Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent

27 Pages·2014·0.13 MB·English

Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd
(previouslyknownasAlcatelNetworkSystems(M)SdnBhd)
[2014]3MLJ (HasanLahFCJ) 785
A Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd
(previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd)
FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02(F)-61–08
B
OF2012(W)
RAUSSHARIFPCA,HASHIMYUSOF,ABDULLHAMIDEMBONG,
HASANLAHANDJEFFREYTANFCJJ
30OCTOBER2013
C
CivilProcedure—Remedyofaccount—Actionfoundedoncontract—Fiduciary
relationship—Allegedfiduciaryrelationshipbetweenappellantandrespondent—
Whetherdependentontermsofcontract—Whetherjustificationforfiduciaryduty
to account exists — Whether fiduciary relationship can be superimposed upon
D
contract
Civil Procedure — Remedy of account — Application allowed by trial judge —
Appeal against — Obligation to pay consultancy fees — Consultancy agreements
E
— Whether appellant and respondent’s contractual relationship established —
Fiduciary relationship —Whether existed between appellant and respondent —
Whetherfiduciarydutytoaccountarose
F
CivilProcedure—Trial–Defence—Defendantfailingtoofferanyevidence—
Whether evidence given by plaintiff ought to be presumed to be true —Whether
appellatecourtprecludedfrominterferingwithdeterminationoffactbyjudge—
WhetherprincipleinTakakoSakaovNgPekYuen&Anorapplicable
G
CompaniesandCorporations—Liftingofcorporateveil—Remedyofaccount—
Relationshipbetweenappellantandrespondent—Whetherappellantanassociated
company—Whetherfraudproven—Whetherabsenceofanyjustificationtolift
corporateveil
H
Contract—Terms—Entireagreementclause—Whetheragreementincludedan
entireagreementclause—Whetherentireagreementclauseprecludedconsideration
ofcollateralcontract
I
The appellant/plaintiff’s claim was for an account from the
respondent/defendant based on ten consultancy agreements entered into
betweentheplaintiffandAlcatelStandardSA(‘Standard’),actingonbehalfof
its associated company namely, Alcatel CIT and Alcatel-Lucent Italia/Alcatel
786 MalayanLawJournal [2014]3MLJ
Italia (the ‘Consultancy Agreements’). The purpose of the consultancy A
agreements was for the plaintiff to provide consultancy services to the
associatedcompanyandthedefendantinsecuringcontractswithTelekom(M)
Bhd (‘Telekoms’) and Celcom Bhd (‘Celcom’). The defendant was not a
contractingpartytotheconsultancyagreements.Thecontractswereallentered
into between the plaintiff and Standard.The obligation to pay the plaintiff’s B
consultancyfeesundertheconsultancyagreementslaidwithStandard,Alcatel
CIT and Alcatel Italia. The consultancy agreements constituted the entire
agreement between the parties. The plaintiff claimed that the mode and
mannerofpaymentasprovidedundertheconsultancyagreementswerenever
C
followedfromdayone.Instead,bywayofacollateralagreementbetweenthe
plaintiffandthedefendant,itwasagreedthatthedefendantwouldnotifythe
plaintiff of the value of all deliveries that had been made to Celcom and
Telekoms, after which the plaintiff would send the invoices to the defendant
whereupon payment would be made by the defendant on the invoices. The
D
plaintiffallegedthatbasedonthiscollateralagreementtheplaintiffwaspaidin
excess of USD 7m from the year 2000. This carried on until the defendant
terminated the services of the plaintiff in 2009 at which point the defendant
stoppedrenderingproperaccountsanddetailsofthedeliveriestoCelcomand
Telekoms to enable the plaintiff to compute the payment due.The plaintiff E
thusinthissuitsoughtfromthedefendant,interalia,statementofaccountsof
all monies received by the defendant from Celcom and Telekoms. The
defendant denied that it was the ultimate beneficiary of services rendered by
theplaintiff.Thedefendantalsodeniedtheexistenceoftheallegedcollateral
contract.Atthecloseoftheplaintiff’scasethetrialjudgerefusedanapplication F
for adjournment by the defendant on the ground that its witness was not
available. The case was therefore closed without the defence offering any
evidence.Thetrialjudgeallowedtheplaintiff’sclaimonthegroundsthatthe
defendant was an accounting party because the defendant, Standard and
AlcatelCITwereagroupenterpriseratherthanaseparatelegalentityofeach G
company within the group included in the operation of the agreements and
thus a fiduciary duty to account arose. The Court of Appeal allowed the
defendant’s appeal. Leave to appeal to the Federal Court was granted to the
plaintiffonthefollowingquestions:(i)whetherinascertainingwhetherparties
H
stand in a fiduciary relationship, a court is to have regard to the course of
dealings between the parties in addition to any express agreement between
them; (ii) whether in view of the decision of the Federal Court in Takako
Sakao(f)vNgPekYuen(f)&Anor[2009]6MLJ751(TakakoSakao),theCourt
of Appeal was precluded from interfering with a determination of fact by a
I
judge of the High Court at trial where the sole defendant had elected not to
lead evidence; and (iii) where an agreement includes an ‘entire agreement’
Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd
(previouslyknownasAlcatelNetworkSystems(M)SdnBhd)
[2014]3MLJ (HasanLahFCJ) 787
A clause, whether such clause on as a matter of course precluded the
considerationofacollateralcontract.
Held,dismissingtheappealwithcosts:
(1) It had not been established that some payments were made by the
B
defendant to the plaintiff for the services rendered. Furthermore the
invoices for payment were not addressed to the defendant but were
addressedeithertoAlcatelCITorAlcatelItaliawhichwasinaccordance
with the term of the consultancy agreements. As the plaintiff failed to
establish that it was entitled to some sum from the defendant, the
C
plaintiff was not entitled to the order of taking of account against the
defendantunderthecommonlaw(seeparas26–27).
(2) Thetrialjudgeerredinliftingthecorporateveilofthedefendanttomake
thedefendantliabletoaccounttotheplaintiff.Theremustbeevidence
D eitherofactualfraudorsomeconductamountingtofraudinequityto
justifytheliftingofcorporateveil(seepara46).
(3) Thebusinessrelationshipbetweentheplaintiffandthedefendantdidnot
fall under the accepted traditional categories of fiduciary relationship.
E Evenapplyingtheflexibleapproachtothecircumstancesofthecase,such
fiduciary relationship did not exist in the case. This is because
commercialtransactionsoftendonotgiverisetofiduciarydutiesbecause
theydonotmeetthecriteriaforcharacterisationasfiduciaryinnature.
Thecircumstancesoftherelationshipintheinstantcasecouldnotgive
F risetoarelationshipoftrustandconfidence(seeparas47–48).
(4) Thenotesofproceedingshowedthatthedefendantdidtakepartinthe
trial.Thetrialjudgerefusedtheadjournmentandthecasewastherefore
closed without the defence offering any evidence.The facts of this case
couldbedistinguishedfromthefactsinTakakoSakao.Theprinciplesin
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TakakoSakaodidnotapplyunderthecircumstances(seeparas56–57).
(5) The trial judge failed to evaluate the evidence relating to the alleged
collateralcontractandmakeanyfindingontheexistenceofthealleged
collateralcontract(seepara64).
H
(6) TheCourtofAppealerredinfailingtoappreciatethatentireagreement
clausesoperatedonlyasbetweenthecontractingparties.Thedefendant
was not a party to the consultancy agreements and as such the alleged
collateral contract between the plaintiff and the defendant should be
treated as a separate and distinct contract and could not fall under the
I
scopeoftheconsultancyagreements.Theentireagreementclausedidnot
preclude the plaintiff from setting up the alleged collateral agreement
betweentheplaintiffanddefendant(seepara68).
(7) Even if the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing the existence of the
788 MalayanLawJournal [2014]3MLJ
collateral contract, such contract was void for want of consideration. A
Therewasnothingtoshowthatconsiderationwasgivenbytheplaintiff
for the defendant to furnish the required information. Under the
consultancyagreementstheplaintiffwasrequiredtoprovideconsultancy
servicesforthebenefitofthedefendant.Butthatwastheconsideration
for the consultancy agreements and not for the alleged collateral B
agreement and also the consultancy services were not rendered at the
defendant’srequest(seepara71).
[BahasaMalaysiasummary
Tuntutan perayu/plaintif adalah untuk akaun dari responden/defendan C
berdasarkansepuluhperjanjianperundinganyangdimasukiantaraplaintifdan
Alcatel Standard SA (‘Standard’), yang bertindak bagi pihak syarikat
bersekutunya iaitu Alcatel CIT dan Alcatel-Lucent Italia/Alcatel Italia
(‘Perjanjian Perundingan’). Tujuan perjanjian perundingan itu adalah untuk
plaintif menyediakan perkhidmatan perundingan kepada syarikat bersekutu D
tersebutdandefendandalammendapatkankontrakdenganTelekom(M)Bhd
(‘Telekom’) dan Celcom Bhd (‘Celcom’). Defendan bukan pihak yang
berkontrakdenganperjanjianperundinganitu.Semuakontraktersebuttelah
dimasuki antara plaintif dan Standard. Obligasi untuk membayar yuran
perundingan plaintif di bawah perjanjian perundingan itu terletak pada E
Standard, Alcatel CIT dan Alcatel Italia. Perjanjian perundingan itu
membentuk keseluruhan perjanjian antara pihak-pihak. Plaintif mendakwa
bahawa kaedah dan cara membuat pembayaran sebagaimana yang
diperuntukkandibawahperjanjianperundinganitutidakpernahdiikutidari
hari pertama. Sebaliknya, melalui perjanjian kolateral antara plaintif dan F
defendan, telah dipersetujui bahawa defendan akan memberitahu plaintif
tentang nilai semua penghantaran yang telah dibuat kepada Celcom dan
Telekom,selepasituplaintifakanmenghantarinvois-invoiskepadadefendan
yangmanapembayaranakandibuatolehdefendanberdasarkaninvois-invois
itu. Plaintif mendakwa berdasarkan perjanjian kolateral ini plaintif telah G
dibayarlebihanUSD7jutadaritahun2000.Iniberterusansehinggadefendan
menamatkan perkhidmatan plaintif pada tahun 2009 yang mana mulanya
defendan berhenti memberikan akaun dan butiran penghantaran yang
sepatutnya kepada Celcom dan Telekom bagi membolehkan plaintif untuk
mengirapembayaranyangperludibayar.Plaintifdenganitudalamsamanini H
memohondaripadadefendan,antaralain,penyataakaununtuksemuawang
yang diterima oleh defendan daripada Celcom dan Telekom. Defendan
menafikan bahawa ia adalah benefisiari utama untuk perkhidmatan yang
diberikan oleh plaintif. Defendan juga menafikan kewujudan kontrak
kolateralyangdikatakanitu.Diakhirkesplaintifhakimperbicaraanmenolak I
permohonan penangguhan oleh defendan atas alasan bahawa saksinya tidak
boleh didapati. Kes itu oleh itu ditutup tanpa pembelaan yang menawarkan
apa-apa keterangan. Hakim perbicaraan membenarkan tuntutan plaintif atas
alasan bahawa defendan merupakan sebuah pihak perakaunan kerana
Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd
(previouslyknownasAlcatelNetworkSystems(M)SdnBhd)
[2014]3MLJ (HasanLahFCJ) 789
A defendan, Standard dan Alcatel CIT merupakan kumpulan perusahaan dan
bukan satu entiti yang sah yang berasingan bagi setiap syarikat di dalam
kumpulanyangdimasukkankedalamoperasiperjanjiandandenganituwujud
kewajipan fidusiari kepada akaun itu. Mahkamah Rayuan membenarkan
rayuan defendan. Kebenaran untuk merayu kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan
B telahdiberikankepadaplaintifberdasarkansoalan-soalanberikut:(i)samaada
dalam menentukan jika pihak-pihak mempunyai hubungan fidusiari,
mahkamah hendaklah mengambil kira pengendalian urusan antara
pihak-pihak ditambah dengan apa-apa perjanjian nyata antara mereka; (ii)
sama ada berdasarkan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Takako
C Sakao(f) v Ng Pek Yuen(f) & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 751(Takako Sakao),
Mahkamah Rayuan dihalang daripada mengganggu penentuan fakta oleh
hakimMahkamahTinggisemasaperbicaraandimanasatu-satunyadefendan
telah memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan keterangan; dan (iii) di mana
perjanjianmemasukkanfasal‘keseluruhanperjanjian’,samaadafasaltersebut
D sebagaiperkarayangsudahtentumenghalangbalasankontrakkolateral.
Diputuskan,menolakrayuandengankos:
(1) Tidakdibuktikanbahawabeberapabayarantelahdibuatolehdefendan
kepada plaintif bagi perkhidmatan yang diberikan. Tambahan pula
E
invoisuntukpembayaranitutidakdialamatkankepadadefendantetapi
telahdialamatkansamaadakepadaAlcatelCITatauAlcatelItaliayang
menurut tempoh perjanjian perundingan itu. Memandangkan plaintif
gagal membuktikan bahawa ia berhak untuk sejumlah wang tersebut
daripada defendan, plaintif tidak berhak kepada perintah pengambilan
F
akaun terhadap defendan di bawah common law (lihat perenggan
26–27).
(2) Hakimperbicaraanterkhilafdalammenyingkaptabirkorporatdaripada
defendan itu untuk menjadikan defendan bertanggungjawab
G menjelaskan akaun itu kepada plaintif. Perlu ada bukti sama ada
penipuansebenarataubeberapaperilakuyangbolehdianggappenipuan
dalam ekuiti untuk mewajarkan tabir korporat disingkap (lihat
perenggan46).
(3) Hubungan perniagaan antara plaintif dan defendan tidak termasuk di
H
bawah kategori tradisional diterima hubungan fidusiari. Walaupun
menggunakan pendekatan yang fleksibel kepada hal keadaan kes itu,
hubungan fidusiari sebegini tidak wujud dalam kes itu. Ini kerana urus
niaga komersial sering tidak menimbulkan tugas fidusiari kerana tidak
memenuhikriteriauntukpenciriansebagaisuatuyangbersifatfidusiari.
I
Keadaan hubungan dalam kes ini tidak mungkin menimbulkan
hubungankepercayaandankeyakinan(lihatperenggan47–48).
(4) Nota prosiding menunjukkan bahawa defendan tidak mengambil
bahagian dalam perbicaraan itu. Hakim perbicaraan menolak
790 MalayanLawJournal [2014]3MLJ
penangguhan dan kes oleh itu tertutup tanpa pembelaan yang A
menawarkanapa-apaketerangan.Faktakesinibolehdibezakandaripada
fakta-fakta dalam kes Takako Sakao. Prinsip dalam kes Takako Sakao
tidakterpakaidibawahkeadaanini(lihatperenggan56–57).
(5) Hakim perbicaraan gagal menilai keterangan berhubung kontrak
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kolateral yang dikatakan dan membuat apa-apa penemuan berhubung
kewujudankontrakkolateralitu(lihatperenggan64).
(6) Mahkamah Rayuan terkhilaf apabila gagal untuk memahami bahawa
seluruhfasalperjanjianberoperasihanyaantarapihakyangberkontrak.
Defendan bukan pihak kepada perjanjian perundingan dan oleh itu C
kontrakkolateralyangdikatakanantaraplaintifdandefendanhendaklah
dianggapsebagaikontrakyangberasingandanberlainandantidakboleh
terangkum di bawah skop perjanjian perundingan. Perjanjian
keseluruhan fasal tidak menghalang plaintif daripada membuat
perjanjian kolateral yang dikatakan antara plaintif dan defendan (lihat D
perenggan68).
(7) Walaupun plaintif berjaya membuktikan kewujudan kontrak kolateral,
kontrak itu tidak sah kerana ketiadaan pertimbangan. Tiada apa-apa
yang menunjukkan bahawa balasan telah diberikan oleh plaintif untuk
E
defendan memberi maklumat yang diperlukan. Di bawah perjanjian
perundinganplaintifitudikehendakiuntukmenyediakanperkhidmatan
perundingan bagi manfaat defendan. Tetapi itu adalah balasan bagi
perjanjian perundingan dan bukan untuk perjanjian kolateral yang
dikatakan itu dan juga perkhidmatan perundingan itu tidak diberikan
F
ataspermintaandefendan(lihatperenggan71).]
Notes
Foracaseonactionfoundedoncontract,see2(3)Mallal’sDigest(4thEd,2014
Reissue)para7451.
G
Foracaseonapplicationallowedbytrialjudge,see2(3)Mallal’sDigest(4thEd,
2014Reissue)para7452.
For a case on entire agreement clause, see 3(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2013
Reissue)para4647.
For a case on remedy of account in general, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,
H
2013Reissue)para480.
Casesreferredto
Baboo Janokev Doss v Bindabun Doss [1843] Moore Ind App 175, PC (refd)
BristolandWestBuildingSocietyvMothew[1998]Ch1,CA(refd) I
CyrilSharpe,Re[1992]FCA616,FC(refd)
EnglishvDedhamValePropertiesLtd[1978]1AllER382,ChD(refd)
FramevSmithandSmith(1987)42DLR(4th)81,SC(refd)
Heilbut,Symons&CovBuckleton[1913]AC30,HL(refd)
Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd
(previouslyknownasAlcatelNetworkSystems(M)SdnBhd)
[2014]3MLJ (HasanLahFCJ) 791
A Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation & Ors (1986)
156CLR41,HC(refd)
InntrepreneurPubCovEastCrownLtd[2000]3EGLR31,ChD(folld)
John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd Matter No
S309/2009[2010]HCA19(refd)
B Law Kam Loy v Boltex Sdn Bhd [2005] MLJU 225; [2005] 3 CLJ 355, CA
(folld)
MasterStrikeSdnBhdvSterlingHeightSdnBhd[2005]3MLJ585,CA(distd)
Petroleum Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu [2004] 1 MLJ 8, CA
(distd)
C TakakoSakao(f)vNgPekYuen(f)&Anor[2009]6MLJ751;[2010]1CLJ
381,FC(notfolld)
TengkuAbdullahIbniSultanAbuBakar&OrsvMohdLatiffbinShahMohd&
Orsandotherappeals[1996]2MLJ265;[1997]2CLJ607,CA(folld)
D Legislationreferredto
ContractAct1950s26
Appealfrom:CivilAppealNoW-02(NCVC)-764of2011(CourtofAppeal,
Putrajaya)
E
MalikImtiazSarwar(RenuZechariahandSCHowithhim)(RosleyZechariah)
fortheappellant
MohdAriefEmran(ElaineYapwithhim)(Wong&Partners)fortherespondent.
F HasanLahFCJ(deliveringjudgmentofthecourt):
INTRODUCTION
G
[1] This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of the Court of
Appeal on the 27 June 2011, in allowing the respondent’s appeal against the
decision of the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted by this court on 13
August2012andthequestionsoflawframedfordeterminationinthisappeal
H areasfollows:
Question1
Whether in ascertaining whether parties stand in a fiduciary relationship, a
courtistohaveregardtothecourseofdealingsbetweenthepartiesinaddition
I
toanyexpressagreementbetweenthem;
Question2
WhetherinviewofthedecisionofthishonourablecourtinTakakoSakaovNg
792 MalayanLawJournal [2014]3MLJ
PekYuen & Anor [2010] 1 CLJ 381, the Court of Appeal is precluded from A
interferingwithadeterminationoffactbyajudgeoftheHighCourtattrial
wherethesoledefendanthaselectednottoleadevidence;and
Question3
B
Whereanagreementincludesan‘entireagreement’clause,whethersuchclause
on as a matter of course precludes the consideration of a collateral contract.
[2] The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondent is the defendant. For
convenience,partieswillbereferredtoastheplaintiffandthedefendantasin
C
theHighCourt.
BACKGROUNDFACTS
[3] Thefactswhichformthebackgroundofthisappealcanbebrieflysetout D
asfollows.
[4] Theplaintiff’sclaimwasforanaccountfromthedefendantbasedonten
consultancy agreements entered into between the plaintiff and Alcatel
Standard SA (‘standard’), acting in the name and on behalf of its associated E
companynamely,AlcatelCITandAlcatel-LucentItalia/AlcatelItaliabetween
27October2000to20June2007(‘consultancyagreements’).Thepurposeof
theconsultancyagreementswasfortheplaintifftoprovideconsultancyservices
to the associated company and the defendant in securing contracts with
Telekom (M) Bhd (‘Telekoms’) and Celcom Bhd (‘Celcom’) with regard to F
telecommunicationnetworksysteminMalaysia.
[5] Thecommontermsandfeaturesoftheconsultancyagreementswereas
follows:
G
(a) thedefendantwasnotacontractingpartytotheconsultancyagreements.
The contracts were all entered into between the plaintiff and standard;
(b) the obligation to pay the plaintiff’s consultancy fees under the
consultancy agreements laid with standard, Alcatel CIT and Alcatel
Italia; H
(c) exceptforthefirsttwoconsultancyagreementsbearingNos532G29049
and 532H39371 which dated back to 2000 and 2001 respectively,
consultancyfeespayableweretobecalculatedbasedoninvoicesissuedby
AlcatelCIT/AlcatelItaliatothedefendantandnotbasedontheamount
I
invoicedbythedefendanttoanyofitsclientinMalaysiaieTelekomsor
Celcom.
(d) theconsultancyagreementsconstitutedtheentireagreementbetweenthe
parties;and
Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd
(previouslyknownasAlcatelNetworkSystems(M)SdnBhd)
[2014]3MLJ (HasanLahFCJ) 793
A (e) anydisputewouldhavetobedisposedofbywayofarbitrationinGeneva.
[6] Theplaintiffclaimedthatthemodeandmannerofpaymentasprovided
undertheconsultancyagreementswereneverfollowedfromdayone.Instead,
by way of a collateral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant (by
B
conductanddocumentsevidencingthesame)itwasagreedthatthedefendant
would notify the plaintiff of the value of all deliveries that had been made to
Celcom and Telekoms, be it by the defendant or any other company in the
AlcatelGroup,intheimplementationoftheprojectsandthereafterinformthe
plaintiff of the manner of computation of payment after which the plaintiff
C
would send the invoices in the format as required by the defendant to the
defendantwhereuponpaymentwouldbemadeorarrangedbythedefendant
ontheinvoices.
D [7] Theplaintiffallegedthatbasedonthiscollateralagreementtheplaintiff
was paid in excess of USD7m from the year 2000.This carried on until the
defendanteffectivelyterminatedtheservicesoftheplaintiffin2009atwhich
point the defendant stopped rendering proper accounts, details of all orders
received by them from Celcom and Telekoms and the value of deliveries to
E
CelcomandTelekomstoassistandenabletheplaintifftocomputetheamount
duetoitforworkdoneandyettobeinvoiced.
[8] Theplaintiffaverredthatdespiterepeatedrequestsbytheplaintiffforan
accountofthedeliverablesthedefendantrefusedtofurnishanyinformation.
F
[9] By this action the plaintiff sought the following reliefs against the
defendant:
(a) astatementofaccountoraccounts(suchstatement/accountscertifiedby
G
the person primarily responsible for the financial management of the
defendant) be ordered to be given by the defendant to the plaintiff
togetherwithcopiesofalldocumentsevidencingthevalueofdeliveries
issuedbythedefendanttoCelcomandTelekomsfortheentireduration
of the projects, together with full details of all monies received by the
H
defendant from Celcom and Telekoms, together with all certified and
relevant supporting documents evidencing the same and if such
documentswerenotinthedefendant’spossessionthatthedefendantbe
compelledtoobtaincopiesofthesamefromCelcomorTelekomsorany
otherpartyinpossessionofthesame,tocomplywiththisorder;
I
(b) that the plaintiff’s appointed auditor be entitled to conduct an
independentauditofthesaidaccountsanddocumentsrenderedbythe
defendant,toverifythesameandbeallowedaccesstoalltherelevantand
supporting documents inclusive of the defendant’s detailed project
794 MalayanLawJournal [2014]3MLJ
account with regards to the projects in the defendant’s office or at any A
placewheresuchdocumentsweremaintained,andtothereafterprepare
anauditreportassoonaspossible.
[10] Initsdefencethedefendantdeniedthatitwastheultimatebeneficiary
ofservicesrenderedbytheplaintiff.Thedefendantstatedthatitwasnotaparty B
to,norabeneficiaryundertheconsultancyagreements.Thedefendantdenied
theexistenceoftheallegedcollateralcontract.Thedefendantsaidthatitwas
involved in the invoicing process in connection with the consultancy
agreementsinafacilitativecapacityattherequestoftheassociatedcompanies
or Alcatel-LucentTrade International AG.The defendant further stated that C
no consideration passed from the plaintiff to the defendant in the assistance
renderedundertheaforesaidcapacityandtherewasnointentionbetweenthe
partiestocreateanylegalrelationsbyvirtuethereof.
D
[11] The defendant also stated that the plaintiff’s action was an abuse of
process as the plaintiff had commenced arbitration proceedings against
Alcatel-Lucent Trade International AG pursuant to the consultancy
agreements seeking payment of alleged dues. Further the defendant averred
that the plaintiff had disclosed no reasonable cause of action against the
E
defendant.
[12] At the close of the plaintiff’s case the learned trial judge refused an
applicationforadjournmentbythedefendantonthegroundthatitswitness
was not available.The case was therefore closed without the defence offering
F
anyevidence.
DECISIONOFTHEHIGHCOURT
[13] The learned trial judge allowed the plaintiff’s claim with costs. The G
reasons given by the learned trial judge for coming to the decision are as
follows:
(a) thedefendantwasanaccountingpartybecausethedefendant,standard
andAlcatelCITwhicharedescribedasassociatedcointheconsultancy
H
agreements are a group enterprise rather than a separate legal entity of
each company within the group included in the operation of the
agreements;
(b) thecontractswereforthebenefitofthedefendant;
I
(c) thefiduciarydutytoaccountarises;and
(d) asnowitnesseshadbeencalledfromthedefendanttotestifyastoitsrole
in the consultancy agreements and its relationship with standard the
courtwaslefttodrawitsowninferences.