2 Sociogram of elites and properties of a network 109
Conclusion 126
Chapter Six: Process evaluation of the social protection programmes 128
6.1 Income enhancement programmes 129
6.1.1 Registration procedures 129
6.1.2 EGS project identification 131
6.1.3 The implementation of the project 135
6.1.4 Selection of workers 136
6.1.5 Payment of wages 140
6.2 Income maintenance programmes 142
6.2.1 Preparing the application 142
6.2.2 Decision-making 153
6.2.3 Delivery mode of the benefits 156
Conclusion 160
Chapter Seven: Differential allocation: power and legitimacy of local elites and
bureaucrats 162
Section I
7.1.1 The constituents of a public service bargain 162
7.1.2 Public service bargain for social protection 165
7.1.3 The role of non-state actors in shaping the state's allocation 171
7.1.3.1 Shopkeeper 171
7.1.3.2 Landlords 174
7.1.3.3 Labour market inequalities and the EGS 180
Section II
7.2.1 Comparison of cases 186
7.2.1.1 Disabled persons 186
VI
7.2.1.2 Elderly persons living in the household 189
7.2.1.3 Elderly persons living alone 191
7.2.1.4 Female headed households 192
7.2.1.5 Potential participants in EGS 194
7.2.2 Probability modelling using survey data 196
7.2.3 Village political factions and differential allocation 199
Section III
7.5 Can this differential allocation continue unchallenged? 209
7.5.1 Administration as a countervailing force 209
7.5.2 Civil society at local level and accountability of state institutions 212
7.5.3 Change in policy process 216
Conclusion 220
Chapter Eight: Inclusion and exclusion from social protection: The Impact on
individuals and household 223
8.1 A gendered analysis of exclusion from the state benefits 224
8.2 Individual vulnerability and household behaviour 229
8.2.1 Single mothers and estranged women after marriage 229
8.2.2 The elderly persons 237
8.2.3 Disability 247
8.3 The use of social protection benefit in the household 250
8.4 Household dynamics around the state pension 254
8.5 Social inclusion for welfare rights and citizenship: Worm's eye view 256
Conclusion 258
Chapter Nine: Summary and Conclusions 259
9.1.1 Exclusion and inclusion for social protection 261
9.1.2 Power and re-distribution 262
9.1.3 Household strategies and social protection by the state 263
9.2 Policy suggestions for implementation 264
9.2.1 Income enhancement programmes 264
9.2.2 Income maintenance programmes 266
9.3 Conclusion 268
Part II
References 01-31
Appendices
1. Key informants: their selection and profile 32
2. A note on the origin and use of the reputation technique 35
3. Interview schedule 38
4. Respondents of in-depth interview 49
5. Survey instruments 51
6. Bureaucratic, political and judicial structures in various levels 71
7. Profile of the elite members 73
8. Certificates required to claim IM 82
9. Two cases of application tracing 86
10. Probabilistic model using logistic regression 88
11. Caste wise description of who gains benefits from whom 90
12. Network of elites among themselves and bureaucrats 91
13. A Typology of targeting 92
vn
Glossary
Acre - 0.4047 hectare of land
Anganwadi - woman and child health care centre in the village
Anganwadi sevika - A female person in charge of Anganwadi
Arrack - locally distilled alcoholic spirit
Brahmin - high caste or priestly caste
Crore- 10,000,000
Dhoti - cloth worn by men over lower part of body
Ghadi - Regular Farm Worker
Goonda - gang person (they may resort to physical assault to achieve their purpose,
often doing violent activities for someone else in exchange of money.
Gram sevak - Village level worker (government official)
Jubba - a traditional cloth worn by men over the upper part of body
Kharif- monsoon agricultural season (June-October)
Khatic - Muslim SC caste
Kshatriya - second highest caste or warrior caste
Kurta - a traditional cloth worn by men over the upper part of body
Lakh-100,000
Mahar - Hindu SC caste
Mahang - Hindu SC caste
Mali - Hindu backward caste
Marwari - Trading high caste who are migrants from Rajastan to different parts of India
Morcha - a demonstration intended as a show offeree
Munim - manager cum clerk;
Mukadam - labour organiser
Panchayat raj/Gram Panchayat - Village self government
Panchayat Samiti - Committee/council of elected representatives co-ordinating
activities in all the Gram Panchayats in a tehsil area.
Pardi - A scheduled tribe
Rabi - Dry or winter agricultural season (December -May)
Surpanch - Elected village council president
Talatti - Village revenue officer
Tamboli - Muslim OBC caste
Tehsil - block (sub district)
Tehsildar - administrative officer in charge of a tehsil
Upsurpanch - Elected deputy village council president
Zilla- District
Vlll
Abbreviations
BJP - Bharatiya Janatha Party
BPL - Below Poverty Line
BSP - Bahujan Samajvadi Party
CDP - Community Development Programmes
CIMB - Continued Income Maintenance Benefit
Col -Census of India
EGS - Employment Guarantee Scheme
FHH - Female Headed Household
FGD - Focussed Group Discussion
GoM - Government of Maharashtra
Gol - Government of India
HDI - Human Development Index
IAS - Indian Administrative Service
IE - Income Enhancement
IGBMY - Indira Gandhi Boomiheen Shethmazoor Mahila Yojana
IM- Income Maintenance
JE - Junior Engineer
LIC - Life Insurance Corporation of India
MLA - Member of Legislative Assembly
MP - Member of Parliament
NSAP - National Social Assistance Programme
NCP - Nationalist Congress Party
NFBS - National Family Benefit Scheme
NMBS - National Maternity Benefit Scheme
NOAPS - National Old Age Pension Scheme
OAP - Old Age Pension Scheme
OBC - Other Backward Class (they have reservations, but lesser than SC)
PDS - Public Distribution System
PWP - Public Works Programme
RFW - Regular Farm Worker
SC - Scheduled Caste (lower caste designated eligible for reservation in public sector jobs)
SGNY - Sanjay Gandhi Niradhar Yojana (a welfare scheme of the GoM)
SHG - Self-help group
SP - Social protection
SSC - Social Security Committee appointed by guardian minister at tehsil level.
ST - Scheduled Tribe
IX
List of tables
Chapters
Table 3.1 Number of respondents from each programme 62
Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Quantitative dimensions of the EGS: 1972/73 to 2001/02 83
Table 4.2 Financial and physical performance of NSAP 1995-2001 89
Chapter 5
Table 5.1 Statistics of social groups and amenities in the villages studied 103
Table 5.2 Density comparison of two villages 111
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of degrees of relationships in two villages 114
Table 5.4 Comparison of influence indicators of actors in Saralgaon 115
Table 5.5 Comparative table of influence indicators of elites in Bajgaon 116
Table 5.6 Per cent of potential relations existing: community wise in Bajgaon 118
Table 5.7 Per cent of potential relations existing: community wise in Saralgaon 118
Table 5.8 Group adjacency matrix of block models of factions: Bajgaon 123
Table 5.9 Group adjacency matrix of block models of factions: Saralgaon 125
Chapter 6
Table 6.1 Stakeholders and types of workers in eight EGS sites 139
Table 6.2 Process deficits and effects of income enhancement programme 141
Table 6.3 Process deficits and effects of income maintenance programme 159
Chapter 7
Table 7.1 Nature of interaction between actors of different social identity 168
Table 7.2 Exclusion and inclusion in IM and EGS according to caste 170
Table 7.3 Advantages and disadvantages of different labour opportunities for the poor people
in Marathwada 182
Table 7.4 "Most similar" cases from disabled individuals 187
Table 7.5 "Most different" cases from disabled individuals 188
Table 7.6 "Most similar" cases of the elderly persons living in a household 189
Table 7.7 "Most different" cases of the elderly persons living in a household 190
Table 7.8 "Most similar" cases of the elderly persons living alone 191
x