Kant on Civil Society and Welfare

84 Pages·2018·1.843 MB·English

by  Sarah Holtman

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What justifi es state-sponsored supports for individual welfare O
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within a Kantian political system, as well as the purpose and T
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extent of such supports and the form they may take, are vexed
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questions. This Element characterizes and assesses main N
contenders (including minimalist and middle-ground accounts)
by examining the competing interpretations of Kant’s larger The Philosophy of
political theory that found their social welfare claims. It then
Immanuel Kant
develops and defends an alternative based in civic respect. This
emphasizes the perspective and institutional commitments
Kant’s model of citizenship entails and what is required to
respect each as both a person and a participant in joint
governance.
K Kant on Civil
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About the series: Series editors: d
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The Elements series on The Philosophy Desmond Hogan e
of Immanuel Kant provides an extensive Princeton lfa
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its impact upon philosophy and
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ElementsinthePhilosophyofImmanuelKant
editedby
DesmondHogan
PrincetonUniversity
HowardWilliams
UniversityofCardiff
AllenWood
IndianaUniversity
KANT ON CIVIL SOCIETY
AND WELFARE
Sarah Holtman
sse
rP University of Minnesota
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Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108438742
DOI:10.1017/9781108529747
©SarahHoltman2018
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noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten
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Firstpublished2018
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Kant on Civil Society and Welfare
ElementsinthePhilosophyofImmanuelKant
DOI:10.1017/9781108529747
Firstpublishedonline:24October2018
SarahHoltman
UniversityofMinnesota
Abstract:Whatjustifiesstate-sponsoredsupportsforindividualwelfare
withinaKantianpoliticalsystem,aswellasthepurposeandextentofsuch
supportsandtheformtheymaytake,arevexedquestions.ThisElement
characterizesandassessesmaincontenders(includingminimalistand
middle-groundaccounts)byexaminingthecompetinginterpretationsof
Kant’slargerpoliticaltheorythatfoundtheirsocialwelfareclaims.Itthen
developsanddefendsanalternativebasedincivicrespect.This
emphasizestheperspectiveandinstitutionalcommitmentsKant’smodel
ofcitizenshipentailsandwhatisrequiredtorespecteachasbothaperson
andaparticipantinjointgovernance.
Keywords:Kant’spoliticaltheory,justice,innateright,socialwelfare,
citizenship
©SarahHoltman2018
ISBNs:9781108438742(PB),9781108529747(OC)
ISSNs:2397-9461(online),2514-3824(print)
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Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 TheMinimalistApproach 17
3 MiddleGrounds 28
4 BeyondForceandFraud 39
ConcludingRemarks 71
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KantonCivilSocietyandWelfare 1
1Introduction
1.1CompetingInterpretationsofKant
Theextentofcivil society’sobligationstoprovideforthewelfareofcitizens
and others, to employ its laws and institutions to offer what I term state-
sponsored social welfare, is notoriously controversial. At one end of the
spectrumisaminimalismthatrelegateswelfare-relatedmatters,amongthem
provisionforbasicneedsincludingfood,shelterandeducation,totherealmof
charity. At the other are accounts embracing provision for basic needs, and
more,asobligationsofjustice.(Articles25and26oftheUniversalDeclaration
ofHumanRights[1950],forexample,respectivelyrecognizeuniversalrights
bothto“astandardoflivingadequateforthehealthandwell-being”ofoneself
and one’s family and to education “directed to the full development of the
humanpersonality.”)
Interpretations of Immanuel Kant’s work on justice, welfare and the state
reflect this range of views. The early twentieth-century work of Hermann
Cohen and Karl Vorländer suggests, for example, that Kant’s ethics grounds
acritiqueofcapitalismand,indeed,aformofsocialism.Writingacenturylater,
Allen Wood contends that “Kantian right would sooner result in a social
democraticstatethanin[one]friendlytowealthandprivilege”(Wood,2014,
p.84).InterpretersincludingMaryGregor,andmorerecentlyB.SharonByrd
and Joachim Hruschka, by contrast, see Kant as a minimalist where state
powers are concerned. As they understand it, the Kantian state’s primary
functions are enforcement of contracts and protection of citizens’ rights of
sse personal security andproperty fromviolation through forceorfraud.On this
rP y view,positivestateactioninsupportofindividualwelfareisjustifiedonlyto
tisre theextentrequiredtoservethesecentralaimsundercurrentconditions.Where
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U e welfare-relatedlawsandinstitutionsarejustifiedatall,ittypicallywillbewith
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dirb aneyetopreservingthestateitself.
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a As in the more general debate, there also are Kant scholars who adopt
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b e a middle ground. Agreeing that Kantian justice primarily addresses issues of
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eh a characterization of the Kantian state that excludes or severely curtails its
silbu welfare-relatedefforts.AllenRosen,forinstance,understandsKant’sstateas
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4 apropervehicleforaddressingwidelysharedindividualneedsthroughbene-
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58 volence. Though his account rejects state benevolence, Arthur Ripstein both
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18 accepts a similarly limited interpretation of Kantian justice at its core and
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2 ElementsinthePhilosophyofImmanuelKant
for whom force, fraud and the violation of valid contractual agreements are
foundational threats) may include access to state-sponsored health care or
similarbenefitsassociatedwiththewelfarestate.
Due in part to worries that justice with too extensive a reach may make
unreasonably burdensome demands, Onora O’Neill’s Kantianism would
provide space for welfare-related state actions based in virtue rather than
justice. Yet she also emphasizes that many apparently benign societal
practices in fact are problematically coercive. They thus require state
intervention on behalf of those economically or otherwise burdened that
aims,mostfundamentally,toaddressforceandfraudinthenameofjustice.
Neither these middle-ground philosophers, nor those who posit a far more
significant role for the Kantian state in social welfare, claim that Kant
explicitly, or even implicitly, discusses the kinds of state programs they
endorse. Reading his works more expansively than some will allow, each
rather argues for Kant-based extensions applicable to issues and conditions
Kant does not address and did not envision.
Wemightsuspectthattheexplanationforsuchdisparateinterpretationslies
inKant’stexts,whichsomecharacterizeasatleastsufficientlyambiguousto
encourage such readings and perhaps so indeterminate that competing and
wide-ranging interpretations in fact fit them equally well. Certainly Kant’s
Metaphysics of Morals, comprising both his most fully developed views on
political philosophy (in Part I, the Rechtslehre or Doctrine of Right) and his
account of moralvirtue (in Part II, theTugendlehre orDoctrine of Virtue),is
notoriously difficult to read. This is especially true of his discussion of the
sse natureandpurposeofthejuststateintheRechtslehre.
rP y Thereis goodreason tothink, though, that the explanation for interpretive
tisre diversitydoesnotlieprincipallyintheRechtslehre’svexedlanguage,oreven
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inU insomespecialdifficultythatplaguesthepassagesonpovertyreliefandother
e
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dirb welfare-relatedissues.AsIsuggestinthesectionsthatfollow,wecantraceit
ma instead to varying understandings of Kant’s larger projects in moral and
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yb e political philosophy. In particular, it reflects contrasting interpretations of his
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silbu Towardthataim,thisintroductorysectionbeginswithabriefoverviewofthe
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74 generalconceptofsocialwelfareandofelementsofKant’spracticalphiloso-
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5 phypotentiallyrelevantindeterminingitsplacewithinthelawsandpoliciesof
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1 thejuststateKantenvisions.Itfurtherhighlightscentralandrelativelyuncon-
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KantonCivilSocietyandWelfare 3
theory as Kant conceives it and of the texts likely relevant to any decisive
argument.
Subsequent sections addressthe main interpretive divisions justdescribed.
Focusing in each case on several central proponents, these discussions detail
andanalyzenotonlythecharacterizationsofstate-sponsoredsocialwelfareon
offer but also the interpretation of underlying Kantian moral and political
theorythoughttosupporteachproponent’sposition.ThusSection2takesup
the minimalist interpretation, concentrating on views that Mary Gregor first
outlinesandthatByrdandHruschkalaterembraceandextend.Itcloseswith
abriefdiscussionofF.A.Hayek’sKant-influencedviews.Section3considers
accounts that likewise understand Kant’s state as foremost concerned to pre-
vent force and fraud, but that also offer grounds for expanding the reach of
state-based Kantian welfare well beyond what minimalists would endorse.
ThefocushereisontheparticularlyinfluentialreadingsthatRosen,Ripstein
andO’Neilloffer.
Accounts rejecting the force-and-fraud model as too narrow to capture
Kant’s conception of the state, and thus of social welfare, are my focus in
Section4.RatherthanseeingKantianjusticeasmostfundamentallycommitted
to preventing specific ills, these emphasize substantive and process-oriented
connectionsbetweenjusticeasKantseesitandinterrelatednotionsofagency,
reciprocity and the general will. The resulting characterizations of social
welfare are at once more fully integrated with Kant’s texts and more robust
inthewelfaresupportstheyendorsethanminimalistandmiddle-groundalter-
natives.Whileseveralexamples(especiallyworkbyAllenWood,PaulGuyer
sse andHowardWilliams)giveafullersenseofthelandscape,centralhereismy
rP y own reading of Kant as what I term a civic respect theorist. Ultimately more
tisre true to Kant’s aims and concerns than the force-and-fraud model, this civic
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inU respectinterpretationtakesKant’scharacterizationofcitizenshipascentralto
e
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dirb justiceasheunderstandsit.Theviewemphasizes,inparticular,theperspective
ma andinstitutionalcommitmentsKant’smodelofcitizenshipentailsandwhatis
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b e required,fromthisstandpoint,ifwearetorespectoneanotherbothasfellow
n
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eh focusoncitizenship,andonjustgovernanceasaprojectweundertaketogether,
silbu places Kant’s conception of those who receive social welfare supports and
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4 those responsible for providing them at the forefront. In so doing, it directly
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5 engages those whose lives and relationships are most centrally at issue and
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4 ElementsinthePhilosophyofImmanuelKant
1.2KantianStartingPoints
1.2.1State-SponsoredSocialWelfare:OverviewofIssues
Before we consider Kant’s views in any detail, an overview of the issues
regularlyinplayindiscussionsofstate-sponsoredsocialwelfareisinorder.1
Beyondquestionsconcerningtheextentofsuchsupportsareonesaddressing
their ground or justification, the needs or interests at which they aim, appro-
priate recipients and whether we gauge success by appeal to outcomes for
individualsorgroups.Answerstothesequestions,ofcourse,arenotcomple-
tely separable. Moreover, the accounts we consider in later sections often do
notaddressthemall,atleastnotexplicitly.Itisneverthelessworthidentifying
questions like these at the start so that we have the range of relevant issues
firmly in mind. This will help us appreciate not only where the views under
discussiondiffer,butwhatgroundtheyshareandtowhatextent.
Aswehaveseen,whetherintheKantianrealmormorebroadly,proponents
offervariedbasesforunderstandingstatesasboundbysocialwelfareobliga-
tions or empowered to address social welfare concerns. Moral grounds com-
monlyincludeobligationsofjustice,orofmoralvirtueorsomecombinationof
thetwo.Someauthorsinsteadseethestate’ssocialwelfareactivityaswhollyor
partly determined by more pragmatic questions. Perhaps, for example, the
extenttowhichastateaddressessocialwelfareissuesshoulddependonwhat
is necessary to ensure its own continued existence (e.g., by preventing mass
exodus, revolution or a severe breakdown in respect for state laws and
institutions).
Again,asourbriefcharacterizationofKant-relatedviewsalreadysuggests,
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tisre cernednotonlywiththeextentofandgroundsforstateactionsbut,relatedly,
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gd aim(foundedinjustice,virtueorpracticality)topreventanarchyordissolution,
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m to offer minimum protections against force and fraud and facilitate private
a
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niln realizing ends by providing for agency-related needs, to secure happiness, to
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de fulfillobligationsofbeneficenceorsomethingelse?
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silb Asfor appropriaterecipients, debatesconcernwhether webest understand
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801 1 All citations to Kant’s texts, including The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (G),
187 TheMetaphysicsofMorals(MM),“OntheCommonSaying,ThatMayBeCorrectinTheory,
9/7 ButItIsofNoUseinPractice”(TP)andTowardsPerpetualPeace(TPP),usethevolumeand
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01 pagenumberoftheGermanAcademyeditionofKantsgessammelteSchriften,ed.theRoyal
.01 PrussianAcademyofSciences(WalterdeGruyter,1900–).QuotationsarefromKant(1996)
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