Table Of ContentThe Kremlin’s
Nuclear Sword
THE RISE AND FALL OF RUSSIA’S
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, 1945-2000
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION PRESS
WASHINGTON AND LONDON
In memory of two friends who provoked my interest
in Soviet military technology, Janusz Magnuski and Jim Loop.
© 2002 by Steven J. Zaloga
All rights reserved
Copy editor: Tom Ireland
Production editor: Robert A. Poarch
Designer: Janice Wheeler
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Zaloga, Steve
The Kremlin’s nuclear sword : the rise and fall of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces,
1945-2000 / Steven J. Zaloga.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-58834-007-4 (alk. paper)
1. Strategic forces—Soviet Union. 2. Strategic forc— Reusssi a (Federation). 3. Soviet
Union. Raketnye voeska strategicheskogo naznacheniéi—History. 4. Russia (Federation).
Raketnye voeska strategicheskogo naznacheniéi. I. Title.
UA776.R3 Z35 2002
355.02’17'094709045 —dc21 2001049092
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available
Manufactured in the United States of America
09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 54321
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials ANSI Z39.48-1984.
For permission to reproduce the photographs appearing in this book, please correspond di-
rectly with the owners of the works, as listed in the individual captions. (The author owns
the photographs that do not list a source.) The Smithsonian Institution Press does not retain
reproduction rights for these photographs or illustrations individually, or maintain a file of
addresses for photo sources.
Contents
Preface v
Chapter 1. Revolution in Military Affairs: 1946-1953 1
Chapter 2. Bomber vs. Nlissile: 1953-1959 22
Chanter 3. Deploying the First Generation: 1960-1965 60
Chapter 4. The Race for Parity: 1965-1973 101
Chapter 5. Beyond Parity: 1973-1985 135
Chapter 6. To the Brink of Collapse: 1985-1891 178
Chapter 7. Soviet Becomes Russian: 1991-2000 215
Appendix 1. Missile Technical Data 231
Appendix 2. Soviet Strategic Forces, 1960-—Present 241
Appendix 3. Guide to Soviet and Western Designations 249
Notes 257
Index 293
SMITHSONIAN HISTORY OF AVIATION AND SPACEFLIGHT SERIES
Dominick A. Pisano and Allan A. Needell, Series Editors
Since the Wright brothers’ first flight, air and space technologies have been central in creat-
ing the modern world. Aviation and spaceflight have transformed our lives — our conceptions
of time and distance, our daily routines, and the conduct of exploration, business, and war.
The Smithsonian History of Aviation and Spaceflight Series publishes substantive works
that further our understanding of these transformations in their social, cultural, political,
and military contexts.
Preface
he terrible heart of the (Cold War was the nuclear arms race. Until recently, its
history has been told from only a single perspective, that of the United States.
The Soviet side of the story has long been an enigma, and Western accounts have
been based on the tiniest fragments of information, strung together with a great
deal of speculation and conjecture. This situation has dramatically changed since
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
This book deals with the development of the Soviet Union and Russia’s strate-
gic nuclear forces. The priraary focus is on the offensive forces, though some
coverage of strategic defensive forces is of course necessary. The intercontinental
ballistic missile force is at tae center of this study, since it was by far the most
important element of the Soviet Union’s forces.
On reading an early draft of this study, a friend of mine jokingly referred to it
as “a billion dollar book”: it contains information that U.S. intelligence agencies
spent billions of dollars tryiig to obtain. During the Cold War, no subject was
kept a more closely guarded secret than the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear
weapons. It went so far that even the names of the missiles, bombs, and submarines
were considered a state secret, to say nothing of more important issues such as
their technical characteristics and performance. Besides the weapons themselves,
their design, the decision-making policy, and plans for. their employment were
all off-limits except to a very narrow circle of top Soviet officials. Since the end of
the Cold War, the secrecy around these issues has lessened considerably, though it
most certainly has not disappeared.
Vi Preface
English-language accounts of Soviet nuclear forces have traditionally focused
on two subject areas: arms control and strategic nuclear doctrine. Arms control
was the most accessible facet of Soviet nuclear weapons policy since it involved
the interaction of American diplomats with their Soviet counterparts. Nuclear
doctrine was not as closely guarded as more technical subjects since the Soviet
government wished to convey state policy to its rivals.
This book provides an account of Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear forces
from a different perspective. Its primary focus is the development of Soviet strate-
gic nuclear weapons technology from the vantage point of the Soviet aerospace
industry and the related institutions of the Soviet armed forces. This approach was
taken for several reasons. Although the Russian state archives are more open than
they were during the Cold War, most state records dealing with this theme are still
inaccessible. In contrast, there has been a torrent of new information on this sub-
ject from other sources, especially from the Russian aerospace industry and key
military institutes.
The second reason for taking this perspective is its novelty and importance.
During the Cold War, details on the design bureaus and research institutes were so
tightly classified that even the CIA had only the faintest impression of their role in
Soviet defense affairs. Due to the lack of information, there was a tendency to por-
tray Soviet defense decision making as an ideal process: the central organs of the
Communist Party, state, and military carefully formulated their doctrine, and from
this issued requirements to the industry, which faithfully carried out their decrees.
As this study suggests, Soviet defense decision making was not so rational, well
organized, or centralized. The Soviet military industries played a far more central
role in defense decision making than has been previously recognized and was the
primary source of technological innovation. A more popular caricature is that the
military’s insatiable appetite for ever more baroque weapons was at the heart of
the Cold War arms race. In fact, the Soviet military was frequently an impediment
to technological innovation due to the difficulties of absorbing radically new tech-
nology into a force manned by poorly educated conscripts. Finally, details of the
weapons program help to illuminate broader issues of state policy and military
doctrine. There is considerable debate about Soviet policy and intentions during
many critical phases of the Cold War, and the weapons programs are the most tan-
gible manifestation of these policies.
The relaxation of secrecy on these themes has been erratic and unorganized.
While the end of the Cold War has certainly diminished security concerns, openness
about defense subjects has never been a Russian trait. To put this in some per-
spective, data on Soviet weapons production in World War II was not declassified
until the mid-1990s. Soviet General Staff studies of many World War II battles are
still classified. No Soviet war plans are available except for some examples from
Preface Vil
the 1930s. Even in the pas: few years, the state police have warned Russian authors
against writing about many Cold War weapons programs, even about weapons that
are obsolete and have bee:1 retired.
The release of information about the Cold War weapons programs has come not
so much from Russian his‘orians as from the weapons designers and their institu-
tions. There have been two principal reasons for this. To begin with, the engineers
and staff of these institutions are extremely proud of their accomplishments during
the Cold War, and resentful of their anonymity. The designers of relatively simple
weapons, such as the rifle designer Mikhail Kalashnikov of AK-47 fame, have been
heralded as Russian national heroes, while engineers of far more sophisticated and
important weapon systems have had their accomplishments cloaked in secrecy for
decades. This rationale alone could not overcome the tendency of the Russian
state police to censor anything dealing with nuclear weapons. However, by the
mid-1990s, a more practice! reason had emerged. The Russian defense industries
were in catastrophic decline. Orders from the Russian government for new weapons
had evaporated due to the collapse of the economy and the state budget. One of the
few bright spots was the Russian space industry, since the U.S. government was
pouring in funding for Russian participation in the International Space Station.
To American firms, the orzanization of the Russian aerospace industry was a
complete mystery. Gradually, the Russian design bureaus and aerospace plants
began to release publications detailing their past accomplishments and current
capabilities in hopes of participating in these international ventures. Since the
space industry and the missile industry are one and same, this shed considerable
light on the history of the Cold War arms race. Some key industry leaders have
published their memoirs, ancl many design bureaus have released accounts of their
past accomplishments.
A similar process took pléce in the Russian armed forces. There was consider-
able pride on the part of ccmmanders and military leaders about their accom-
plishments in the Cold War, which had previously been hidden from public view.
This encouraged the armed forces to push back the boundaries imposed by state
censors. The 300th anniversary of the founding of the Russian fleet in 1996 pro-
vided a rationale for a flood of publications on the history of the Soviet fleet and
the Soviet ship-building industry. Similarly, the fortieth anniversary of the found-
ing of the Strategic Missile Force in 1999 was occasion for a surge of publications
about its history. The appearance of these other sources has made it possible for
Russian scholars to examine ‘his sensitive subject.
Over the past decade, I have been able to talk to hundreds of Russian and Ukrain-
ian engineers involved in the Cold War programs. While wary of discussing tech-
nical issues, they were extremely helpful in explaining the process and motivation
of many weapons programs.
viii = Preface
This is one of the first books in English to refer to Soviet nuclear weapons by
their Russian names, not by their more familiar U.S. or NATO intelligence desig-
nations. So the Soviet ICBM known in the West as the SS-11 is referred to in this
book by its Russian designation, UR-100. Initially, this will be jarring to readers
unfamiliar with the Soviet designations, but it is a necessary and timely change in
dealing with Cold War history. As the Russian archives gradually become more
open, historians will have to become familiar with the Russian terms for their
weapons. For example, some recent accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis, based
on newly released archival documents, have been confusing due to lack of famil-
iarity with Russian military terminology. Recent Russian books on this subject
have also shifted to the use of these formerly secret Russian designations. Appen-
dix 3 lists the various designations applied to these weapons in hopes of making
this process less troublesome. The names of the various design bureaus have been
simplified somewhat in this account to avoid confusing readers. Soviet design
bureaus had multiple classified and unclassified names, which frequently changed
through time. Indeed, the recent history of one rocket engine design bureau was
preceded by an entire page listing the many names under which the bureau had
been known over the past half century! So, where possible, this account uses
the name of the founding general designer of the bureau for the organization, a
practice that the Russians themselves follow.
I am indebted to many friends and colleagues for their assistance on this proj-
ect over the past decade. Special thanks go to David Markov and Andrew Hull of
the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses
for their support and encouragement over the years. David Isby and Joseph Durant
have been instrumental in keeping me abreast of the latest revelations from the
Russian defense press. Norman Friedman has provided a great deal of practical
advice on the technical issues examined in this book. Charles Vick of the Federa-
tion of American Scientists has provided generous support from his own consid-
erable knowledge of the Soviet space program. Joshua Handler of Princeton’s
Center for Energy and Environmental Studies has been most helpful in sharing
material from his own extensive research in Russia. Asif Siddiqi, Dwayne Day,
Piotr Butowski, David Woods, and Barney Dombrowski have all provided helpful
comments and material. And William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson of the National
Security Archives at George Washington University have been most helpful in
sharing the results of their own extensive research into Cold War history.
1. Revolution in Military Affairs
1946-1953
n May 1945 the Red Arrny was at the pinnacle of its power, standing victorious
in the smoldering ruins of Berlin. After four years of savage warfare with Ger-
many, it had vanquished the strongest European continental power. The Red Army
was the largest in the world, with over 430 rifle divisions, 20 cavalry divisions,
and 32 tank and mechanized corps.' It was armed with 89,600 field guns; 27,300
armored vehicles, and 115,600 combat aircraft. The communist dream of spread-
ing the world revolution was now a tangible possibility. But Soviet power would
advance on the inexorable power of the Red Army, not on the intellectual fantasies
of the Marxist dialectic. Then in August 1945, “Plump came the atomic bomb.
The balance which now sesmed set and steady was rudely shaken. Russia was
balked by the West when everything seemed to be within her grasp. The three
hundred divisions (of the Red Army) were shorn of much their value.”?
There was a palpable change of mood in Moscow. The U.S. ambassador cabled
Washington: “Suddenly, the atomic bomb appeared and [the Soviets] recognized
that it was an offset to the power of the Red Army. This must have revived their
old feeling of insecurity.” A correspondent stationed in Moscow in 1945 recalled
that news of the Hiroshima bomb “had an acutely depressing effect on every-
body. ... Some Russian pessimists dismally remarked that Russia’s desperately
hard-won victory over Germany was now as good as wasted.”* An official in the
bomb program later recallec. “Stalin was really enraged, [it was] the first time
during the war that he lost control of himself. ... He perceived the collapse of
his dream of expansion of socialist revolution throughout all Europe, the dream
that had seemed so real after the capitulation of Germany and that was invalidated
