Table Of ContentA Decade of Political Change
in Latin America
1963-1973
Raymond Estep
1974
Directorate of Documentary Research
Air University Institute for Professional Development
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
AIR UNIVERSITY DOCUMENTARY RESEARCH STUDY
(AU-203-71-IPD)
MAR1975
RECUVS©
icn
mmi
\<P MAHAN
Vrl, nmv <«.*
¿P/S HBWMifc ft. '••
Published at
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
June 1974
propriety. J
s ^ ní trT y S S a T s T n ^ ¡" th¡S pub,icati°" are «* «o be eon-
as carrying official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or the Air
University.
It
Preface
THIS study of the twenty major Latin American nations has been pre
pared to satisfy the requirements of the faculty, students, and staff of the
Air University. It is especially designed as a continuation of the author’s
earlier work, The Latin American Nations Today: A Study of Political De
velopments Since World War II (Air University, 1964). Since the original
volume contains considerable information on the historical devel
opment of the major political parties in the different countries, this
volume devotes little attention to that subject and focuses primarily on
the details of recent political developments. In accomplishing this it
presents a country-by-country analysis of all constitutional and un
constitutional changes of government, and reviews significant state,
provincial, departmental, and municipal elections. In addition, it
describes the influence on national politics of such non-peaceful actions
as strikes, guerrilla campaigns, civil wars, revolutions, and one interna
tional war.
In preparing this study the author not only consulted the book and
periodical materials listed in the “Suggested Readings,” but he also
made extensive use of a large number of other sources. For current in
formation he relied on reports carried in The New York Times, The
Miami Herald, The Times of the Americas, and Latin America (London).
For in-depth treatments of relatively recent developments he consulted
Current History, the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,
and Inter-American Economic Affairs. All of the above listed publica
tions, as well as those listed in the “Suggested Readings,” are available
in the Air University Library.
iii
2362
Contents
Preface...............................................................................................................111
Introduction..................................................................................................... 1
Argentina......................................................................................................... 5
Bolivia............................................................................................................. 37
Brazil............................................................................................................... 63
Chile................................................................................................................. 85
Colombia..................................................................................................... 125
Costa Rica................................................................................................... 142
Cuba............................................................................................................. 148
The Dominican Republic........................................................................ 164
Ecuador....................................................................................................... 123
El Salvador................................................................................................ 189
Guatemala.................................................................................................. 192
Haiti............................................................................................................. 203
Honduras..................................................................................................... 209
Mexico...................................................................... 211
Nicaragua..................................................................................................... 229
Panama......................................................................................................... 232
Paraguay....................................................................................................... 247
Peru................................................................................................................ 252
Uruguay...................................................................................................... 281
Venezuela...................................................................................................... 301
Glossary......................................................................................................... 318
Introduction
Most of the problems that confronted the Latin President Goulart in 1964, however, the military
American nations in 1963 are still present today high command has installed one general after
and many of them have worsened in the intervening another in the presidency and has refused to fix the
years. The most serious problem has been that date when it expects to return the government to
posed by the replacement of" democratic govern civilian control. Similarly, the Argentine military,
ments by military-led or military-controlled after ousting President Illia in 1966, installed three
governments, which, in one fashion or another, Army generals in succession in the presidency and
have circumscribed, restrained, or otherwise seemed bent on holding on to the presidency in
limited the exercise of the democratic processes of definitely until General Lanusse persuaded his col
freedom of speech, press, and election. This trend leagues to give up control of the government in
toward military usurpation of control, which began 1973. In like manner, leftist Peruvian generals, who
in 1963 with interventions in Guatemala, Ecuador, led the military golpe that ousted President
the Dominican Republic, and Honduras, has con Belaunde in October 1968, also have zealously re
tinued unchecked during the last ten years. By the tained control of executive power and have reftised
end of 1973 military officers, who had gained power to indicate when they propose to restore civilian
either by intervention or election, ruled over na government. The most recent entrant on the politi
tions encompassing three-fourths of the land area cal scene is the Chilean military which ousted Presi
and two-thirds of the people of Latin America. dent Allende in September 1973. Members of the
At the end of the period the trend toward mili four-man military junta which took control of the
tary rule was most pronounced in South America, government soon revealed that they expected to rule
where military rulers had installed themselves by for an extended period while they rescued the peo
force of arms in the presidential palaces in Peru, ple from some of the excesses of Allende’s attempts
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. In addition, a general to convert Chile into a socialist state.
who had won every election since 1954 ruled in One of the major problems for several nations in
Paraguay, and a once-exiled former general had just the years from 1963 to 1973 has been the activities
been re-elected to the presidency in Argentina. In of guerrilla groups, which at times posed serious
neighboring Brazil the military high command was threats to the governments in power. In the early
in the process of replacing one general with another 1960s the leaders of movements in some countries,
in the presidency by means of a controlled indirect taking their cue from Castro’s experience in the
election. At the same time, the President of Uruguay jungles and mountains of eastern Cuba, concen
was occupying his office at the sufferance of the mil trated their efforts on rural-based operations. Typi
itary. Among the other Latin American nations the cal of such campaigns were those in Guatemala,
military’s influence was not so obvious, except in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Of these four the
the middle sector of Central America where an Bolivian posed the least threat to the government,
Army officer held office as president by virtue of an for it owed its existence to the presence of Che
election in El Salvador and a second ruled Hon Guevara and a small band of foreign-born suppor
duras as the result of a “peaceful” golpe. In ters and was completely eradicated when the Boli
Nicaragua General Somoza still remained the vian Army wiped out Guevara’s force. The Peruvian
“real” ruler, although he had vacated the presidency guerrilla movement never constituted a real threat
in favor of a civilian junta in 1972. A somewhat to the government and was easily eliminated when
similar situation prevailed in Panama where its city-born guerrilla leaders were unable to win
General Torrijos had been the “actual” ruler converts among the Indians of the altiplano. In
though not the installed president since 1968. Guatemala, guerrillas posed a serious threat to the
The period since 1963 has been marked more by government until the Army destroyed their base in
the radical transformation in the thinking of the the mountains and killed or captured most of their
leaders of some of the military establishments than supporters. Since the death of their principal
by their actual acts of intervention in government. leaders, guerrillas have ceased to be a significant
For example, in Brazil the military occasionally factor in Guatemalan politics. In Colombia the
had intervened in the government before 1963, but guerrillas weakened their movement by organizing
never for extended periods of time. Since ousting in three separate ideological groups. Still, they re-
1
A DECADE OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA, 19631973
mained strong enough to occupy the attention of a a population problem exists. Although Mexico had
significant number of Army troops and police until taken the first tentative steps toward inaugurating a
late in 1973. Similarly, Venezuelan guerillas, who type of family-planning program, at the end of 1973
experimented with both rural and urban operations, no government supported an effective birth control
had ceased to be a threat to the government by the program. In the meantime, while national leaders
end of 1973. Although their campaigns of arson and ignore it, the problem yearly grows more trouble
bombing had caused millions of dollars in damages, some as new births and migrants from rural areas
principally to foreign-owned enterprises, the guer swell the already-overpopulated cities and swamp
rillas never came close to unseating any of the presi all governing officials from mayors, to governors, to
dents who ruled during the period. In Brazil, congressmen, to presidents with insatiable demands
guerrillas achieved their greatest victories in their for such essential services as police protection,
operations in Rio and Sáo Paulo. During the transportation, education, employment, and health
mid-1960s they challenged the might of the govern facilities. In many countries, however, it is food that
ment by seizing foreign diplomats and holding them is fast becoming the critical factor, for, in spite of
as hostages until they forced the authorities to the gains in food production wrought by the so-
release from jail (and fly overseas) a large number called “green revolution,” it is becoming obvious
of their comrades. Thereafter, a persistent campaign that people are reproducing themselves at a faster
by the police and the military services decimated the rate than farmers and ranchers can produce food to
ranks of the guerrillas and left them leaderless and satisfy their hunger. As the cities grow ever larger,
with few supporters at the end of the period. Urban the problem of producing and supplying food to the
guerrillas in Uruguay, who took the name of city dweller grows ever more difficult, for not only
Tupamaros, literally laughed at the authorities for must sufficient food be produced, it must also be
years and operated almost at will until the Army made available at a price the city dweller can afford.
took charge of counterinsurgency operations in Another significant problem confronting many
1971. Prior to that time the Tupamaros robbed of the nations is their dependence on a one-product
banks, captured rural villages, kidnapped foreign or two-product economy. In spite of strenuous
diplomats and native industrialists, and, when cap efforts to overcome this handicap, many nations
tured, tunnelled to freedom. Since 1972, however, still must rely on one or two agricultural or mineral
the military and the police have captured or killed commodities for a major portion of their foreign
their leaders or forced them to flee for safety to exchange. Most of these nations have sought, with
Argentina or Chile. With the Tupamaro’s founder some success, to increase their foreign exchange
imprisoned in a military garrison under sentence of earnings by joining such international trade
death and his followers dispersed or dead, the associations as those devoted to controlling the sup
movement had almost ceased to exist by the end of ply and price of such products as coffee, copper,
1973. Late arrivals on the guerrilla scene have been sugar, bananas, or petroleum. They have also ex
the urban terrorists of Argentina, who during the perimented with home-grown commercial or trade
last five years have concentrated their efforts in organizations. Among the first of these was the
Buenos Aires and the larger provincial capitals. In Central American Common Market (CACM),
that period they have refined the art of kidnapping which had a remarkably rapid growth rate through
to the point where they have been able to extract the mid-1960s. However, it had already begun to
millions of dollars from foreign and domestic encounter serious obstacles before the outbreak of
owners of large industrial complexes. In addition to the so-called “Soccer War” between Honduras and
kidnapping for ransom, they have also executed a El Salvador in the summer of 1969. In the aftermath
number of labor leaders, high-ranking military of that episode Honduras withdrew from the
figures, and even former President Aramburu. At CACM and closed the Pan-American Highway to
the end of 1973 several of the guerrilla groups Salvadoran commerce, actions which for a time
openly defied all attempts by President Perón to threatened the existence of the organization. Over
win their support or halt their activities. the last four years the remaining Central American
One of the most significant problems which the nations, in spite of quarrels over tariff rates, have
Latin American nations must solve is that resulting struggled to keep the Market’s concept and opera
from the population explosion, which increased the tions alive. At the end of 1973, however, prospects
number of people in the area from 200,000,000 in for the CACM were not overly bright. Another ex
1960 to 290,000,000 today. There is little reason for ample of this type of approach to a solution of trade
believing that the annual growth rate of approx problems was the Latin American Free Trade
imately three percent will be radically slowed over Association (LAFTA), which six South American
the next two decades, for the leaders of most nations and Mexico established in 1961. For a time
governments refuse (officially, at least) to admit that LAFTA appeared to flourish and was eventually
2
INTRODUCTION
enlarged to include three of the remaining four Guerrillas in Latin America: The Technique of the Counter-State.
Spanish-speaking South American nations. Over Luis Mercier Vega (Daniel Weissbort, translator). New
York: Praeger, 1969. 246 pp. 320.98/M555g.
the years, however, its growth rate slowed as its
The Inter-American System: Its Development and Strengthening.
directors found it difficult, if not impossible, to per Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies.
suade member nations to make further cuts in their New York: Oceana Publications, 1966. 530 pp. 341.18
domestic tariffs. By the end of 1973 LAFTA had 7/I612Í.
International Communism in Latin America: A History of the
lost the dynamism that marked its earlier years and
Movement, 1917-1963. Rollie E. Poppino. New York: The
had long since yielded its place in the sun to the
Free Press, 1964. 247 pp. 335.43098/P831L
newest cooperative trade concept, the Andean “Isolating the Guerrilla: Some Latin American Examples.” Ed
Development Corporation, which was created as a ward B. Glick. Orbis, Vol 12, Fall 1968, pp 873-886.
subgroup of LAFTA in 1970. The Corporation’s Latin America and the United States in the 1970's. Richard B.
charter members—Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Gray (ed). Itasca, 111: Peacock, 1971. 370 pp. 327.7308/G78
11
and Colombia—received new hope in 1973 when .
Latin American Christian Democratic Parties. Edward J.
oil-rich Venezuela finally overcame its fears and
Williams. Knoxville: Univ of Tennessee Press, 1967. 305 pp.
joined its poorer Andean neighbors. At the end of 329.98/W7221.
1973 the Corporation seemed well on its way to A Latin American Economic Community: History, Policies, and
becoming a viable entity. Problems. Nino Maritano. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ
Press, 1970. 265 pp. 337.918/M3421.
A host of other problems will require the atten
Latin American Political Parties. Robert J. Alexander. New York:
tion of Latin America’s leaders in the next decade. Praeger, 1973. 537 pp. 329.98/A3771.
In some manner and in some degree they must find Latin American Political Thought and Ideology. Miguel Jorrin
solutions to problems in the fields of industrializa and John D. Martz. Chapel Hill: Univ of North Carolina
Press, 1970. 620 pp. 320.98/J821.
tion, transportation, agriculture, labor, education,
“Latin American Population Prospects in the Next Fifteen
public health, and many others. Their solutions will
Years: A Brief Analysis.” M. A. El-Badry. Population Stu
determine the course of Latin American history for dies, Vol 25, July 1971, pp 183-192.
the remainder of the century. “The Latin American University at the Crossroads.” Freeman J.
Wright. Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol 24, Spring
1971, pp 81-91.
SUGGESTED READINGS
“Latin America’s Trend to the Right.” Sidney Lens. New
Politics, Vol 10, Winter 1973, pp 56-70.
Allende’s Chile. Kenneth Medhurst (ed). New York: St. Martin’s
“Military Power and Political Change.” Elizabeth H. Hyman.
Press, 1972. 202 pp. 320.983/M488a.
Survival, Vol 15, March-April 1973, pp 65-72.
“Alliance Rhetoric versus Latin American Reality.”'Abraham
Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America. Arthur P. Whitaker
F. Lowenthal. Foreign Affairs, Vol 48, April 1970, pp
and David C. Jordan. New York: The Free Press, 1966. 229
494-508.
pp. 980.03/W577n.
Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of its Future. Luigi R.
“New Directions for Our Latin American Policy.” Martin C.
Einaudi (ed). New York: Crane, Russak & Co: 1974. 250 pp.
Needier. Yale Review, Vol 60, Spring 1971, pp 333-341.
980/E35b.
“Big Business and ‘Dependencia’: A Latin American View.” “The Nixon Foreign Aid Policy for Latin America.” William C.
Osvaldo Sunkel. Foreign Affairs, Vol 50, April 1972, pp Binning. Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol 25, Summer
517-531. 1971, pp 31-45.
“Communist Parties of Latin America.” Robert J. Alexander. Organized Labor in Latin America. Robert J. Alexander. New
Problems of Communism, Vol 19, July 1970, pp 37-46. York: The Free Press, 1965. 274 pp. 331.88098/A377.
Cuba, Castro, and Revolution. Jaime Suchlicki (ed). Coral Ga “Parties, Neighborhood Associations, and the Politicization of
bles: Univ of Miami Press, 1972. 250 pp. 309.17291/S942c. the Urban Poor in Latin America.” Raymond B. Pratt. Mid
Cuba, Castro, and the United States. Philip W. Bonsai. Pittsburgh: west Journal of Political Science, Vol 15, Aug 1971, pp
Univ of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. 318 pp. 327.7307291/B721C. 495-524.
“Currents [of Communism] in Latin America.” Problems of The Political Economy of Latin America. Wendell C. Gordon.
Communism, Vol 19, July 1970, pp 1-46. New York: Columbia Univ Press, 1965. 401 pp. 330.98
“Development Assistance to Latin America.” Richard S. /G665p.
Aldrich. Yale Review, Vol 60, Autumn 1970, pp 53-62. Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations. Richard
“Electoral Fraud and Regime Controls in Latin America.” R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. (eds). Englewood
Ronald H. McDonald. Western Political Quarterly, Vol 25, Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 419 pp. 320.98/F153p.
March 1972, pp 81-93. Political Violence in Latin America. Jack Davis. London: Inter
Elites in Latin America. Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari national Institute for Strategic Studies (Adelphi Papers No
(eds). New York: Oxford Univ Press, 1967. 531 pp. 309.18 85), 1972. 35 pp. 909.82/L8471a/No 85.
/L767e. “Politics and Population Control in Latin America.” J. M.
“The Emergence of the Secular Nation-State and Latin Stycos. World Politics, Vol 20, Oct 1967, pp 66-82.
American Catholicism.” Edward J. Williams. Comparative “Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military.”
Politics, Vol 5, Jan 1973, pp 261-277. Charles D. Corbett. Orbis, Vol 16, Winter 1973, pp 927-951.
“The Futility of Schooling in Latin America.” Ivan Illich. “Portents for Politics in Latin American Population Expan
Saturday Review, Vol 51, 20 April 1968, pp 56-59. 74-75. sion.” Richard L. Clinton. Inter-American Economic Affairs,
The Guerillas: New Patterns in Revolution in Latin America, A Vol 25, Autumn 1971, pp 31-46.
Provocative Analysis of Post-Castro Guerilla Warfare. Jean “The Rise and the Decline of Latin American Economic In
Lartéguy(Stanley Hochman, translator). New York: New tegration.” Miguel S. Wionczek. Journal of Common Market
American Library, 1970. 237 pp 325.425/L335g. Studies, Vol 9, Sep 1970, pp 49-66.
3
A DECADE OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. 1963-1973
The Roman Catholic Church in Modern Latin America. Karl M. “U.S. Military Commitments in Latin America.” Current Histo
Schmitt (ed). New York: Knopf, 1972. 225 pp. 282.8/S355r. ry, Vol 56, June 1969. Entire issue.
“Seven Dilemmas of Latin America’s National Revolutionary
“Urban Guerrilla in Latin America.” Alexander Craig. Survey,
Parties.” Russell H. Fitzgibbon. Orbis, Vol 14, Summer
Vol 17, Summer 1971, pp 112-128.
1970, pp 443^462.
“Urban Guerrillas in Latin America.” Robert Moss. Conflict
“Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on Latin American Armed
Studies, No 8, Oct 1970. Entire issue.
Forces.” Elizabeth H. Hyman. Political Science Quarterly,
Vol 87, Sep 1972, pp 401-418. Urban Guerrilla Warfare. With an Appendix: Minimanual of the
“Soviet Views of Urbanization, Industrialization, and Mod Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighella. Robert Moss. London:
ernization in Latin America.” Roger Hamburg. Studies in International Institute for Strategic Studies (Adelphi Papers
Comparative Communism, Vol 5, Spring 1972, pp 1-20. No 79), 1971. 42 pp. 909.82/L8471a/No 79.
“U.S. Aid to Latin America: Funding Radical Change.” George “Waking from the Pan-American Dream.” Lawrence J. Har
C. Lodge. Foreign Affairs, Vol 47, July 1969, pp 735-749. rison. Foreign Policy, No 5, Winter 1971-72, pp 163-181.
4
Argentina
For almost two decades after 1955 Argentina to earn foreign exchange slowed by a rising popula
was plagued by two virtually insoluble political and tion which consumed more of the beef on which the
economic problems. These were Peronism and in nation once relied as its principal producer of
flation. The first resulted "from the continuing foreign exchange. At home, on the government
political influence of Juan Domingo Perón, who in level, the various presidents were handicapped by a
the 1940s created a personal political following, failure to raise the revenues to meet the rising de
which over the years remained the strongest politi mands of the populace for increased social and
cal grouping in the nation. From the day of his other services. And, internally also, the inflationary
ouster in 1955 the problem of how to deal with spiral was accentuated by widespread featherbed
these followers of Perón, who number about one- ding (as in the national railways) and by the success
third of the electorate, has dominated the thinking of labor in winning increases in wages. Few at
of the nation’s leaders, especially among the mili tempts to stabilize the economy were successful, for
tary, who in 1962 and again in 1966 ousted elected freezes on wages (and prices) proved extremely un
presidents Frondizi and Illia after Peronist parties popular. Since the departure of Dr. Krieger Vasena
had polled more than 35% of the votes in congres in 1969 no Finance Minister has come forward with
sional and provincial elections. The fear that Perón, a long-range program for creating economic stabili
whom they had ousted, would use his supporters to ty. His successors have relied on stopgap economic
regain control of the nation through the ballot box expedients characterized by their short-sightedness
caused most of the military through 1972 to oppose and their short-range goals.
the restoration of democratic government.
Throughout this period of military control, Perón, ARTURO UMBERTO ILLIA, 1963-1966
from his exile in Madrid, plotted and schemed to
regain control, while at home in Argentina his sup Nineteen months of political infighting between
porters, for various reasons, used his name to main the “hardline” colorado and “softline” azul factions
tain or enlarge their political influence. All Argen of the military, in which José Maria Guido, the
tines recognized that these followers of Perón must temporary president, served as an unneutral referee,
eventually be reincorporated in the body politic. ended with the inauguration of Dr. Arturo Umberto
The question of when and how was what occupied Illia. In the election held on 7 July 1963 Illia, the
much of the thinking of President Lanusse from candidate of the People’s Radical Civic Union
1971 to 1973. (UCRP), triumphed over six other presidential can
For much of the period since 1955 Argentina has didates by polling more than 25% of the popular
suffered from the effects of an inflation some of vote and winning 169 electoral votes.
whose roots could be traced to the decade of The inauguration of Illia on 12 October (El Día
Perón’s rule. In his efforts to build a political power de la Raza) brought to the leadership of the Argen
base during the 1940s and 1950s, Perón turned to tine government a colorless country physician and
organized labor which in return for economic con longtime provincial politician whose tenure was to
cessions gave him its soul and its vote. At the same be marred by economic, labor, and political trou
time Perón, by his efforts to industrialize Argen bles. Within a month of taking office he fulfilled
tina, greatly enlarged the nation’s non-agricultural earlier promises by annulling all contracts nego
work force. After Perón’s ouster this enlarged work tiated by Frondizi with foreign oil companies in the
force used its muscle to force succeeding govern 1958-1959 period, contracts which had made
ments to heed its demands for more and more wages Argentina self-sufficient in petroleum production.
and thus compounded the effects of an inflation that The inability of the national petroleum corporation
in greater or lesser degree slowed the economic (YPF) to duplicate the production efforts of the
efforts of most governments after 1955. Abroad, in foreign oil companies complicated a deteriorating
most of this period, the government found its efforts economic picture and once again forced Argentina
5
A DECADE OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1963-1973
to begin expending its hard currency for imported 1965, governmental authorities announced that all
oil. Other economic problems that confronted Illia parties could participate if they abided by police
from the outset, problems he was unable to solve, regulations and pledged their allegiance to the Con
included sharp “price inflation, the flight of private stitution and the federal system of government.
capital, heavy unemployment, unfavorable terms of Following this, on 16 November, Illia approved a
trade, a snow-balling foreign debt, and the threat Senate decree which removed all restrictions on
from the European Common Market.” Peronist and Communist parties imposed by the
Of all the problems confronting Illia none was Guido government.
fraught with more danger to his position than that In spite of these actions, Illia sought to extradite
posed by the labor movement, for it represented the Perón to Argentina on charges of “improper con
twin frustrations of those who, on the one hand, duct and living with a minor.” A warrant carrying
sought economic redress for their real or fancied ills these charges was delivered to the Spanish govern
and those who, on the other, often represented the ment on 12 December. The motivation behind this
political frustrations of the followers of Perón who action is difficult to determine, for it came less than
had been denied political fulfillment since the dic a month after the relaxed rules against the Peronists
tator’s overthrow. In their pressure for change, the had been accepted at home, as well as on the heels
labor leaders did not speak with a single voice, for of an earlier declaration that Perón was free to
the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was a return home. Regardless of the motive, the Spanish
conglomerate composed of more than 100 unions of government took no action on it and Perón con
which Peronist leaders held control over 62, Com tinued his residence in Spain, where periodically he
munists over 12, and non-Peronists over 32. In an met with visiting delegations of his followers, to
attempt to force the adoption by the Congress and whom he gave his promise to return to Argentina
the President of an adjustable minimum wage bill in before the end of 1964.
1964, unionists and union sympathizers carried out In July 1964, after once again promising to
a nationwide terroristic campaign (in which a num return, he appealed to the Argentine Army for sup
ber of persons were killed), which one of the ter port and pledged the backing of the CGT for the
rorists declared was a part of the CGT’s strategy for Army if it would “bar the way to Communism.”
creating so much chaos that Perón might be asked News of this declaration generated widespread in
to return to restore the peace. From mid-May to the terest within Argentina, and high-level officials felt
end of June the CGT followed its “battle plan” in compelled to shed some light on how the govern
which workers seized factories in a series of surprise ment viewed Perón’s activities. The Minister of the
occupations, which reached a climax on 5 June Interior, after making several declarations that
when almost 2,000,000 workers were involved in Perón could come home as a private citizen, on 24
sit-ins. The strike action came to an end on 27 June, August denied knowledge of any agreement be
the day before the President signed a minimum- tween military leaders and Perón pertaining to his
wage bill, which provided for wages to be geared to return, a denial that was repeated by General Juan
the COL Index. Carlos Ongania, Commander in Chief of the Army,
Although economic and labor problems sorely on the 26th. Five days later the Under Secretary of
troubled Illia, it was the Perón issue that caused his the Interior, however, revealed the real deterrent
downfall, as it had led to the ouster of many of his when he pointed out that if Perón “returned he
predecessors since the overthrow of Perón in 1955. would be treated like any other private citizen and
Illia’s position on the treatment of Peronist prob would have to face the court charges pending
lems was an ambivalent one initially. As the inheri against him.” In the same month the Justicialist Par
tor of the approach used by the azules under Guido ty, which had named Perón as its chief on 28 July,
in 1962 and 1963, Illia was inclined to permit held its first congress in Madrid and issued a
Peronist parties to function in the provinces and to declaration containing. Perón’s “irrevocable deci
accept the fiction that the different parties were in sion” to return to Argentina before the end of 1964
dependent of each other, even though a group of na “to facilitate unity and peace” for all the people.
tional Peronist leaders continued to take orders The climax to Perón’s long war of nerves against
from Perón in exile in Spain. the Argentine government came in his comic-opera
Typifying Illia’s approach was his authorization, attempt of December 1964 to fulfill his promises or
during his first week in office, of a mass rally of an threats. What he hoped to accomplish is not clear,
estimated 50,000 Peronist supporters, at which its but in the light of events as they developed, it
leaders presented tape recordings of speeches by seemed as if he was trying to convince his faithful
both Eva and Juan Perón and also demanded that followers of the sincerity of his promises, for there
the government permit Perón’s return. In Novem is little indication that he had made any serious
ber, in issuing a call for congressional elections in plans to prepare the way for his return. Arriving at
6
