Islam and Politics in East Africa: The Sufi Order in Tanzania

251 Pages·1980·15.82 MB·English

by  August H. Nimtz

Islam and Politics in East Africa
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Islam and Politics
in East Africa
The Sufi Order in Tanzania
August H. Nimtz, Jr.
Department of Political Science
University of Minnesota
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS
Minneapolis
Copyright © 1980 by the University of Minnesota.
All rights reserved.
Published by the University of Minnesota Press,
2037 University Avenue Southeast,
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55414
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Nimtz, August H.
Islam and politics in East Africa.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Sufism—Tanzania. 2. Islam and politics —
Tanzania. 3. Tanzania —Politics and government.
I. Title.
BP188.8.T34N55 322M 80-429
ISBN 0-8166-0963-2
The University of Minnesota
is an equal-opportunity
educator and employer.
To my parents
and
Maxine,
who saw this
from the beginning
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Preface
This book is about Islam and politics in twentieth-century East
Africa. More specifically, my purpose is to explain why an Islamic
institution, the tariqa, (also known as the Muslim brotherhood, or
sufi order), can be important in political change. Unlike most studies
on the political role of the tariqa,1 this book stresses explanation
rather than mere description. To this end, the study is exploratory
in that it formulates hypotheses.
The book is based on three assumptions. First, the political im-
portance of Islam and, more particularly, the tariqa can best be
explained by an analysis of the social cleavages of the society in
which it is located. By cleavages, I mean the long-lasting societal
divisions that pit groups against one another, especially those divi-
sions based on ascriptive criteria. The second assumption is that in
order to explain the political role of a particular Muslim institution,
in this case the sufi order, it is necessary to look at the way in which
social cleavages are reflected in the religious sphere as well as in the
broader society. Last, although "institutional" or "historical" factors
such as social cleavages may be necessary conditions in explaining
political behavior, they are not sufficient unless the interests of the
individuals who make up the groups in the cleavages are taken into
account.
Vll
viii Preface
Following these assumptions, I employ a conceptual framework
that combines on the one hand a theoretical perspective on conflict
groups and social change —Ralf Dahrendorf's theory of group con-
flict—and on the other a microanalytic model of interest groups —
Robert Salisbury's exchange theory of interest groups. I use both
models as heuristic tools, and, therefore, I do not test them in the
technical sense. It may be useful to point out those aspects of both
models relevant to my framework.
Conflict groups in Dahrendorf's model arise as a result of the "dif-
ferential distribution of authority" in a social system, the fact that
some group or individual possesses authority while others are ex-
cluded from it. The possessors are the "dominants" and the non-
possessors are the "subjects." Thus, any social system contains two
role groups with opposing interests—interest groups —one desiring
to maintain the distribution of authority and the other having an
interest in its redistribution. Furthermore, "the theory of group
conflict involves no statement about the empirical variety of interest
groups."2 Its concern is only that such groups engage in conflict as
a result of the differential distribution of authority.
The existence of interest groups is likely to lead to conflict as the
groups —or conflict groups—strive to promote their interests. Among
the most important factors affecting the conflict is the social struc-
ture. The three aspects of social structure that are essential to the
theory are stratification and cleavages, social mobility, and the
degree to which cleavages and other inequalities are superimposed.
Finally, the nature of conflict results in certain kinds of structural
changes for the social system.
Salisbury's exchange theory is employed because it provides a
more detailed perspective on the conditions that give rise to conflict
or interest groups by focusing on individual interests. The basic frame-
work of this theory has been succinctly described: "Entrepreneurs/
organizers invest capital to create a set of benefits which they offer
to a market of potential customers at a price. If, and as long as,
enough customers buy, i.e., join, to make a viable organization, the
group is in business. If the benefits fail, or are inadequate to warrant
the cost of membership, or the leaders get inadequate return, the
group collapses." Insofar as the exchange is very profitable for the
entrepreneur/organizer, then "he may spend some of his 'profits'
in public activity."3 This may entail lobbying in the public sector on
behalf of the interests of the membership or simply on the basis of
the entrepreneur/organizer's own interests.
The theoretical link between the two models is provided by
Preface ic

Dahrendorf's explanation of why "a market of potential customers"
may exist for certain benefits, a consideration with which Salisbury
does not concern himself. In the joining of these two theories, it
should be realized that there is an important difference between
them. In Dahrendorf's scheme, a conflict group is organzied express-
ly for the purpose of furthering the interests of the dominant or
subject group; in Salisbury's model, an interest group that engages
in conflict need not necessarily have been organized for that purpose.
This difference in Salisbury's model does not, however, contradict
the basic assumptions in Dahrendorf's perspective, and as my study
reveals, this characteristic of the exchange theory is useful in looking
at the sufi brotherhood.
One of the advantages in employing Salisbury's model is that it
provides a theory of group leadership. On its own, the theory of
group conflict tends to be deterministic and does not adequately
explain how an interest group furthers its interests. A theory of
leadership provides an explanation for this process.
The key variables in this study based on Dahrendorf's perspective
are the differential distribution of authority between dominants and
subjects (or the rulers and the ruled], cleavages, and the superimposi-
tion of cleavages. Based on Salisbury's exchange model are the im-
portant concepts of the entrepreneur/organizer and the benefits that
he or she creates. Three kinds of benefits are distinguished in this
study: religious, material, and solidary. Understanding cost of bene-
fits is key in understanding the exchange between the organizer and
the members. The way in which these variables are employed be-
comes clear in the relevant chapters.
Conflict theory has been used before to analyze the political
role of religion. Donald Smith, for example, in his analysis on how
religion draws people into active participation in the political pro-
cess, argues that conflict —"central" to his "understanding of the
nature of politics"—involving socioreligious structures, religious
communities, et cetera, has long been a major factor.4 Islam and
Politics in East Africa is unique in that it integrates a conflict per-
spective with a theory that focuses on individual interests and that,
in turn, enhances the explanatory power of both.
The unit of analysis is Muslim East Africa—mainly, Tanzania,
Kenya, and Uganda. Because it contains the overwhelming number
of East Africa's Muslims and almost all of the brotherhoods, Tan-
zania is the primary focus of this study. The employment of ex-
change theory requires a more detailed view of the political process.
It means shifting the level of analysis from the group (macro) level —