Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945

249 Pages·2002·0.98 MB·English

by  Edwin P Hoyt

BACKWATER WAR:
THE ALLIED
CAMPAIGN IN ITALY,
1943–1945
Edwin P. Hoyt
PRAEGER
BACKWATER
WAR

Edwin P. Hoyt
BACKWATER
WAR
THE ALLIED CAMPAIGN
IN ITALY, 1943–1945
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Hoyt,EdwinPalmer.
Backwaterwar:theAlliedcampaigninItaly,1943–1945 / EdwinP.Hoyt.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0–275–97478–2(alk.paper)
1. WorldWar,1939–1945—Italy. 2. WorldWar,1939–1945—Campaigns—Italy. 3.
AnzioBeachhead,1944. 4. Italy—History—Germanoccupation,1943–1945. 5.
Italy—History—Alliedoccupation,1943–1947. I. Title.
D763.I8H66 2002
940.54'215—dc21 2002025328
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable.
Copyright(cid:1)2002byEdwinP.Hoyt
Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe
reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,without
theexpresswrittenconsentofthepublisher.
LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2002025328
ISBN:0-275-97478-2
Firstpublishedin2002
PraegerPublishers,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881
AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc.
www.praeger.com
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
TM
Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe
PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational
InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface vii
1 The Anglo–American Military Alliance 1
2 The Allies Prepare 9
3 The Axis Defenses of Sicily 15
4 Invasion 19
5 The British Eighth Army’s Drive 27
6 The U.S. Seventh Army’s Drive 33
7 The Fall of Mussolini 37
8 Confusion 45
9 The Race for Messina 49
10 The Surrender of Italy and the Surprise That Wasn’t 57
11 Unrest at Quadrant 67
12 Salerno 71
13 The Strategic Trap 81
14 A Series of Delaying Actions 87
15 The Advance Is Stopped 93
16 The Rapido River Fiasco 101
v
Contents
17 Crossing 111
18 Anzio 119
19 The Attack on Cassino 127
20 The Bombing of Monte Cassino 133
21 The Germans at Anzio 141
22 Spring Offensive 145
23 The End of the Gustav Line 151
24 Breakthrough 157
25 The Fall of Rome 163
26 North from Rome 167
27 Cracking the Gothic Line 173
28 The Center of the Line 181
29 Winter Doldrums 187
30 To the Bitter End 195
AppendixA:OrderofBattleasofJuly10,1943,DDay—Invasion
of Sicily 201
Appendix B: Order of Battle as of September 8, 1943, Salerno
Landing 203
Appendix C: Order of Battle as of January 22, 1944, Anzio
Landing 205
Bibliographic Essay 209
Notes 211
Index 213
Photo essay follows page 79.
vi
Preface
It has been more than half a century since the end of World War II, and
the real story of the conflicts among the Allied high command still has
not been thoroughly explored. In hindsight it seems a wonder that the
great alliance between the British and Americans did not founder in
1943.TheonlythingthatkeptittogetherwasPrimeMinisterSirWinston
Churchill’s willingness to sacrifice the British strategy for winning the
war to the exigencies of keeping the Americans in the European war.
It was a very near thing, as this book will show. The Americans felt
from the beginning of their war effort that the solution in Europecalled
for a direct drive at the German heart. TheBritish believedthattheGer-
mans should be nibbled into defeat, with a major effort made in the
Balkans. General George C. Marshall, the U.S. army chief of staff, was
particularly distrustful of Churchill, and all the way along, even after
Normandy, he shot down one Churchill plan after another for action in
the south. As late as September 1944, when the British prime minister
plumped for an invasion of Trieste and Adriatic Italy, Marshall inter-
vened to stop it.
It is quite obvious now that the British were right and Marshall and
the Americans were wrong. The speed with which Adolf Hitler actedto
shore up his southern defenses every time they were threatened is the
proof of it. When the British threatened in Greece in 1941, he delayed
the invasion of Russia for weeks to deal successfully with the threat.
Again in 1943, when the Allies feinted an attack in the Balkans, Hitler
rushed troops to the area. The result of the Allied strategy of the Cross
vii
Preface
Channel Attack allowed Hitler to maintain his forces in the south, until
very near the end.
As it turned out, the American campaigns in North Africa, Sicily,and
Italywereunnecessaryandcostly,theresultofconfusedAlliedplanning.
The better course would have been for the Americans to keep their
troops at home until they were better trained and to concentrate on the
buildup for the Cross Channel Attack. This was not possible because
President Franklin D. Roosevelt was eager to move after making the
fateful decision to override his military advisers and concentrate on the
war in Europe rather than the war in the Pacific. That decision caused
the fall of the Philippines, and lengthened the war in the Pacific. Had
General Douglas A. MacArthur received reinforcement from America,
thereiseveryreasontobelievethathecouldhavestavedofftheJapanese
invasion of the Philippines, and the first American victory would have
come there instead of at Guadalcanal. But in those first fateful weeks
after Pearl Harbor, there were no reinforcements for the Pacific. Every-
thing was being geared for the war against Hitler.
At the theater level, the conflicts between the British and the Ameri-
cans began in North Africa and did not let up. After thefirst battles,the
British began calling the Americans “our Italians,” and their contempt
for the American fighting ability did not cease until well into the Italian
campaign. All the way through, the British underrated the American
armyandairforces,andsincethewar,apopularwaveofanti-American
sentiment has coursed through Britain, denying the competence of the
World War II American fighting men on land or in the air.
This negativism was shared by American military commanders from
General George S. Patton Jr., who once remarked that the best thing the
Americans could do in England would be “to drive the British into the
sea,” to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who strongly resistedthedemands
of the British (not to be confused with the Australians and the New
Zealanders) to participate in the Pacific war. It was only when higher
authority decreed cooperation that British units were included in the
Pacific Fleet operations.
In Italy, the conflicts between the British and the Americans werefre-
quent, and sometimes expensive. British General Bernard L. Montgom-
ery’s narcissism is too well known to need elucidation. Time and again
he balked or delayed Allied planning. Less well known is British Major
General Richard L. McCreery’s antipathy toward General Mark W.
Clark, which finally erupted in McCreery’s refusal to serve under Clark
when he becametheater commander.Thisresultedinanawkwardcom-
mand structure in which McCreery reported to another. This ledtocon-
fusion and certainly did not advance the Allied cause in Italy.
The Germans in Sicily and Italy conducted a surprising retreat and
defense. The Allies had expected thefallof Sicily andthecollapseofthe
viii
Preface
Italian defenses to trigger a German retreat to northern Italy. Instead,
after the Allies landed at Salerno, Field Marshal Albert Kesselringchose
to first defend the Gustav Line in the south and thereafter to retreat
slowly and stubbornly. General Heinrich von Vietinghoff conducted a
masterful defense that has gone down in the annalsofstrategicwarfare.
The tragedy of the Benedictine Abbey at Monte Cassino—the satura-
tion bombing by the American air force that needlessly destroyed this
historic landmark—has been described at length elsewhere. However,
not so well known is the role played by a minor British commander,
LieutenantGeneralBernardC.FreybergoftheNewZealandCorps,who
refused to attack on the ground unless the saturation bombing was car-
ried out. After the bombing was over, Freyberg tried and failed to cap-
ture the abbey. This could have been predicted; Freyberg was the man
who seized defeat from the jaws of victory on Crete, losingtheislandto
an inferior force of German paratroopers because of his failure to attack
at the strategic moment. General Clark, quite properly, took responsi-
bility for the debacle at MonteCassino, buttherecordsonlyindicatethe
depth of the command quarrels that led to his decision aboutthebomb-
ing.ItwasaspectaculardisplayofAllieddisunitythatmarkedtheentire
Mediterranean operations.
ix