Saudi Arabia's nuclear posture: is hedging the future?

161 Pages·2015·1.61 MB·English

by  Holloway, William F.

NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

SAUDI ARABIA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: IS HEDGING
THE FUTURE?

by

William F. Holloway

September 2016

Thesis Advisor: Erik J. Dahl
Co-Advisor: Zachary S. Davis
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SAUDI ARABIA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: IS HEDGING THE FUTURE?
6. AUTHOR(S) William F. Holloway
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) leaves Iran with residual capabilities that positions
it for the rapid development of nuclear weapons should it abandon the deal. This thesis examines how the
JCPOA affects Saudi Arabia and what actions the Saudis are likely to take. The Saudi premise of
“whatever they have, we’ll have” in regard to Iran leans toward a Saudi Arabian nuclear hedging strategy,
but is it feasible? This thesis proposes a model that explores the interaction of threat, domestic factors, and
current international nonproliferation regimes and how they drive a nation toward nuclear hedging. The
model is applied to the cases of Pakistan, a nuclear proliferate nation, and Japan, the archetypical hedging
nation, and later to Saudi Arabia. This comparative case study finds that despite its national will,
technological factors—such as an impoverished scientific community—make Saudi Arabia’s nuclear
hedging untenable at this time. In addition to technical capability, the presence or absence of strong
alliances factor into the national decision to hedge or proliferate. This thesis concludes by offering insight
into when the United States should reexamine the Saudi Arabian case and what it should consider if the
Saudis consider nuclear optionality.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF
Saudi Arabia, Nuclear, Hedging, Pakistan, Japan PAGES
161
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SAUDI ARABIA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: IS HEDGING THE FUTURE?

William F. Holloway
Major, United States Army
B.S., Excelsior College, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY & STRATEGY)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2016

Approved by: Erik J. Dahl
Thesis Advisor

Zachary S. Davis
Co-Advisor

Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) leaves Iran with residual
capabilities that positions it for the rapid development of nuclear weapons should it
abandon the deal. This thesis examines how the JCPOA affects Saudi Arabia and what
actions the Saudis are likely to take. The Saudi premise of “whatever they have, we’ll
have” in regard to Iran leans toward a Saudi Arabian nuclear hedging strategy, but is it
feasible? This thesis proposes a model that explores the interaction of threat, domestic
factors, and current international nonproliferation regimes and how they drive a nation
toward nuclear hedging. The model is applied to the cases of Pakistan, a nuclear
proliferate nation, and Japan, the archetypical hedging nation, and later to Saudi Arabia.
This comparative case study finds that despite its national will, technological factors—
such as an impoverished scientific community—make Saudi Arabia’s nuclear hedging
untenable at this time. In addition to technical capability, the presence or absence of
strong alliances factor into the national decision to hedge or proliferate. This thesis
concludes by offering insight into when the United States should reexamine the Saudi
Arabian case and what it should consider if the Saudis consider nuclear optionality.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................1
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................1
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................10
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................11
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................12
II. A MODEL FOR NUCLEAR HEDGING ..........................................................13
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................13
B. HEDGING AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ..............................14
C. A HEDGING MODEL FROM PROLIFERATION MODELS ..........18
D. SECURITY FACTORS ...........................................................................19
E. DOMESTIC FACTORS ..........................................................................23
1. Technological Factors ..................................................................26
2. Economic Factors .........................................................................29
F. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES .............................................................30
G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................32
III. PAKISTAN CASE STUDY: MORE THAN A HEDGE ..................................35
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................35
B. HISTORY .................................................................................................36
C. PAKISTAN’S SECURITY IMPERATIVE ...........................................36
D. ALLIANCES AS AN OFFSET TO INDEPENDENT ACTION .........38
E. DOMESTIC FACTORS ..........................................................................41
1. Technological Barriers and National Will .................................44
2. Economic Factors .........................................................................47
F. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES .............................................................50
G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................52
IV. JAPAN CASE STUDY: THE CONSUMMATE HEDGE ...............................57
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................57
B. HISTORY .................................................................................................58
C. ANALYZING JAPAN’S EVOLVING SECURITY THREATS .........60
D. ALLIANCES AS AN OFFSET TO NUCLEAR ACQUISITION .......64
E. DOMESTIC FACTORS ..........................................................................66
1. Technological Factors ..................................................................70
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2. Economics .....................................................................................73
F. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES .............................................................75
G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................77
V. SAUDI ARABIA: NOT QUITE A HEDGE ......................................................83
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................83
B. HISTORY .................................................................................................84
C. SECURITY FACTORS ...........................................................................87
1. Tenuous Alliances as an Offset to Nuclear Acquisition ............94
D. DOMESTIC FACTORS ..........................................................................99
1. Technological Hurdles to a Credible Hedge ............................104
2. Economic Factors .......................................................................106
E. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES ...........................................................108
F. CONCLUSION: A HEDGE ONLY IF, WHEN, AND HOW IT
IS BUILT ................................................................................................110
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................113
A. FINDINGS ..............................................................................................113
1. One Model, Three Different Cases, Three Different
Outcomes ....................................................................................113
B. IMPLICATIONS ...................................................................................118
1. Alliances Matter .........................................................................118
2. Technology Matters ...................................................................119
C. FINAL WORDS .....................................................................................121
1. DOD Implications ......................................................................121
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................123
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................143

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