Americans and Asymmetric Conflict: Lebanon, Somalia, and Afghanistan

252 Pages·2007·0.88 MB·English

by  Adam B. Lowther

Americans and
Asymmetric Conflict
PraegerSecurityInternationalAdvisoryBoard
BoardCochairs
Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs,
SchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs,UniversityofGeorgia(U.S.A.)
PaulWilkinson,ProfessorofInternationalRelations andChairmanofthe
AdvisoryBoard,CentrefortheStudy ofTerrorismand PoliticalViolence,
UniversityofSt.Andrews(U.K.)
Members
Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for
StrategicandInternationalStudies(U.S.A.)
The´re`seDelpech,DirectorofStrategicAffairs,AtomicEnergyCommission,
andSeniorResearchFellow,CERI(FondationNationaledesSciencesPoli-
tiques),Paris(France)
SirMichaelHoward,formerChicheleProfessoroftheHistoryofWarand
Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A.
LovettProfessorofMilitaryandNavalHistory,YaleUniversity(U.K.)
LieutenantGeneralClaudiaJ.Kennedy,USA(Ret.),formerDeputyChiefof
StaffforIntelligence,DepartmentoftheArmy(U.S.A.)
PaulM.Kennedy,J.RichardsonDilworthProfessorofHistoryandDirec-
tor,InternationalSecurityStudies,YaleUniversity(U.S.A.)
Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All
SoulsCollege,OxfordUniversity(Australia)
ShibleyTelhami,AnwarSadatChairforPeaceand Development,Depart-
mentofGovernmentandPolitics,UniversityofMaryland(U.S.A.)
FareedZakaria,Editor,NewsweekInternational(U.S.A.)
AMERICANS AND
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT
LEBANON, SOMALIA, AND
AFGHANISTAN
Adam B. Lowther
ForewordbyDonaldM.Snow
PSIReports
PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL
Westport, Connecticut London
•
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Americansandasymmetricconflict:Lebanon,Somalia,andAfghanistan/AdamB.Lowther;
forewordbyDonaldM.Snow.
p.cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN-13:978–0–275–99635–2(alk.paper)
1. Asymmetricwarfare—UnitedStates.2. UnitedStates—Militarypolicy.3. Asymmetric
warfare—Casestudies.4. Counterinsurgency—Casestudies.5. WaronTerrorism,2001–
6. Worldpolitics—1989–I.Title.
U163.L692007
355.4’2—dc22 2007014362
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable.
Copyright©2007byAdamB.Lowther
Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe
reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe
expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher.
LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2007014362
ISBN-13:978–0–275–99635–2
Firstpublishedin2007
PraegerSecurityInternational,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881
AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc.
www.praeger.com
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe
PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational
InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984).
10987654321
Contents
ForewordbyDonaldM.Snow vii
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xv
Introduction 1
1MilitaryThoughtandAsymmetricConflict 14
2UnderstandingAsymmetryintheTwenty-FirstCentury:Strategy, 52
Tactics,andWeapons
3Lebanon(1982–1984):TheRiseofTerrorismandtheSuicide 82
Bombing
4Somalia(1992–1994):IntothePost-ColdWarEra 102
5Afghanistan(2001–2004):WinningWarsofAsymmetry 126
Conclusion:TheLessonsofWarandImplicationsforIraq 148
Notes 161
WorksCited 205
Index 231

Foreword
Asymmetricalwarfare,thesubjectofthisbook,isandprobablyalwayshas
beenanenigma,especiallytothoseagainstwhomitisemployed,butalsoto
someextenttoitspractitioners.Forthoseagainstwhomasymmetricalwar-
fareiswaged,theenigmainvolvesattemptingtocounterastyleofwarfare
thatisalienandunfamiliartothemconductedbyanopponentthatwould
not be able to compete if it fought the way the symmetrical warrior pre-
ferred (which of course is the virtualdefinition of asymmetricalwarfare).
Notonlyareasymmetricalmeansunfamiliarand,generallyspeaking,inad-
equatelyencompassedindoctrineandstrategy,theyaregenerallyobjection-
ableand,fromtheviewofthosesubjectedtothem,confusing,difficultto
counterand,especially,difficulttocounteractinwaysthatleadtoconven-
tionalnotionsofsuccess.
For the asymmetrical warrior, the problem is different. In a very real
sense,asymmetricalwarfareisnotsomuchamethodasitisawayofthink-
ing about war.Certainly,thereareprinciplesofwar—thelessons of Sun-
tzu,forinstance—thatcanbeandareappliedinmanyasymmetricalcircum-
stances,butthereisnosetbodyofrulesofengagement,strategyandtactics,
andgranddesignsavailabletotheasymmetricalwarrior.Weresuchabody
ofinstructionsavailable,theenemiesofasymmetrywould havestudiedit
andfiguredhowtodefeatit.Ifthereisanunderlyingfirstprincipleofasym-
metricalwarfare,itisadaptation—findingandapplyingmethodsthatwill
frustrateandfoilan enemythatcannotbedefeatedbystandardmethods.
War fought where one side fights differently than the other (the heart of
asymmetricalwarfare)isthusacat-and-mousegamewheretheasymmetri-
calwarriorseekstoremainoneintellectualandphysicalstepaheadofhis
symmetricalopponent.Forthesymmetricalopponent,thechallengeisget-
tingaheadofthethinkingoftheasymmetricalwarrior,anticipatingwhat
thatopponentwilldobeforehecandoitandactingeffectively.Applying
viii Foreword
JohnBoyd’sOODA(observe,orient,decide,react)Loopforfighterpilotsis
alsothetaskofthesymmetricalwarrior—andnotabadmodelfortheanti-
asymmetricalwarfarestrategisttoadopt.
AstheIraqWardevolvesintothelikelyrecriminationsthatwillbeassoci-
atedwithtryingtoassemblethe‘‘lessonslearned,’’theghostofasymmetri-
calwarfarewillonceagainrearitshead.Whateverelsetheevaluationofthe
Americanwareffortmayproduce,itwillalmostcertainlyhavetomaketwo
points.Thefirstisthat,overaquartercenturyaftertheVietnamimbroglio,
it is not at all clear that the mainstream of the American military has
embracedsolvingtheproblemofasymmetricalwarfareasaproblemserious
enough to devote its major energies. When itinvaded Iraq,the Armyand
Marines were not prepared for the rear guard tactics they encountered (a
formof asymmetricalwarfare),andtheirinability totame theIraqiresis-
tanceduringtheoccupationwasfurthertestimonytothepovertyofAmeri-
canunderstanding.Thefailuretopossessandapplyaviablestrategyofanti-
asymmetricalwarfareisnottheonlyreasontheUnitedStatesdidnotprevail
inIraq,butitiscertainlyoneofthem.Thesecondlessonwill,orshould,be
that until the United States figures out how to solve this problem, all the
technologicalsuperiorityintheworldthatitsforcespossesswillnotassure
success when it is applied, at least as measured by attaining the political
goalsforwhichthatforcewasapplied.AnAmericanmilitarycomparedat
the turn of the millennium to Rome at the height of its power was, after
all,stalematedbyabandofinsurgentsinIraq.
There undoubtedly will be numerous lessons from the Iraq experience,
but one should be especially clear. An asymmetrical approach to warfare
worked against the United States in Iraq, and America’s future potential
opponentsaregoingtostudythiswar,realizethatindeedtheUnitedStates
canbeopposedsuccessfullyifthepropermethodsaredevisedandapplied,
and will make adaptations to the Iraqmodel to fit their circumstances. If
theUnitedStatesdoesnotrecognizethatcertaintyandengageinfurtive,sys-
tematicstudy—ofafarmoreseriousandheartfeltqualitythanitdidafter
Vietnam—ofhowtodealwiththeserealities,itwillhavenoonebutitself
toblamefortheproblems,includingthefailures,itencountersinthefuture.
Itisthedutyofthosewhofollowandreportonmilitaryaffairstomakesure
theymaketheeffort.
AdamLowther’sbookisagoodfirststepinthisprocess.Hedoesavery
thoroughjoboflayingouttheasymmetricalproblemandapplyingittohis
three cases, recognizing that they are exemplary of the processes through
whichasymmetricalwarriorsgoratherthansomesetofrigidguidelinesor
lineardevelopmentinasymmetricaltechniques.Asymmetricalwarfareby
many of the names he discusses has been around for a long time, and
although they share commonalities, most of the successful applications
shareawillingnesstoadapttochangingcircumstancesandtopresenttheir
foeswithproblemsthoseopponentshadnotanticipated.
Foreword ix
DuringtheColdWar,Sovietmilitaryliteraturewasfixatedwiththeprob-
lemoftechnologicalsurprise—thefigurativedisasterofcomingoverthetop
ofthehill,lookingdownandseeingtheAmericanmilitaryarmedwithsome
weapontheyneitherunderstoodnorcouldovercome.Thetaskisparallelto-
day.Theproblemisnottechnologicalbutintellectualsurprise.Onthenext
Americanbattlefield,whattacticalandstrategicinnovationswillbewaiting
overthetopofthehilltofrustrateus?Willwebeabletoanticipatethose
innovationsandbewaitingforthem?Whatdoweneedtodonottobesur-
prised next time? Reading the pages that follow is a good start toward
approachingandhopefullyansweringthosequestions.
DonaldM.Snow
HiltonHeadIsland,SouthCarolina