Alexander F. Kerensky; The Political Career of a Russian Nationalist.

274 Pages·2017·14.19 MB·English

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LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1976
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Michael James Fontenot
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
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Fontenot, Michael James, "Alexander F. Kerensky; The Political Career of a Russian Nationalist." (1976).
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77-10,367
FONTENOT, Michael James, 1943-
ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY; THE POLITICAL
CAREER OF A RUSSIAN NATIONALIST.
The Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College,
Ph.D., 1976
History, Europe
Xerox University Microfilms,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
© 1977
MICHAEL JAMES FONTENOT
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY; THE POLITICAL CAREER
OF A RUSSIAN NATIONALIST
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of History
by
Michael James Fontenot
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1967
December, 1976
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people had a part in the appearance of this paper— more,
in fact, than I can properly acknowledge— and I certainly owe them
a great debt of gratitude. Dr. George Putnam and Dr. James Hawkes
offered needed advice during the preliminary stages of research, ami
Dr. Thomas C. Owen, who directed this project throughout the main
phase of research ami writing, provided excellent guidance and sound
advice. Needless to say, their influence was only beneficial, and any
errors are my own. The staff members of the Hoover Institute at
Stanford University and the Humanities Research Center at the Univer­
sity of Texas should also be mentioned, for they offered willing aid.
The Graduate School, which presented me with a Dissertation Year
Fellowship, and the History Department, which made teaching assistant-
ships available several times, allowed the continuation of my work at
crucial periods. But I am especially indebted to my parents, who
offered invaluable moral and financial support; without their concern
and affectionate help, the conclusion of this paper would have been
greatly delayed. I would also like to thank my fiancee, Karen Anding,
for her practical aid and warm encouragement. Finally, I must mention
my son, Joel, and my brothers, John and Chris, for they have endured
my preoccupations with patience and considerable good humor.
ii
FOREWORD
Standard difficulties exist regarding the treatment of Russian
history, and the approach adopted in this paper requires a short
explanation. The Julian calendar, which was abandoned only in 1918,
was thirteen days behind the western one in 1917* Since the Russians
themselves prefer to use the old style calendar in their works on the
revolution, that system of dating will be used consistently within the
text. But citations from western sources, such as the New York Times,
will remain in conformity with the Gregorian calendar.
The system of transliteration will follow System II, cited in
J. Thomas Shaver, The Transliteration of Modern Russian for English
Language Publications (University of Wisconsin, 1967)* Exceptions
will be made in the cases of well-known political figures, such as
Leon Trotsky and Alexander Kerensky, whose names have become
standardized in western usage.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................... ii
FOREWORD iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . ..................... v
ABSTRACT vi
INTRODUCTION 1
I. ALEXANDER KERENSKY'S PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
CAREER 10
II. KERENSKY AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION ............ 43
III. KERENSKY AND THE FIRST PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT 74
IV. THE COALITION EXPERIMENT ............ Ill
V. THE FINAL BID FOR POLITICAL
STABILIZATION 154
VI. THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENT 192
VII. CONCLUSION .................................... 238
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .................... 251
VITA .................... 261
iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ARR Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii
GD Gosudarstvennaia Duma
KA Krasnyi Arkhiv
NZ Novyi Zhurnal
SZ Sovremennye Zapiski
WP Vestnik Vrenennogo Pravitel'stva
ABSTRACT
An investigation of Alexander F. Kerensky’s political activities
is of vital importance, for his public career affected perhaps the most
crucial period in modern Russian history; the years that spanned the
enfeeblement and collapse of tsarism, the February revolution of 1917*
and the Bolshevik seizure of power. As a radical deputy in the State
Duma and then as a minister in the various provisional regimes that
attempted to guide the revolutionary state in 1917, he exercised an
increasing degree of influence upon political events. Because of his
offices, personal inclination, and initial prestige, Kerensky managed
to dominate the Russian Provisional Government and, through it, to
determine state policy.
While Kerensky was a populist and a revolutionary, he was also a
fervent nationalist. Because of his nationalism, he became the primary
advocate of political moderation as a means of preserving national
interests in the midst of war and still bringing to his country a demo­
cratic, egalitarian order based on agrarian socialist principles. In
pursuit of those aims, he distorted the interplay of political parties
and the course of the revolution. His refusal to adopt a partisan
posture when the internal and external pressures upon the country de­
manded such a stance contributed significantly to the Bolshevik victory
in October of 1917.-
Kerensky failed to recognize the dangers inherent in his
mediative policy because he underestimated the power of class interests
and overestimated the self-discipline of the population. His populist
belief in the virtues of the people and his fiery patriotism combined
to blind him to the true depths of popular discontent. Because he
expected too much of the revolution, and too much of the Russian
people, he relied upon his undoubted talent as a political tactician
to solve problems through the creation of coalition regimes; confusing
appearance with reality, he thought that parliamentary devices would
assure the effective cooperation of socialists and non-socialists.
He succeeded only in isolating the government from the populace and
antagonizing the parties on the Right and the Left. Ultimately, the
results were political turmoil, attempted counterrevolution» the
disintegration of the army, spreading anarchy, and the seizure of the
state by an extreme leftist party, the Bolsheviks. By October,
Kerensky's moderate policies were in such disrepute that his presence
within the government actually hindered efforts at resisting the
Bolshevik insurrection of October
vii