Ending America's Vietnam War

496 Pages·2013·2.15 MB·English

by  David L. Prentice

Ending America’s Vietnam War:
Vietnamization’s Domestic Origins and International Ramifications, 1968-1970

A dissertation presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

David L. Prentice
December 2013
© 2013 David L. Prentice. All Rights Reserved.
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This dissertation titled
Ending America’s Vietnam War:
Vietnamization’s Domestic Origins and International Ramifications, 1968-1970

by
DAVID L. PRENTICE

has been approved for
the Department of History
and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Chester J. Pach
Associate Professor of History

Robert A. Frank

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
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Abstract
PRENTICE, DAVID L., Ph.D., December 2013, History
Ending America’s Vietnam War: Vietnamization’s Domestic Origins and International
Ramifications, 1968-1970
Director of Dissertation: Chester J. Pach
America’s exit from Vietnam was as contingent, complicated, and agonizing as its
decision to pursue war in Indochina, and this dissertation focuses on the critical period—
1968-1970. Based on research at eight domestic and foreign archives, I argue that the
perception of a crumbling home front drove U.S. policymaking and that America’s allies
and enemies appreciated and reacted to this domestic context and decision-making. In
1968, President Lyndon Johnson concluded he had little choice but to cap U.S. troop
strength, stop bombing North Vietnam, and begin negotiations, but he drew the line at
unilateral withdrawals and kept military escalation on the table.
Hence, the battle over America’s exit strategy occurred during Richard Nixon’s
first year in office. During 1969, three individuals—Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and
Melvin Laird—plotted, schemed, and wrangled over Nixon’s Vietnam strategy. The allure
of victory remained strong as Nixon and Kissinger devised an elaborate plan to threaten
and then launch a savage bombing campaign against North Vietnam to compel its
capitulation before time ran out at home. Secretary of Defense Laird argued the domestic
front would not tolerate such a mad scheme. Instead, Laird developed what became
America’s exit strategy, Vietnamization—the strategy of improving South Vietnamese
military capabilities while withdrawing American troops. Though overlooked by
historians, Laird’s Vietnamization defeated Kissinger’s militant strategy to halt U.S. troop
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reductions and escalate the war. By the end of 1969, Nixon sided with Laird, hoping that
Vietnamization could win the war at home and abroad.
Vietnamization’s domestic origins reflect only part of the story, and this
dissertation establishes its international context as well. Foreign officials understood U.S.
policymakers had changed course to abate pressure at home. Whereas both the North and
(surprisingly) South Vietnamese greeted Vietnamization with confidence, Australia and
Great Britain worried it could be an early symptom of a global American retreat. They
feared humiliation in Vietnam would create an isolationist lobby that would curtail U.S.
commitments worldwide. Nevertheless, they judged Nixon’s resolve and Vietnamization
positively. The Nixon administration was holding the line in the United States and South
Vietnam, but all understood that Vietnamization marked the beginning of the end of
America’s Vietnam War.
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For my parents
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Acknowledgments
This dissertation was the product of many hours of meticulous research, writing,
and revising, but it is in no way the product of one individual. Many people, guided,
enriched, and encouraged this work, and I consider myself in their debt. Its omissions and
errors, of course, are my own.
First, I would like to thank Brooks Flippen. His guidance and timely advice were
invaluable to me as I began my own career as a historian. From explaining what a historian
does to commenting on my earliest work, Dr. Flippen was diligent to make me a better
scholar. In short, Dr. Flippen was the first person to show me what it means to be a
professional historian; it is an example I will always strive to live up to.
At Cornell University, I am thankful to whoever put Keith Taylor and Fredrik
Logevall’s course on the Vietnam War in Baker Laboratory. It was appropriate that I
wandered in just as they began covering the Tet Offensive. Enthralled, I snuck back in for
the rest of the semester. Along those same lines, I am thankful to Professor Logevall for
opening his door to a student in Chemistry and Chemical Biology. He was generous with
his time and advice when few others would have been as kind. Years later, he again proved
most helpful as he offered suggestions on how to turn my domestic-centered thesis into a
manageable, international history of Vietnamization.
Without the aid of the hard-working people at archives worldwide, this dissertation
would have lacked the sources necessary to sustain its central arguments. At the Gerald
Ford Library, I would like to thank William McNitt who introduced me to the archival
system and helped me locate key documents. I was more than a little apprehensive about
my first trip to an archive, but he quickly put me at ease. Archivists at the Nixon and
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Johnson presidential libraries also went out of their way to facilitate my research. Thanks
also goes to the staffs at the National Archives in College Park, Public Records Office in
Kew, National Archives of Australia, and Fulbright papers in Fayetteville. Nancy Adgent
at the Rockefeller Archives Center also deserves especial mention. Knowing that I had
little time, she accommodated my requests and went above and beyond to get me the
necessary documents.
I would also like to thank the librarians at the Dallas Public Library. They filled
hundreds of inter-library loan requests without question and always with the utmost speed.
They enabled me to continue my work after I had moved from Athens. I could not have
completed my comprehensive exams or secondary research without their assistance.
Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is also among those whose unexpected
generosity amazed me. I never will forget that fateful February night, when while working
on the seminar paper that prefigured this dissertation, I received a surprise telephone call
from Laird himself. While Laird has provided me with priceless conversations and leads,
perhaps his biggest contribution to my present and future work was that first phone call.
For a new generation of scholars born after the Vietnam War, it is too easy to forget that
we are writing about real people and events. Laird brought that realization home to me,
and as a result, I have shown greater diligence to test my assumptions and portray events
as accurately as possible.
At Ohio University, there are too many to name but I will try nonetheless. I am
grateful to the History Department and the Contemporary History Institute for generously
funding my many research trips. Professors Robert Ingram, John Brobst, Kevin Mattson,
and Chester Pach supervised my subject fields and thereby established the intellectual
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foundation for my scholarly endeavors. Laura Seddelmeyer proved invaluable in helping
me navigate the literature on Australian grand strategy and Vietnam as well as Australia’s
archives. A true gentleman and scholar, Bruce Steiner was a wellspring of encouragement
and delightful conversation. I would be remiss if I did not thank two of my thesis defense
committee members, Marvin Fletcher and Kevin Mattson. Both provided insightful
comments on the thesis while raising questions I had not thought to ask. Similarly, my
dissertation committee members, Ingo Trauschweizer, Paul Milazzo, and Patrick
Washburn, gave useful suggestions on the prospectus and then the dissertation itself.
I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my advisor and dissertation chair,
Chester Pach. As a first year-graduate student searching for a seminar topic, I was in his
office often, and Professor Pach suggested I look into Vietnamization. As I began delving
deeper into the subject, Dr. Pach continued to provide timely advice despite having his own
heavy workload. Perhaps most valuable of all was his thorough comments on each of the
dissertation’s revisions. They made for a much better dissertation. Likewise, his
thoughtful counsel on the other aspects of our profession will make me a better historian.
Of course, many others deserve mention. Ed Hull and I spent countless hours
discussing the thesis, the Vietnam War, and history broadly, and I look back on those
evenings with the utmost fondness. Ed and his wife Patty also deserve my eternal thanks
for introducing me to my wife. The Byrds and the Sargents were constant sources of
encouragement and friendship as well.
Most important of all have been the love, support, and encouragement of my family.
Words cannot describe how much they mean to me, and so I will keep it relatively short.
Young James was born just as I began the second chapter, and he was ever by my side as
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I wrote and finished the dissertation (though naptimes were an invaluable blessing). Now
a precocious toddler, he is in and out of the office rather than a constant presence but he
never ceases to bring a smile to my face.
My wife Jaclyn deserves my utmost praise and gratitude. More than anyone else,
she stood by me and cheered my work on. She also endured many a research trip, patiently
scanning or photocopying thousands of documents. In some cases, it felt like we looted
and carted off whole archives. She is the perfect research assistant but more importantly,
she is the perfect companion and wife.
My parents, Russell and Ann Prentice, saw this work through from the beginning.
Their encouraging phone calls and support were an immeasurable help. They, along with
Jaclyn and James, remind me that life is so much more than books and study. It is for my

parents that I have dedicated this dissertation.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3
Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 5
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 6
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 11
Introduction: The Beginning of an Ending ..................................................................... 13
1. The Statesman, the Strategist, and the Politician: Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, and the
Vietnam War ..................................................................................................................... 23
2. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: De-Escalation & the Johnson Administration,
January-August, 1968 ....................................................................................................... 92
3. Winning the Election & the War: The Republicans & De-Americanization, January-
August 1968 .................................................................................................................... 125
4. The Other Domino: America’s Domestic Front & the Global Cold War, January-
August 1968 .................................................................................................................... 164
5. The ’68 Election: De-Americanization & October Surprises, September-November,
1968................................................................................................................................. 201
6. The Writing on the Wall: De-Americanization, November 1968 - January 1969 ...... 227
7. Nixon & Kissinger: The Will to Win .......................................................................... 274
8. Laird’s Vietnamization ............................................................................................... 307
9. “The Long Haul” vs. “Going for Broke”: Vietnamization and Escalation in the Global
Context ............................................................................................................................ 347
10. A Very Near Thing: Duck Hook, Vietnamization, & the Struggle over Nixon’s
Vietnam Strategy ............................................................................................................ 386
Epilogue .......................................................................................................................... 422
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 468
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 483