Table Of ContentJAPAN-CHINA JOINT HISTORY RESEARCH REPORT
(provisional translation)
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
Vol.1
March 2011
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY Vol.1
CONTENTS
OVERVIEW 1
PART I: THE INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION OF MODERN BILATERAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER 1. Inception of a Modern Relationship 3
Kitaoka Shin’ichi
CHAPTER 2. Confrontation and Accord: Japan and China Pursue Different Courses 35
Kawashima Shin
CHAPTER 3. Japan’s Continental Expansion Policy and the Chinese National Revolution
Movement 66
Hattori Ryûji
PART II: THE WARTIME PERIOD
CHAPTER 1. The Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino-Japanese War 95
Tobe Ryôichi
CHAPTER 2. The Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45: Japanese Military Invasion and Chinese
Resistance 128
Hatano Sumio, Shôji Jun’ichirô
CHAPTER 3. The Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War 165
Hatano Sumio
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
OVERVIEW
The modern and contemporary history of Japanese-Sino relations includes a period
of intense warfare, and memories of such history are still fresh in the minds of many
people in both nations. Particularly acute are Chinese recollections of the injuries
suffered during the invasion by Japan. Thus, in contrast with the history of bilateral
relations prior to the modern era, achieving mutual understanding on the true
nature of the conflict and perceptions of wartime responsibility among people in
both countries is a very difficult matter.
Both Japanese and Chinese researchers identified the start of Asia’s modern
era as being the period of initial contact with modern Western powers. But they did
not completely agree on the extent to which modernization was attributable to
external shocks or to factors of internal origin. The two sides recognized, though, the
significance of encounters with the West; had Western powers not ventured into Asia,
neither Japan nor China would have followed the paths they subsequently took.
While the two countries experienced shock at different times and in different ways,
there was agreement on the basic premise that for China the shock came in the form
of the Opium War, and for Japan it was the Black Ships of Commodore Matthew
Perry and the Meiji Restoration.
To some extent, the two subcommittees—one investigating the modern and
contemporary eras and the other researching the ancient, medieval, and
early-modern eras—took different approaches in determining research themes.
Members of the former divided the modern and contemporary eras into several
chronological stages, further dividing each stage into periods according to
developments in Japanese-Sino relations and examining the historical process of
each period in a comprehensive manner. Put another way, the papers treated the
fundamental process of historical development from a temporal, rather than
thematic, angle.
Specifically, the subcommittee established three historical stages—prewar,
wartime, and postwar—with the war years (1931–45) positioned in the middle. The
first stage begins with each country’s opening up to the West through the 1920s, the
second stage from the Manchurian Incident until Japan’s defeat in World War II, and
the third stage from the postwar period until the present. Each stage was further
divided into three chronological periods, resulting in the creation of nine periods.
Japanese and Chinese papers were written for each period, and these were
organized into nine chapters under three parts.
In order to ensure balanced treatment among the two countries’ researchers,
significant issues for each period were identified as “shared topics of concern.” This
was to prevent either side from completely disregarding issues that the other
deemed important; researchers from both countries were compelled to include an
analysis of these issues in their papers. Considering the likelihood of substantially
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differing perceptions regarding the basic processes of historical development, we did
not seek to come up with a unified interpretation for every incident. Rather, we tried
to encourage thorough discussion and exchanges of views by comparing the
treatises for each historical period written from the Japanese and Chinese
perspectives. After revising the treatises to incorporate points raised by the other
side that were considered appropriate, we published both papers side by side. In
other words, we adopted an approach whereby each side presented its own
conclusions after exchanging views and thoroughly discussing each topic with the
other.
The subcommittee for modern and contemporary history met six times to
exchange views: on the sidelines of three plenary meetings in December 2006 in
Beijing, March 2007 in Tokyo, and January 2008 in Beijing, and separately in
November 2007 in Fukuoka, March 2008 in Kagoshima, and May 2008 in Jinan.
Individual members also met privately on numerous occasions and conducted
on-site research.
Subcommittee members of both countries undertook joint research in a
consistently serious, straightforward, and cordial manner. Through the process of
research and discussion, we learned that scholars on both sides had the same or
nearly the same understanding and perception of a majority of historical facts. This
was attributed to the fact that both sides adhered strictly to basic principles of
historical research and scholarly criterion, respected historical evidence, and based
their search for truth on facts. This was the fundamental reason we were able to
conduct joint research so smoothly.
Differences were observed, though, in research methodology and
approaches to historical issues. Chinese participants placed greater emphasis on the
substance of the various historical incidents involving the two countries; Japanese
researchers, on the other hand, tended to focus more closely on the process by which
these incidents emerged and developed. Naturally, over the long course of joint
research, a degree of mutual understanding was reached on the differences in
approach. The Japanese side realized that Chinese historians approached their work
quite dispassionately despite the emphasis they gave to the factors behind the war’s
heavy impact on their country. Those on the Chinese side, meanwhile, came to see
that the empirical approach adopted by Japanese researchers did not indicate a
refutation of Japan’s responsibilities as the perpetrators.
Historians of both countries need to continue their discussions in an effort to
avoid simplification and allow for complexity and to deal with cases where there are
differing interpretations of the same historical incidents. But the fact that researchers
in the subcommittee on modern and contemporary history gained a measure of
understanding of each other’s views represents a big step forward.
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PART I: THE INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION OF MODERN BILATERAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER 1
INCEPTION OF A MODERN RELATIONSHIP
Kitaoka Shin’ichi
Introduction
International relations in East Asia until the mid-nineteenth century were premised
on an order quite different from that which prevailed in the West. The arrangement
was an inconvenience for the Western powers, which, on the strength of their
superior military might, demanded changes. This challenge from the West forced a
fundamental transfiguration of the East Asian international order. While it would be
too simplistic to view this transfiguration solely as a reaction to the “shock” from the
West, they would never have occurred without such external stimuli.
Japan and China responded in very different ways, and this had a big
bearing on the subsequent relationship between the two countries. This chapter will
describe how the two countries’ respective histories and traditions shaped the
manner in which they dealt with this external shock and how bilateral
contact—which had been relatively limited prior to modernization—evolved and
deepened in the subsequent years. For this reason, this chapter differs from most
others in the section on Modern and Contemporary History in that it details the
establishment and development of bilateral relations from the perspective of
comparative history, rather than offering a description and analysis of the
relationship itself. In the light of this writer’s area of specialization, the focus of this
endeavor here will inevitably be on Japan.
1. Opening to the West
(1) International Order in the West and East Asia
A China-centered international order existed in East Asia through the first half of the
nineteenth century based on the sakuhō system, under which China granted court
ranks and official titles to the rulers of neighboring tributary states that brought
tributes (chōkō) to China. The system served to reinforce China’s cultural and
political superiority while also granting official endorsement and protection to the
rulers of the tributaries. In return for the tributes, the countries benefitted from
favorable trading terms.1
1 This system has been called by various names, but to the extent that it was centered on the
sakuhō imperial edicts and the chōkō (or shinkō) tributes and also that it was premised on a
3
Japan was virtually alone in East Asia in insisting on equal terms with China.
Owing to domestic political and economic reasons, there have been cases in ancient
history and also during the medieval period of rulers (notably Ashikaga Yoshimitsu)
receiving the title of “king of Japan” from the Chinese court and paying homage to
China as a vassal, but such examples were quite rare.2
As a result, Japan was a relatively remote entity for China. The Qing dynasty
tended to maintain close track of its tributaries, but it had very little information on
Japan.3 Japan, on the other hand, was quite familiar with the Qing, and trade was
conducted with Qing merchants even during the Edo period (1603–1868). Among the
biggest imports from China were books. Japan was at once heavily influenced by
China under the Qing dynasty despite limited direct contact and, as a reaction, also
motivated to develop its own distinctive culture and identity.
The Western world, meanwhile, featured an international order quite unique
in world history consisting of sovereign states and their colonies. Sovereign states
were, as a matter of formality, all on equal terms with one another and bore
responsibility for everything within their own state and their colonies. Conversely,
states could claim sovereignty only when they were capable of taking complete
responsibility over that territory. A corollary to this was that all territories belonged
to just one country. As a matter of principle, no land belonged to two or more
countries or to none at all.
Such relations among countries are quite rare in the history of the world. In
many civilizations, relations between countries have not been equal; there has
usually been one dominant power, with other countries being positioned
hierarchically in relation to that power. A state’s possession of territory was not
absolute, moreover, so it was not unusual for a region to belong to several states or
to none.
In East Asia, too, the international order was traditionally not among equals,
as described above. While an East Asian tributary in a suzerainty relationship did
not have the autonomy of a Western sovereign state, neither were they as
subordinate as the colonies of those states. Japan and the Qing court laid competing
relationship in which China was placed in a position of cultural superiority, the different names
do not indicate major discrepancies. For a detailed examination of the various features, refer to
Nishizato Kikō’s Shinmatsu Chū-Ryū-Nichi kankei no kenkyū (A Study of China-Ryūkyū-Japan
Relations at the End of the Qing Dynasty) (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2005), 13–18.
2 See Banno Masataka, Kindai Chūgoku seiji gaikōshi (History of Politics and Diplomacy in Modern
China) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1973), chap. 3. While the Wanli Huidian (1587)
collection of statutes describes Japan as a “tributary state,” Japan is listed as a “mutually trading
state” in the 1818 Jiaqing Huidian. Ibid., 84–87.
3 The 1849 Yinghuan zhilue (A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit), whose 1866 reprint was
brought to Japan, for example, simply quotes ancient documents in describing Japan as
consisting of three main islands: Tsushima to the north, Nagasaki in the middle, and Satsuma to
the south. See Sasaki Yō’s Shinmatsu Chūgoku ni okeru Nihonkan to Seiyōkan (Views of Japan and
the West in the Late Qing Dynasty) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000), iii–iv.
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claims to the Ryūkyū Kingdom, for instance, and there was only tenuous recognition
of Hokkaido as being Japanese territory until Russia began making advances into
East Asia.
In this context, the encounter with the West raised great difficulties for both
Japan and China. China, in particular, was unable to adjust to the system of modern
states that Western countries tried to impose on East Asia, and it consequently
suffered great losses. By contrast, Japan, relatively speaking, was able to ride out the
challenge from the West without making a major blunder.4
(2) China’s Opening to the West
In 1661 the Qing emperor issued the Great Evacuation order, in effect sealing off the
coast. This, along with the haijin ban on maritime activities, was rescinded in 1684,
and four ports—including Macau and Ningbo—were reopened, and trade was
conducted through customhouses there. Foreign trade was prohibited in 1757,
though, except through the port of Guangzhou, and the city thrived from the late
eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, by which some 150 foreign ships made port
calls every year. Trade under the so-called Canton System was most active with
Britain, which was positioned by the Qing court as a tributary state. British traders
were under stringent restrictions, being allowed to trade with only a limited number
of Chinese merchants in the Thirteen Factories district of Guangzhou.
Britain began importing large volumes of tea from China from the end of the
eighteenth century, resulting in a massive outflow of silver. To halt the drain, Britain
began exporting opium, which quickly spread throughout China and resulted in a
dramatic jump in the number of addicts. In 1839 Qing official Lin Zexu proclaimed a
strict ban on opium and ordered its confiscation, citing the need to rebuild public
finance and drive opium addiction out of the country. This served as the trigger for
the First Opium War. Many in Britain strongly opposed the war as being morally
unjustified, but by May 1840 both houses of Parliament had come to support the war
and given its approval of war expenditures.
The Qing were no match for Britain. By 1842 it concluded the Treaty of
Nanjing, which called for the opening of four more ports besides
Guangzhou—Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai—and the ceding of Hong Kong
Island. Demands for a similar treaty were made by the United States in 1843, and on
the principle of impartiality the Qing conferred most-favored-nation status to
countries other than Britain as well.
These new terms of trade continued to be regarded by China as an
expansion of the Canton System of relations with tributaries. The number of treaty
ports was still quite limited and concentrated in the south, and for the most part they
4 By “blunder” I mean only from the viewpoint of dealing with the West and preserving the
country’s independence at that time. Generally speaking, the same conditions that lead to success
in one area not infrequently cause failure in the next. This is a point that must not be forgotten in
the context of East Asian history.
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were provincial fishing ports. The ceding of such remote areas was meant simply to
appease Western demands.
The Western powers, though, leased land surrounding the ports, built up
infrastructure, created a system of local rule, and established territory unlike that of
traditional China. Western-style buildings were constructed one after another,
especially in Shanghai, and the landscape underwent a dramatic transformation.
Christianity also moved into these settlements, which went on to trigger major
changes in the country.
The influx of Christianity and the debilitation of the Qing dynasty sparked
the Taiping Rebellion, causing great upheaval in China. The civil war continued
from 1850 to 1864 and resulted in an estimated 20 million casualties. Leading the
suppression was not the imperial Qing army proper but the Xiang and Huai militia
forces led by Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, respectively, and the Ever-Victorious
Army of Western mercenaries commanded by British officer Charles Gordon. The
rebellion was of great historical significance in that it not only dealt a blow to the
Qing dynasty but also exposed the powerlessness of the traditional political
structure centered on Manchu leadership.
The Arrow War (Second Opium War) occurred in the midst of the rebellion,
partly by accident. In October 1856 Qing officials boarded and inspected the Arrow, a
Chinese-owned, allegedly British-registered ship, and arrested 12 Chinese crew
members on suspicion of piracy. The British contended that Qing officials pulled
down the British flag that the Arrow had been flying. In fact, the registration of the
nationality of the Arrow had expired, in which case the Qing action was not unlawful.
The British, though, seeking to expand its privileges by renegotiating the Treaty of
Nanjing, invited France, Russia, and the United States to forge an alliance. France,
which was embarking on an active foreign policy under Napoleon III, accepted the
invitation. The joint British-French force that had conquered Guangzhou at the end
of 1857 headed north to Tianjin, where the Qing army, exhausted from putting down
the Taiping Rebellion, conceded the city. The Treaties of Tianjin were signed in June
1858.
Opposition to the treaties sprung up in Beijing after the British and French
forces left, resulting in further clashes when Britain and France returned the
following year to ratify the treaties. Full-scale fighting resumed, and in October 1860
British and French troops entered Beijing, destroying and thoroughly looting the Old
Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan) and Summer Palace (Yiheyuan).
Britain and France signed the Convention of Beijing in 1860 with the Qing,
which confirmed the validity of the Treaties of Tianjin and which now was saddled
with a heavier burden. Namely, the Qing was required to (1) provide 11 treaty ports,
including Tianjin, Hankou, and Nanjing, and grant foreigners living in treaty port
settlements the right to travel; (2) grant the right of Christians to evangelize and
legalize the opium trade; (3) grant the right to establish diplomatic legations in
Beijing and outlaw the use of the Chinese character for barbarian (夷) in referring to
foreigners; and (4) cede the Kowloon Peninsula to Britain. In addition, Russia, which
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mediated the treaty, won a concession for the full control of present-day Primorsky
Krai, which had previously been jointly settled with China.
In sum, Britain and other Western countries had ambitions on Qing China
and proceeded to satisfy them on the strength of their military and by inventing a
host of excuses. The Qing, on the other hand, did not take adequate precautions
against the military might and ambitions of the Western powers, and inadvertently
wound up giving the Western powers excuses to make further encroachments. In
many cases, the damage suffered could have been mitigated had Qing leaders been
more vigilant.
(3) Japan’s Opening to the West
By comparison, Japan’s opening to the West was relatively free of turmoil.
Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Japan in July 1853 seeking diplomatic
relations. He soon left the country but returned in February the following year, at
which time the Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States and the Empire
of Japan was signed. The treaty called for the opening of two ports at Hakodate and
Shimoda. These could be interpreted as being exceptions to the policy of national
seclusion, though, rather than a full-fledged opening to the West. Following the US
example, Britain, the Netherlands, Russia, and France also entered into similar
agreements. When Townsend Harris arrived in Shimoda in 1856 as US consul
general to Japan and pushed for a treaty of commerce and navigation, though, Japan
could no longer put off a decision. The signing of the US-Japan Treaty of Amity and
Commerce in 1858 clearly showed that the isolationist policy had been abandoned,
and the new treaty had far graver implications than the Treaty of Peace and Amity.
The shogunate was split between those arguing for the gradual opening of
the country and those insisting on unbroken seclusion. The former camp hoped to
import Western military technology and establish diplomatic organs, believing that
the opening of the country was inevitable. It solicited the advice of daimyo lords and
sought to win over public opinion, and it endorsed Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu
(1837–1913), head of one of the Tokugawa clan’s branch houses, as successor to the
heirless shogun, Iesada. The conservatives, on the other hand, while recognizing the
dangers of confrontation with the West, were reluctant to undertake military and
diplomatic reforms or to seek the opinion of others, including regional daimyo. They
supported Tokugawa Yoshitomi (1846–66)—later renamed Iemochi—for shogun
despite his young age, as he belonged to the prestigious Kishū (Wakayama) line of
the Tokugawa clan and thus considered a more fitting candidate in the shogunal line
of descent.
The shogunate’s leader following Perry’s arrival was Senior Councillor (rōjū)
Abe Masahiro, who was succeeded by Hotta Masayoshi when Abe died in 1857. Both
men had an understanding of Western civilization and realized that Japan had no
choice but to open up. The question was how. Instead of reaching a decision
unilaterally, they sought the views of numerous daimyo, and they also hoped to sign
the commercial treaty with the blessings of the imperial court. This issue of imperial
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sanction became quite complicated when it became embroiled with that of shogunal
succession, and the shogunate was unable to gain the emperor’s consent. Hotta was
forced to step aside, after which Ii Naosuke—a supporter of the Kishū line—took
over as tairō (great elder), signed the treaty without imperial sanction, and declared
that Yoshitomi had been chosen as the next shogun. Many who had opposed him
were punished in the Ansei Purge, touching off a retaliation and leading to Ii’s
assassination in March 1860 in what is known as the Sakuradamongai Incident.
Antiforeign activities gained great momentum from around the time of Ii’s
purge and assassination. Save for isolated attacks on individual Westerners, military
clashes with the West were limited, though, to the June 1863 firing of a Western ship
by Chōshū soldiers, the Kagoshima Bombardment in August that year by a British
naval squadron, and the September 1864 bombardment of Shimonoseki Strait by a
four-nation fleet. There was thus little military turbulence compared to the situation
in China.
There were several reasons for this.
The first was that the Western powers were primarily interested in China.
Japan, by comparison, was a small, peripheral country. The powers were
preoccupied fighting the First and Second Opium Wars and unable to devote their
full attention to Japan. This is also one explanation for the fact that it was the United
States, rather than Britain or France, that led the push for Japan’s opening. Similar
circumstances were behind the relatively limited pressure exerted on Korea, as will
be detailed below.
The second reason was that Japan had learned of the Qing dynasty’s demise
and had time to prepare for Western encroachment. That the Qing was subjected to
an unjust conflict like the First Opium War was terribly shocking for Japan, alerting
its leaders to the malevolent motives and awesome brute force of the West. Western
ships had repeatedly appeared in Japan’s coastal waters and been visiting the
Ryūkyū Islands, and the Netherlands had advised Japan to end its isolation. Japan’s
decision to open up was not made willingly, but the country was nonetheless better
prepared to deal with the consequences than China.
The third key reason was that members of the ruling elite in Japan were of
the military class and had an appreciation of military affairs. They thus immediately
perceived that Japan did not have a chance of winning against the West. Kawaji
Toshiakira, who played a prominent role in Japan’s foreign affairs, such as by
negotiating a treaty of friendship with Russian envoy Evfimii Putiatin, had great
respect for Putiatin as a “truly heroic man” who had survived a long and difficult
journey to reach Japan. Kawaji conceded that the samurai class, himself included,
had become too accustomed to peaceful times and could not hope to match the
stoutheartedness of such men.5
5 Satō Seizaburō, “Kawaji Toshiakira” in Shi no chōyaku o koete: Seiyō no shōgeki to Nihon (Beyond
“Salto Mortale”: Western Impact on Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan, 1992; reprint, Tokyo:
Chikura Publishing, 2009), 106.
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