The PLA at Home and Abroad

654 Pages·2010·3.53 MB·English

THE PLA AT HOME AND ABROAD:
ASSESSING THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
OF CHINA’S MILITARY
Roy Kamphausen
David Lai
Andrew Scobell
Editors
June 2010
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ISBN 1-58487-448-1
ii
CONTENTS
Foreword ............................................................................... v
1. Introduction …………………….....……………………1
David Lai
2. The People’s Liberation Army and the Changing
Global Security Landscape ..........................................45
Paul H. B. Godwin
3. Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine,
Circa 2009 .......................................................................99
Andrew Scobell
4. Changing Civil-Military Relations in China ……....135
You Ji and Daniel Alderman
5. T owards an Integrative C4ISR System:
Informationization and Joint Operations in the
People’s Liberation Army ..........................................193
Kevin Pollpeter
6. The People’s Liberation Army and China’s
Internal Security Challenges ….................................237
Harold M. Tanner
7. Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counter
Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond ....295
Andrew S. Erickson
8. People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed
Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces,
2002-2009.......................................................................377
Dennis J. Blasko
iii
9. Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics:
The People’s Liberation Army Experience
with Military Relations ...............................................429
Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen
10. Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense
Industry Reform ..........................................................481
Eric Hagt
11. Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military
Logistics Since 2000 ....................................................553
Susan M. Puska
About the Contributors .....................................................637
iv
FOREWORD
It is a distinct honor to write the foreword to this
volume dedicated to Ambassador James R. Lilley. I am
proud that the George H. W. Bush School of Govern-
ment and Public Service at Texas A&M University—
along with the National Bureau of Asian Research and
the U.S. Army War College—was one of the sponsor-
ing institutions of the September 2009 Conference on
the People’s Liberation Army. For the 11th consecu-
tive year, the event has been held at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
It is entirely appropriate that this book of papers
presented at the 2009 conference be dedicated to Jim’s
memory. He had been closely involved in this series
of conferences from the very start; indeed, Jim was the
driving force behind the instigation of this enterprise
back in the early 1990s. Jim believed that it was impor-
tant to gather leading specialists on China’s military
on a regular basis away from the hustle, bustle, and
hype of Washington for serious, objective, and in-
depth analysis of the subject. Jim was a man ahead of
his time in that he recognized the importance of care-
fully monitoring and documenting the moderniza-
tion of China’s military. Moreover, he was committed
enough to seek funding, commission experts to write
research papers, and ensure the proceedings were
published. The result is an entire bookshelf’s worth of
high quality edited volumes that are invaluable refer-
ence works for policymakers, analysts, scholars, and
students.
This volume and many others stand as part of Jim
Lilley’s enduring legacy and as testament to the im-
v
pact that a single determined individual can have on
U.S. policy. With the passing of Jim Lilley in October
2009, the United States lost one of its most dedicated
public servants and an extremely talented China hand.
And I lost an old and loyal friend.
While Jim, of course, needs no introduction to the
contributors to this volume and many readers, it is
worth mentioning some of the highlights of his ex-
tremely eventful life and long history of selfless ser-
vice to this country. Jim was a China hand literally
from the day he was born in Shandong Province and
grew up speaking Chinese. Jim’s career of government
service began in the military and continued in the in-
telligence community, with a major focus on China.
Later, he shifted to a career as a diplomat. In the early
1980s Jim took the post of chief of the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. Embassy in Taipei.
Shortly thereafter, he ably served as U.S. ambassador
in two Asian capitals at times of considerable political
upheaval—for 3 years in Seoul, Korea, followed by 2
years in Beijing. The latter posting was during my ad-
ministration and took place at an especially difficult
time in America’s relationship with China during the
tragedy of Tiananmen Square and its aftermath. Sim-
ply put, Jim did an outstanding job.
After such a distinguished career, Jim richly de-
served a restful retirement. But leaving government
service in 1991 did not mean sitting back in a rock-
ing chair. Jim lived in the Washington area, where he
remained an active participant in policy debates on
China and Korea and a keen sponsor and lively par-
ticipant in this conference series.
While Jim never got to see this volume or attend
last year’s conference, I am confident that he would
vi
have been extremely satisfied with the results. I com-
mend this fine collection to anyone interested in the
military and security affairs of China.

GEORGE H. W. BUSH
vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
David Lai
The final years of the 2000s turned out to be quite
eventful for the People’s Republic of China (PRC and
China interchangeably) and its armed forces, the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA). While there were excit-
ing events for them to celebrate, there were disturbing
ones for them to worry about as well.
China’s economic reform and phenomenal eco-
nomic development had sailed on uncharted waters
for 30 years. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leaders could not have wished for a better occasion
than the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing to celebrate
their accomplishments. The Beijing Olympics ceremo-
nies were probably the most expensive in history; but
China had plenty to spend. After all, its economic de-
velopment had turned it into the world’s third largest
economy and trading nation, the largest holder of for-
eign exchange reserves and U.S. treasury bonds, and
so on.
In 2009, the PRC turned 60. The CCP leaders
staged a lavish celebration and held a spectacular
national day armed forces parade that made similar
ones in Moscow and Pyongyang look pale by com-
parison. “Commander-in-Chief” Hu Jintao followed
the footsteps of his predecessors (the “core leaders”
[领导核心] of the CCP’s first, second, and third gen-
erations: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Ze-
min, respectively) to review PLA troops in Tiananmen
Square. The PLA took the occasion to show off its de-
fense modernization advances since its last parade in
1999.
1
Also in 2009, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) celebrated their 60th anniversaries.
The PLAAF demonstrated its new air power during
the October 1 national day parade. The PLAN held
its birthday party earlier in April in Qingdao, the
Headquarters of its Beihai Fleet (北海舰队 [Northern
Sea Fleet]). Over 200 foreign naval dignitaries, most
notably the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and the
Russian Navy Commander, were invited to the cele-
bration. It was like an Olympics meeting for the inter-
national navies. President Hu Jintao and all the senior
PLA leaders led the review of China’s major warships,
headed by two nuclear-powered and armed subma-
rines (the first-ever public demonstration of China’s
strategic submarine fleet) and 21 warships from 14
other nations, especially major naval powers such as
the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
France.
Behind these glittering numbers of China’s eco-
nomic development, the PLA parades, and the spec-
tacular celebration fireworks, the world clearly saw an
ambitious China edging its way to the center stage of
international economic, political, and military affairs.
However, a few other major events in the last 2 years
came just in time to remind the Chinese leaders, and
the world as well, that China still faced a challenging
future.
• The global financial crisis was a wakeup call
to China that its economy was vulnerable to a
volatile world market that was still beyond its
control. China’s mercantilist export-oriented
development strategy, while deserving credit
for jump-starting China’s economic develop-
ment, was making China too dependent on the
well- and ill-being of the outside world. The
2