Table Of Content'he question whether or not there is African philosophy has, for too long,
lominated the philosophical scene in Africa, to the neglect of substantive is
ues generated by the very fact of human existence. This has unfortunately led
o an impasse in the development of a distinctive African philosophical
radition. In this path-breaking book, Segun Gbadegesin offers a new and
>romising approach which recognizes the traditional and contemporary facets
>f African philosophy by exploring the issues they raise. In Part I, the author
~xamines, with refreshing insights, the philosophical concepts of the person,
ndividuality, community and morality, religiosity and causality, focusing on
Phil sophy
he Yoruba of Nigeria. Part II discusses, in an original way, contemporary Afri
:an social, political and economic realities from a philosophical perspective.
'This is a book that should advance the discipline of African philosophy. Dr.
:.:;badegesin brings his powers of clear expression and judicious reasoning to Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and
:>ear on a variety of topics of the· profoundest significance for African philoso Contemporary African Realities
phy in the contemporary world. I find his conception of African philosophy
enlightened and his interpretations and analyses of Yoruba traditional
philosophy enlightening. Equally impressive is the way he applies his philo
sophical skills to the treatment of some of the social ills of his society. Here, Segun Gbadegesin
quite simply, is a good philosopher at work."
Kwasi Wiredu
University of South Florida
"A few African philosophers are ... producing contemporary philosophy by
reflecting on West African traditions. If philosophy is 'reflection on intui
tions,' then African philosophers should be reflecting on traditional African
intuitions and thereby creating an African philosophy which is at once tradi
tional and also contemporary. This is precisely what Gbadegesin is doing and
his work is the best I have seen in this regard."
H. Gene Blocker
()hio University
Segun Gbadegesin received his B.Sc. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
with a First Class Honors from the University of Ife, Nigeria and his M.A. and
Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is Senior
Lecturer in Philosophy at Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria, where he has
also served as Head of the Philosophy Department and Vice Dean of the
Faculty of Arts. He was Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1989-1990, and is currently Visiting
Professor of Philosophy at Colgate University, Hamilton, New Yorki In
addition to many contributions to academic journals, he is editor of The
Politicization of Societv During Nigeria's Second Re:p1iblic1 1979,.,83.
'I
l
il
li/
~·
11
Segun Gbadegesin
African Philosophy
Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and
Contemporary African Realities
PETER LANG
N~;w York • San Francisco • Bern
Friinkfurt am Main • Paris • Lo~on
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gbadegesin, Segun,
African philosophy : traditional Yoruba
philosophy and contemporary African realities I
Segun Gbadegesin.
p. cm. - (American university studies. Series
V, Philosophy; vol. 134)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Philosophy, Yoruba. 2. Philosophy, African. To Adetoun and the children,
3. Yoruba (African people)-Social life and customs.
4. Africa-Economic conditions-1960- 5. Africa in love and appreciation
Social conditions-1960- I. Title. II. Series.
B5619.N6G33 1991 199'.66-dc20 91-864
ISBN 0-8204-1770-X CIP
ISSN 0739-6392
Die Deutsche Bibliothek-CIP-Einheitsaufnahme
Gbadegesin, Segun:
African philosophy : traditional Yoruba philosophy
and contemporary African realities I Segun
Gbadegesin.-New York; Berlin; Bern; Frankfurt/M.;
Paris; Wien: Lang, 1991
(American University Studies Ser. 5, Philosophy;
Vol.134)
ISBN 0-8204-1770-X
NE: American university studies I 05
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and
durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for
Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.
© Segun Gbadegesin, New York 1991
All rights reserved.
Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm,
xerography, microfiche, microcard, offset strictly prohibited.
Printed in the United States of America.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has benefitted from the good will, support and encouragement of
several institutions, friends and colleagues. Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife,
Nigeria granted me a sabbatical leave during 1989/90 academic year and leave of
absence during 1990/91 academic year. As a visiting professor at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison during 1989/89, I had access to excellent facilities for research.
Colgate University provided the intellectual and social environment which
facilitated the completion of the work, as well as some financial assistance for its
publication. I am grateful to these institutions. The following persons deserve
special thanks for the encouragement and inspiration I received from them: Dean
Don Crawford; Michael Byrd; Linda Hunter and Fred Hayward; Andrew Levine,
who encouraged me to embark on the project; Terrence and Rosemary Penner;
Marcus Singer; Haskell Fain; Bill Hay; and Daniel Wickler, all of the University
of Wisconsin, Madison. Chris Willard, Julie Fellenz and Jacqueline Crystal helped
with the preparation of the manuscript at the initial stages. I appreciate the
encouragement I received from Gene Blocker, Albert Mosley and Roland Abiodun,
and an anonymous reader of the manuscript. Kw asi Wiredu read the entire
manuscript and offered extensive comments which enabled me to clarify my
position on some of the issues. I appreciate his time and encouragement. I am also
grateful to Professor Elliot Skinner who read Chapter 5 and gave very useful
comments. At Colgate, several colleagues made my year a pleasant one. Dean
Selleck encouraged me with the provision of vital facilities for my work. Harvey
Sindima read the entire manuscript and offered very helpful suggestions. I am also
grateful to Chris Vecsey and Carol Ann Lorenz, Roy Bryce-Laporte, Charles Rice
and Elleni Tedla for their support in various ways. I acknowledge, with gratitudes,
viii
Contents
the encouragement I got from the faculty of the Department of Philosophy and
xi
Religion at Colgate. Among my graduate students at Wisconsin, I should mention Preface
in particular, Akuwa, Bob, Cuca, Anthony, Ludora, Pearl, Tokunbo, and Sauda and Part I Traditional Yoruba Philosophy
Joseph Smith. Joseph helped with the technical production of the chart in Chapter
1
1. On the Idea of African Philosophy
2. Finally, my wife, Adetoun, has always been a loving and loyal wife and sister;
and this has been an important source of strength for me. This time, she not only 27
2. Eniyiin: The Yoruba Concept of a Person
took up additional responsibilities for the family, but while I was away from home,
61
3. Individuality, Community and the Moral Order
I lost my dear father; and Adetoun played the role of a daughter, son and wife. To
her and our loving children, I dedicate this volume.
4. Traditional African Religiosity:
83
Myth or Reality?
5. Causality and the Concept of Health
105
and Illness
Part II Contemporary African Realities
6. The Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning
and Contemporary African Realities:
137
The Religious View
7. Contemporary African Realities:
161
The Cultural View
8. Contemporary African Realities:
189
The Politico-Economic View
215
9. The Ethics and Politics of Work
10. Concluding Remarks:
255
Development and Human Values
263
Endnotes
283
Bibliography
295
Index
PREFACE
My position in this book has been greatly influenced by two central beliefs,
derived from my own experience of the social, economic and cultural dimensions
of life in Africa, and reinforced by years of active teaching and research in
philosophy. First, I am convinced of the reasonableness of the belief that, if
philosophy as an academic discipline is to mean anything to Africa in the present
situation of its existence, it has to be made relevant to the realities that confront
Africans. Though I have not argued directly for this view here, it represents, for
me, a foundation upon which a lasting structure of an African philosophical
tradition can be built. Second, from the vantage point of research in the areas of
social and political philosophy and ethics, it has become clear to me that no one
can ignore the importance of the cultural dimensions of philosophical reflections.
Indeed, the relationship between the two is one of mutual influence. Culture
influences philosophy by providing it with the basic materials for reflection, while
philosophy influences culture by posing a critique, in various ways, of its
foundation. This connection between philosophy and culture is not confined to
modem philosophizing alone. I am convinced that if we look well enough, we will
find it in all ages and all contexts. The denial of philosophical reflection to
traditional Africans therefore appears to me to be a "modernist" bias without an
adequate justification.
From this perspective, therefore, I believe that we may approach African
philosophy rewardingly by looking at the presuppositions and foundations of
traditional philosophy as well as posing a critique of the foundations of our
contemporary realities. This accounts for the two parts into which this study is
divided. Part I deals with the foundations of traditional Yoruba philosophy by an
examination of its conceptual scheme. I also attempt a comparison of some of the
xii
concepts with those of traditional Akan philosophy. In Part II, I develop a critique
of contemporary African realities from three perspectives: religious, cultural and
politico-economic, focusing on the available literature in these areas. I end with African Philosophy
some remarks on the tension between the goal of development and the respect for
human values which are generally acknowledged as the foundation of African
social life.
The approach I have adopted here represents my own understanding of the
distinctive nature of African philosophy and the way to advance its frontiers. Of
course, I also recognize the value of diversity and I respect other view-points. What
I consider to be counter-productive, however, is what appears to be an unending
dispute about the nature of the subject itself and the continued insistence by some
on the myth of philosophy as something alien to traditional Africa. I am convinced
there is a need to rethink that position. We need to get on with the positive task of
reconstructing an authentic African philosophy which will be distinctive in the
contributions it makes towards the resolution of the crisis of African existence.
There will be problems along the way. Confusions will need to be clarified. There
are a lot more issues to deal with, a lot more confusions to clarify and a lot more
ideas that call for reconstruction. But such clarifications and reconstructions cannot
be done unless we have made a start from somewhere. I therefore expect that a
study such as this will provide a basis for moving forward in the kind of interest
that it generates and, I think, that is how African philosophy will advance.
Hamilton, New York
July, 1991.
Part I Traditional Yoruba Philosophy
1
ON THE IDEA OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY
Definitions of African philosophy
There are at least four schools of thought regarding the question of the nature
of African philosophy. For one group, it is the philosophical thought of traditional
Africans as could be sifted from their various world-views, myths, proverbs, etc.
In this sense, it is the philosophy indigenous to Africans, untainted by foreign
ideas. To attain a deep understanding of this philosophy, then, one needs to go to
its roots in the traditions of the people without the mediating influence of the
westemized folks. For another group, African philosophy is the philosophical
reflection on, and analysis of, African conceptual systems and social realities as
undertaken by contemporary professional philosophers. The basic idea here is that
African traditional thought, like any traditional thought, raises issues of great
philosophical interest, and that this makes it fit for philosophical investigation. Such
investigations may be rewardingly carried out by professionally trained philoso
phers with the collaboration of those traditional thinkers with good knowledge of
traditional beliefs, values and conceptual systems. For yet a third group, African
philosophy refers to a combination of these two approaches, without suppressing
or looking down on any. The point of this is the presupposition that philosophical
thought cannot be ruled out of court wherever the existence of a community of
rational beings is conceded or acknowledged. Thus, traditional societies must have
had their own share of philosophers and philosophical reflections. Such reflections
take on the form of beliefs and values, concerning life and its meaning which later
3
On the Idea of African Philosophy
2 Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities
contradiction, accept the idea of a contemporary African philosophy alongside his
passed through generations of survivors to become part of the communal ethos.
account of Bantu philosophy. At least, he does not say anything to suggest
These can now be examined by trained philosophers for contemporary relevance.
Finally, there is a fourth group for which African philosophy is none of the above, otherwise.
Yet he says enough to suggest to critics that he is on the wrong track. The
but just any collection of texts produced by Africans and specifically described by
very idea of a Bantu philosophy is a misconception because it suggests the
their authors as philosophy. This group is also responsible for the view that African
possibility of a collective philosophy based on recollections of oral traditions and
philosophy, as presented by ethnographers and philosophers adopting their methods,
this is unacceptable to his critics. We either have an individualized and written
is a myth. The trend of the debate thus generated by these seemingly incompatible
philosophy or we have none at all. So in spite of what he does not expressly affirm
views of African philosophy appeared to have, perhaps unwittingly, identified the
[that African philosophy is the philosophy of traditional Africans], for conceiving
substance of African philosophy with the issue of its meaning and method. It is not
Bantu philosophy as the philosophical thought of traditional Bantus, Tempels
unusual, for instance, to find a course in African philosophy dealing with only the
belongs to the first category. So does Kagame, one of his African collaborators.
debate on its meaning. My objective in this opening chapter, is to re-examine the
This is how professional philosophers see Tempels; and to describe his approach
issue of meaning and method, and identify the view I consider most appropriate for
2
to the matter of African philosophy, the term "ethnophilosophy" is coined. Other
an adequate understanding of the subject and content of African philosophy.
3
authors placed in the same category include Leopold Senghor and J. S. Mbiti.
There is need for a clarification of the position of these people. As observed
earlier, it seems quite compatible with Tempels' position that in addition to the
African philosophy as the traditional African philosophical thought.
traditional philosophy of the Bantu, there are also modern philosophies elaborated
by individual Bantus. So he does not need to insist on a monolithic sense of Bantu
First, then, we need to re-examine the positions listed above, starting with
philosophy. We may imagine Senghor and Mbiti maintaining similar positions.
the first which sees African philosophy as the philosophical thought of traditional
Indeed, Mbiti goes out of his way to suggest that what he refers to as African
Africans. This is the view attributed to the so-called ethno-philosophers, prominent
philosophy ''may not amount to more than simply my own process of philosophiz
among whom is Placide Tempels the author of Bantu Philosophy. Strictly, Tempels
ing the items under consideration .... "4 The point, then, is that these authors may
does not offer a definition of African philosophy in general, or even Bantu
be willing to admit that the exposition of world-views is not all there is to African
philosophy with which he concerns himself. The closest he goes in this direction
philosophy; in which case they will not be properly located in our first category
is in his appeal to his fellow Europeans to ''try above all to understand Bantu
above. Indeed, for Tempels, Bantu philosophy, among other things, is the rational
philosophy, to know what their beliefs are and what is their rational interpretation
of the nature of visible and invisible things.'' 1 One may see this as a view of what interpretation of things by the Bantus.
Is there anyone who has maintained the position suggested by our first
Bantu philosophy is: the beliefs of the Bantu and their rational interpretation of
category then? There is a sort of ambiguity in the suggestion itself. While it may
things. And though Tempels says this much, there is nowhere in his book, in which
be interpreted [as has been done above] as making the claim that African
he suggests that this is all there is to either Bantu philosophy or African philo
philosophy is the philosophy indigenous to traditional Africans, it may also be
sophy. In other words, for all we are entitled to infer, Tempels may, without
interpreted as the claim that the most authentic source of African philosophy is the
4 Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities On the Idea of African Philosophy 5
traditional thought and world-view indigenous to Africans. The difference between discounts the fact that such ideas are responses to the realities that confront the
the two seems clear. The first is claiming that African philosophy is either people at one time or the other and may not be adequate to contemporary
traditional world view or nothing; the other is making a weaker claim that even if problems. Some of the ideas may need to be superseded because they are not even
African philosophy exists in other forms, its most authentic source is the world morally adequate; while it is even possible that, though they now seem part of the
view of the people. This second one is my own interpretation of the first category traditional ideas, they have in fact been taken over from other sources or
above and I think it is a claim that those grouped in that category may be willing assimilated into the traditional world-view from the people's confrontation with
to defend. other realities. Take the case of proverbs, for instance. It is generally agreed that
Even this weaker claim has not been spared by critics. Professor Hountondji, proverbs are good sources of a people's traditional beliefs. But some proverbs find
for instance, has insisted that world-view cannot be a source of African philosophy their ways into the world-view of a people as a result of their contact with other
because (1) it is communal or collective thought and (2) it is unwritten. I will have peoples. Many Yoruba proverbs now include references to money, to wealth and
more to say on this below. For now, the problems I have with this first view are poverty, and to master-servant relationship, all of which developed out of the
two. First, the idea of defining an authenthic African philosophy in terms of only colonial experience of the people. According to one such proverb, "even if the
the traditional will not do. It cannot be defended because it would then follow that eyeballs of the laborer are as red as the palm fruit, the farm owner is his master
contemporary African philosophy is not authentic. In other words, it would appear and he will have his way." This may be interpreted as a realistic way of looking
to mean virtually the same denial as contained in the first interpretation: that at the master-servant relationship. But two points need to be noted. First, it is not
African philosophy means only traditional philosophy. Yet we need to come to a saying that is indigenous to traditional Africa because the kind of master-servant
terms with the fact that even in its traditional form, we cannot expect any relationship it depicts is not indigenous to Africa. Second, it is not a saying that
philosophical thought to be static. The thinkers of traditional societies have their reflects the attitude of traditional Africans to the wrongness of such a relationship.
ways of responding to problems that arise for them. They could be, and indeed Rather, it is a saying which reflects the ideology of the ruling class at the dawn of
have to be creative and innovative in their responses even when the majority of the colonialism. Those natives who were recruited as interpreters for the colonial
members of such societies believe that they are still doing things according to laid masters and who were made to believe that they had joined the class of the masters
down traditions. Without such creativity, no society can survive. So we have to had a way of putting across the harsh realities of the colonial exploitative and
assume that creativity is an integral part of the endowment of the traditional oppressive relationship to their unfortunate kith and kin. If we now look at proverbs
philosophic sages. If so, then it cannot be expected that their philosophical ideas as sources of authentic African philosophy, we have to be fully aware of this
will be static. Therefore, identifying what is authentic with what is traditional may dynamic aspect of language. We cannot therefore just be contented with a report
amount to a misplaced focus. of such thought forms. We also have to pose a critique of their adequacy. Indeed,
The second problem I have with this position as interpreted above is that it it is my view that such an uncritical report does not do justice to the fact that
tends to assume that, once we have identified these authentic philosophical ideas, traditional thinkers too must have reflected critically on those ideas among
we need only report them without posing any critique. In other words, because they themselves, reflections which, unfortunately, are not now available to us in writing.
are regarded as authentic, they provide us with the correct thought forms of the This is one reason it seems to me that we cannot insist too much O:Q the exposition
people and all we need to do is to learn them, and perhaps be guided by them. This of world-view as the only authentic approach to African philosophy. It is, in effect,
