Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics

186 Pages·1990·17.81 MB·English

by  Barry Rubin (auth.)

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN EGYPTIAN
POLmCS
Also by Barry Rubin
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Islamic Fundamentalism
in Egyptian Politics
Barry Rubin
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-21095-4 ISBN 978-1-349-21093-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21093-0
©Barry Rubin, 1990
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
NewYork,N.Y.10010
First published in the United States of America in 1990
ISBN 978-0-312-04571-5
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Rubin, Barry M.
Islamic fundamentalism in Egyptian politics/Barry Rubin.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-312-04571-5
1. Islamic fundamentalism-Egypt. 2. Islam and politics-Egypt.
3. Egypt-Politics and government-197~ I. Title
BP64.E3R83 1990
322' .1 '0962--dc20 <»-8060
CIP
Contents
Preface vii
Overview I
I Introduction 3
Factors Promoting Fundamentalism 4
Factors Opposing Fundamentalism 5
Prospects for Fundamentalism 6
Organization of this Study 6
2 Contemporary History of Fundamentalism in Egypt 10
The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood 10
The Second Round 14
Sadat Revives the Brotherhood 16
Confrontation and Assassination 19
Mubarak Tames the Opposition 23
Conclusions 26
3 The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology and Program 28
Al-Tilimsani's Policy 29
General Strategy and Electoral Politics 31
Attitude Toward Radicals, Violence and Demonstrations 35
Internal Factions 38
Conclusions 39
4 TheJama'at 41
General Ideology 43
Al-Jihad's Ideology 44
Sayyid Qutb 49
The Critique of Jahiliyyah 50
Motives 53
The Islamic Liberation Organization and AI-Takfir
Wal-Hijrah 56
Al-Jihad 57
Survivors From (Hell] Fire 59
Rivalry Among the Jama'at 60
Conclusions 61
v
vi Contents
5 The Radical Jam'iyat 63
Jam'iyat on University Campuses 63
The Jam'iyat's Appeal 65
Islamic Action in Asyut 67
Student Elections 69
Reasons for Jam'iyat's Growth 70
Community-based Jam'iyat 72
Charismatic Preachers 75
6 Popular Islam and Official Ulama 79
Al-Azhar and State Control Over Religion 80
The Debate With the Radicals 83
How Should Al-Azhar Counter Extremism? 86
The Mainstream Clergy and the Shari' ah 88
The Popular Moderate Islamic Revival 88
7 Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Issues 93
Stages of Egyptian Foreign Policy 96
The Fundamentalists and the United States 98
The USSR 106
Israel 107
Iran and the Arabs 115
The Arabs and Arab Nationalism 121
8 Strategy and Doctrine 125
Muslim Brotherhood: Political Party or Electoral
Alliance? 126
Critics of Brotherhood Strategy 130
The Shari'ah as Rationale 131
How to Implement the Shari'ah 132
Reform or Revolution? 137
9 Assessments and Conclusions 150
Notes and References 156
Bibliography 171
Preface
Following the Victory of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 and the
murder of Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, many studies
were undertaken and published on radical Islamic fundamentalist
movements in the Middle East. Given these events, that research
stressed the importance of such groups, focusing on reasons for their
rise and possible future success.
During the following decade, however, Islamic fundamentalist
movements did not come to power in any country. Furthermore, they
failed to show the kind of growth in power, size or influence which
many observers had expected. Consequently, it is necessary to
analyze why the fundamentalists have not done better.
This study deals with Egypt, the most important country in the
Arab world. Certainly, Egypt had many problems in the 1980s which
might conceivably have strengthened radical Islamic groups, whose
apparent assets seemed to include a long-established Muslim
Brotherhood and a revolutionary underground capable of murdering
the country's ruler. This book considers why other, contrary, factors
remained uppermost in Egyptian politics.
The book began as a research project for the Orkand Corporation.
Raymond Stock did a massive amount of translation with admirable
speed and accuracy. Dr Ami Ayalon and Professor Jerrold Green
read the manuscript and made extremely helpful suggestions. Enthu
siastic support from Simon Winder is also acknowledged with plea
sure.
BARRY RUBIN
vii
Overview
Revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt is capable of epi
sodes of terrorism and urban disorder, but lacks the capability to
overthrow the government. A careful examination of the ideologies
of Egyptian Islamic groups reveals deep divisions among them and
their espousal of doctrines which do not appeal to most Egyptian
Muslims. These constraints, which create conflicting approaches to
how national political power should be gained and used, are unlikely
to be overcome under the current leadership of the fundamentalist
movement.
Four main forces, each demanding a more Islamic society, are
currently active in Egypt. The first of these, the Muslim Brother
hood, has made a strong commitment to a reformist strategy because
of severe repression in the past. The Brotherhood presents itself
today as a responsible and moderate force in an effort to broaden its
base and to gain a fully legal status from the government.
The second grouping, the jama'at, are small, underground groups
that seek a violent revolution. They are badly divided among
themselves, however, and have suffered greatly from the govern
ment's countermeasures. The jam'iyat, the third grouping, are
campus or neighborhood associations - some led by charismatic
preachers - which have varying ideological views. Their interest in
continuing to function openly, however, cautions them against
confronting the authorities.
These radicals tend to accept the doctrine of jahiliyyah, which
declares that Egypt's rulers and much of its society is pagan and
anti-Islamic. It is difficult for average Egyptians to see themselves as
having deviated from their own religion, a fact making it harder for
the revolutionaries to win many converts. Moreover, their ideology
deviates in other ways from Islam as most Egyptians understand it.
The fourth group, the mainstream clergy, tends to be pro
government. This attitude is based on a combination of factors - the
clergy's distaste for the radicals' innovative ideas, its professional
rejection of the revolutionaries' anti-clericalism, and the fact that the
government controls its jobs and salaries. Thus, while there has
undoubtedly been a popular revival of Islam in Egypt, much of this
movement has been of an apolitical and traditionalist nature which
does not necessarily coincide with the views of extremists.
1
2 Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics
The fundamentalists are extremely suspicious of the United States,
the USSR, and Israel. Non-Muslims are often seen as anti-Muslim
forces. The view that Western culture is subverting Egypt's tradition
al way of life and religious piety encourages these attitudes as much
as does any political question. The fundamentalists preach non
alignment.
Despite the fundamentalists' passionate feelings about foreign
policy issues, they are more focused on internal affairs. Their main
complaint about the United States is what it does inside Egypt -
especially its alleged control over the government and the high profile
of Americans throughout the country-rather than what it does in the
region as a whole. There is an underlying isolationism which condi
tions their views of external matters and the lower priority these hold
in their agenda. Very few of them have any sympathy toward Iran;
Khumayni's ideology is seen as a handciap for the Egyptian fun
damentalist cause.
The most important domestic issue for the fundamentalists is the
implementation of the Shari'ah. The mainstream clergy hopes that
the government will enact the Islamic code as the basis for all Egypt's
laws. The Brotherhood hopes to persuade others through parliamen
tary means, while the revolutionaries believe that the authorities
have no intention of enacting the Shari'ah.
Both the mainstream clergy and the Brotherhood criticize the use
of violence. The jam'iyats use low-level violence on local matters but
are restrained by the concern about repression. The revolutionaries
say that only armed struggle can bring about a change in Egypt.
Within the fundamentalist community, the more moderate forces
the bulk of the clergy, the Brotherhood, and some jam'iyats -
campaign for an institutionalized Islamic society. The jama'at and
some jam'iyat demand an Islamic state. The Mubarak government
has clearly played on these divisions by promoting the moderate
clergy and allowing the opposition to function as long as it does not
exceed certain limits. At the same time, it threatens revolutionaries
or those using violence with extreme punishments. Although Egypt's
growing economic difficulty and its effect on living standards are
causes for concern, a serious fundamentalist upheaval does not seem
likely in the short-to medium-term future.