CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

228 Pages·2012·12.74 MB·English

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY:
ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN LEADERS
MügeAknur
Department of Political Science
McGiII University
Montreal
February,2005
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy in Political Science
©Müge Aknur, 2005
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Abstract
This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role played by
civilian leaders in the consolidation of democracy examining changes in levels of military
influence over politics. This study departs from typical military-centric civil-military
relations literature by employing a civilian-centric analysis. In particular, it shows how
the former's focus on changing levels of internaI threat cannot account for variations in
the levels of civilian control over the military. The study instead adopts a framework that
focuses on the incentive structure of civilian leaders as determined by competitive
elections; the political capacity of leaders as reflected in their parliamentary majority,
political experience and the effectiveness of their economic policies; and institutional
rules, such as the system of government and organization of the parties. The thesis argues
• that, depending on their incentive structure and political capacity, the civilian leaders will
either challenge a politically powerful military or ally with that military by adopting its
preference structures. The relevance of this model for understanding civil-military
relations in the aftermath of a transition to democracy is explored in the Turkish case by
examining the shift from low to high levels of military influence between late 1980s and
mid-1990s. The thesis identifies this shift by looking at the incentive structure and the
political capacity of two civilian leaders: Prime MinisteriPresident Turgut Ozal and
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller.
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Résumé
Dans cette thèse, nous cherchons à mieux comprendre le rôle joué par certains
dirigeants civils dans la consolidation d'une démocratie en examinant les changements
d'influence de l'armée sur leurs politiques. Pour ce faire, on effectue une analyse civils
centrée. Ceci nous distingue notamment des ouvrages usuels utilisant une approche plutôt
basée sur des analyses militaires-centrée ou militaires-civils. En particulier, notre analyse
nous permet d'affirmer qu'il n'existe pas de lien direct entre le contrôle des dirigeants
civils sur l'armée et de la menace interne que peut parfois poser cette dernière. Notre
étude se concentre plus spécifiquement sur les incitatifs déterminés par les dirigeants
civils lors de la tenue d'élection serrée; la capacité des dirigeants politiques selon leur
majorité parlementaire, l'expérience politique et le succès de leur politique économique;
•
ainsi que les règles institutionnelles telles que le fonctionnement du gouvernement et
l'organisation des partis. Notre travail tend à démontrer que dépendamment des structures
incitatives présentes et leur capacité politique, les dirigeants civils vont ou bien défier un
pouvoir militaire politique puissant ou bien s'allier aux militaires en adoptant une
structure qui leur convient. La pertinence de ce modèle dans la compréhension des
relations civils-militaires durant la période de transition vers une démocratie est explorée
dans le cas de la Turquie où l'on peut examiner divers degrés d'influence de l'armée sur
la période allant de la fin des années 80 jusqu'au milieu des années 90. Plus
particulièrement, on étudie les mesures incitatives et la capacité politique de deux
dirigeants politiques turques: le Premier Ministre/Président Turgut Ozal et le Premier
Ministre Tansu Çi11er.
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Acknowledgements
1 am deeply grateful to many people and institutions that have supported me in so
many ways over the years, enabling me ultimately to complete this dissertation. First and
foremost, 1 would like to extend my special thanks to my advisor Prof. Philip Oxhorn for
guiding me throughout my dissertation. He meticulously read my chapters and provided
me with insightful suggestions.
1 was fortunate to be surrounded by wonderful friends throughout my years as a
Ph.D. candidate. 1 would first like to extend my sincere thanks to my dearest friends
Saime Ozçürümez and Tolga BOlükbasi, who were with me throughout the good times
and the difficult times at McGill University. Life in Montreal was much more enjoyable
•
with their warm friendship and support. They provided me with great advice and
scholarly feedback at every step of my proposaI writing stage. 1 would also like to thank
to my good, old friends Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews with whom 1 started my
graduate life in Washington D.C. and fini shed that life in Montreal. They offered me
valuable suggestions throughout my writing stage. Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu has always
proven to be a reliable friend. She followed up on aIl of my bureaucratic business in
Montreal during the period 1 was in Turkey. During my fieldwork, Canan and Sait
Akman accommodated me in Ankara. 1 thank them aIl.
1 was able to complete part of my doctoral studies with the Turkish Higher
Education Council's fellowship awarded to me by Dokuz Eylül University of Izmir,
Turkey. 1 wish to thank to Professors Mete Oktav, Omür Ozmen and Mustafa Tanyeri of
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Dokuz Ey1ü1 University for their support and for trusting me to finish my Ph.D. 1 would
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like to extend my sincere thanks to my good friends Townsend and Valerie Burden for
their very generous financial help during difficult times. 1 owe a very special debt of
gratitude to Prof. Théresè Marie Dougherty for acting as my "mom" throughout my
graduate life in North America.
1 wish to extend my thanks to the interviewees who made time in their bus y
schedules to answer my questions and shared their valuable experience and insights on
Turkish politics. At the Interlibrary Loan of McLennan Library, Janice Simpkins, Maria
de Souza and Elizabeth Dunkley were very helpful in aUowing me to access Turkish
books from libraries across North America. During my fieldwork in Turkey, my unc1e,
CelaI Yilmaz, and my aunt, Hayal Turgut provided me with the necessary connections to
reach politicians and retired generals for interviews. Ayse Asker from the Research
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Department of the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly assisted with my
research. Berna Yilmaz from Bilkent University helped with the archivaI research, and
Jeff Cuvilier from Mc Gill University helped with the editing of the dissertation. 1 thank
them aU. 1 would also like to thank my cousins ilknur Cankes for her emotional, Gürcan
Yilmaz for his technical, Gülben Seber for her bureaucratic support who made my
writing stage easier.
Life at McGill University, with its long gray co Id winters was made much more
satisfying and memorable thanks to the support 1 received from a group of marvelous
friends. For that, 1 am thankful to Ozge Akçali, Gülhan Alpargu, Alain Bourget, Burkan
îsgor, Asya EI-Meehy, Manal Jamal and Efe Postalci.
FinaUy, 1 would like to dedicate this work to my mother Didar Yilmaz, for her
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love, encouragement, and unceasing support .
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Table of Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................. .i
Résumé ................................................................................................ .ii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................... iii
Table of Contents ...................................................................................... v
Abbreviations ........................................................................................... viii
Introduction ....... " ............. " ............ '" ..................................................... 1
Civil-Military Relations and the Role of the Civilian Leaders: The Turkish Case ............. 3
Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . .. . ............................................................................... 7
Structure of the Thesis ................................................................................. 9
Chapter 1:
Civil-Military Relations and the Role of the Civilian Leaders ............................... 12
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Introduction: Civil-Military Relation from the perspective of civilian leaders ................ 12
I. Civil-Military Relations ............................................................................. 13
1. Issues and Actors ................................................................................ 13
2. 'Military Centric' Analysis in Civil-Military Literature of 1950's, 1960's and 1970's ... 16
3. Continuation of the 'Military Centric' Analyses in Civil-Military Literature in 1980's
and 1990's .......................................................................................... 23
II. Civil-Military Relations Literature in Turkey ................................................... 27
III. Framework of Analysis .......................................................................... 32
1. Incentive Structure of the Civilian Leaders and the Rational Choices they make ...... 33
2. Institutional Context and Institutionalism as a Theoretical Approach ................... 36
3. Political Capacity of a Civilian Leader. ...................................................... 39
Conclusion: .............................................................................................. 42
Chapter 2:
Historical Overview of the Role of the Military in Turkish Politics ....................... 44
Introduction: ........................................................................................... 44
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1. The Role of the Military in Politics during Ottoman Empire Period .......................... 45
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II. The Role of the Military in Politics during the Republican Period .......................... 48
1. Transition to Multi-Party Period .............................................................. 54
2. The 1960 Military Intervention ............................................................... 58
3. The 1971 Military Intervention by Memorandum .......................................... 61
4. The 1980 Military Intervention ......... '" ............ '" ............. " .................... 64
5. Public Legitimacy of the Turkish Military .................................................. 71
6. The Return to Civilian Rule ............. " .............. " ............................. '" .... 73
7. The Erosion of Military's Role in Politics .................................................... 76
Conclusion: ............................................................................................. 78
Chapter 3:
The Period of Prime Ministerl President Turgut Ozal and his Confrontations with the
Military (1987-1993) ................................................................................. 81
Introduction: ........................................................................................... 81
1. Kurdish Question .................................................................................... 82
Background of the Kurdish Question ............................................................. 83
• II. Prime Minister/President Ozal's Kurdish Policies ............................................. 87
1. Prime MinisterlPresident Ozal's Kurdish Policies during ANAP governments: ....... 87
2. Rational Choices and Political Capacity and Institutional Context ....................... 91
A. Rational Choices and Particularistic Incentives ......................................... 92
B. Political Capacity and Institutional Context ........................................ .. .. 98
a. Parliamentary Majority ................................................................... 97
b. Political Experience ...................................................................... 99
c. Political Performance in Economy ............................................. " .... 102
C. Analysis of Political Capacity through different Issue Areas ........................ 104
a. Lifting of the ban on Kurdish .... , .............................................. " .... 104
b. Official Recognition of the Iraqi Kurdish Leaders ................................. 109
c. Kurdish Refugees from northern Iraq and Operation Pro vide Comfort ......... 113
3. President Ozal's Kurdish Policies during DYP-SHP Coalition Government ........... 117
A. Discussion of "General Amnesty" and the Feasibility of a Federation ............... 121
B. Broadcasting and Education in Kurdish ................................................ 121
C. Peace Through Negotiations and Unilateral Cease-Fire .............................. 122
III. Interference in the Military Promotion Process ........... ............................ .. ... 130
1. The Role ofCivilian Leaders in Military Promotions in Turkey: ...................... 130
2. The Appointment of the Chief of the General Staff in June-July 1987: ............... 132
3. Rational Choice and Political Capacity .................................................... 133
A. Rational Choices ........................................................................... 133
a. The Strict Kemalism of General Oztorun .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 134
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b. The Pinarcik Incident .................................................................. 136
c. The Year 2000 Plan ................................................................... 137
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B. Political Capacity ......................................................................... 139
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 141
Chapter 4:
The Period of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and her Alliance with the Military (1993-
1995)
Introduction ........................................................................................... 145
1. Kurdish Problem during Prime Minister Çiller's Period ..................................... 145
1. Prime Minister Çiller's Failure to bring a Political Solution to the Kurdish Problem.148
2. Rational Choice, Political Capacity and Institutional Context.. ......................... 149
A. Rational Choices and Particularistic Incentives ....................................... 151
B. Political Capacity and Institutional Context ........................................... 153
a. Political Experience .................................................................... 153
b. Political Performance in Economics ................................................. 156
c. Existence of a Strong Competitor for Political Control .......................... 158
C. Analysis of Çiller's Attempts to bring Political Solution to the Kurdish Problem159
3. The Signs of the Increase in Military's Control in Politics through Prime Minister
Çiller's Hardline Kurdish Policies .......................................................... 167
• A. Village Guards (Koy Koruculari) ...................................................... 170
B. Military's Special Teams ............................................................... 171
C. Village Evacuations .............................................................................. 172
D. Cross-Border Operations ............................................................... 173
E. Rejection of Cease-Fire ProposaIs ...................................................... 176
F. Deterioration of the Relations with the Iraqi Kurdish Factions ..................... 178
G. Postponement of Army Discharges .................................................... 180
H. Imprisonment of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party Deputies ......................... 181
1. State-supported Crime Syndicates ..................................................... 184
II. Extension of the Term of Chief of the General Staff ....................................... 186
Extension of Chief of General Güres' term in August 1993 ................................ 187
Rational Choices ............................................................................. 189
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 190
Conclusions ........................................................................................... 193
Civilian Centric Analysis ............................................................................ 193
The Role of Civilian Leaders in Civil-Military Relations ....................................... 193
Applicability of the Model for Further Study. .. . .. .. . . .. .. . ... ... .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. ..... .. ... ... 194
• Bibliography ........................................................................................... 202
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Abbreviations
ANAP: Anavatan Partisi---Motherland Party
AP: Adalet Parisi---Justice Party
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi---Republican People's Party
DP: Demokrat Parti---Democratic Party
DEP: Demokrasi Partisi---Democracy Party
DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti---Democratic Left Party
• DYP: Dogru Yol Partisi---True Path Party
EU: European Union
HEP: Halkin Emek Partisi---People's Labor Party
HP: Halkçi Parti---Populist Party
MDP: Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi---Nationalist Democracy Party
MGK: Milli Güvenlik Konseyi---National Security Council
MHP: Miliyetçi Hareket Partisi---Nationalist Action Party
MiT: Milli istihbarat Teskilati--National Intelligence Agency
MSP: Milli Selamet Partisi---National Salvation Party
PKK: Partiya Karkaran Kürdistan-Kurdish Workers Party
SHP: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Parti---Social Democratic Populi st Party
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