Gulf War Air Power Survey - vol V - Air Force Historical Studies Office

978 Pages·2004·29.78 MB·English

Gulf War
Air Power Survey
Volume V
A Statistical Compendium
and
Chronology
Washington, D. C.
1993
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gulf War Air Power Survey
p. cm.
Gulf War Air Power Survey directed by Eliot A. Cohen.
Includes an unnumbered summary report by Thomas A. Keaney and
Eliot A. Cohen.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. Planning and Command and Control -- v. 2. Operations and
Effects and Effectiveness -- v. 3. Logistics and Support -- v.4. Weapons, Tactics,
and Training and Space Operations -- v. 5. A Statistical Compendium and Chronology.
1. Persian Gulf War, 1991--Aerial operations. American. 2. United States.
Air Force--History--Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Cohen, Eliot A. 11. Gulf War Air
Power Survey (Organization : U.S.). 111. United States. Dept. of the Air Force.
IV. Title: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report.
DS79.724.U6G85 1993
956.7044’248--d~20 93-30601
CIP
For sale by the US. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISBN 0-16-042055-5
Gulf War Air Power Survey
Staff
Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director
Col. Emery M. Kiraly Executive Director
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley Senior Military Advisor
(Retired, USAF)
Dr. Wayne W. Thompson Senior Historical Advisor
Mr. Ernest D. Cruea ANSER Program Manager
Maj. Joseph W. Patterson Executive O@er
Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek Publishing Manager
Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl Chief, Statistics
Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen Chief, Chronology
Dr. John F. Guilmartin Chief, Weapons, Tactics
and Training
Mr. Richard A. Gunkel Chiej Logistics, Space,
and Support
Dr. Thomas C. Hone Chiej Command, Control,
and Organization
Dr. Alexander S. Cochran Chief, Strategy and
Plans
Mr. Barry D. Watts Chiej Operations and
Efsects
Dr. Thomas A. Keaney Chiej Summary Report
...
111
Gulf War Air Power Survey
Review Committee
Hon. Paul H. Nitze, Chairman
Diplomat in Residence
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Gen. Michael J. Dugan (USAF, Retired)
Multiple Sclerosis Society
Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired)
Center for Naval Analyses
Dr. Richard H. Kohn
The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill
Dr. Bernard Lewis
Princeton University
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Mr. Phillip Merrill
Former Assistant Secretary General
for Defense Support, NATO
Dr. Henry Rowen
Stanford University
Hon. Ike Skelton
U.S. House of Representatives
Gen. Maxwell Thurman (USA, Retired)
Associalion of the U.S. Army
Maj. Cen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Former Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies
and Analysis)
Dr. James Q. Wilson
University of California at Los Angrlcs
iv
Foreword
From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and its
allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history,
a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. The Gulf
War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 to review
all aspects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the United States
Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of that institution.
The Survey has produced reports on planning, the conduct of operations,
the effects of the air campaign, command and control, logistics, air base
support, space, weapons and tactics, as well as a chronology and a com-
pendium of statistics on the war. It has prepared as well a summary
report and some shorter papers and assembled an archive composed of
paper, microfilm, and electronic records, all of which have been deposited
at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama. The Survey was just that, an attempt to provide a comprehen-
sive and documented account of the war. It is not a definitive history:
that will await the passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi
records, for example) that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor
is it a summary of lessons learned: other organizations, including many
within the Air Force, have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides
an analytical and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the
air campaign. It concentrates on an analysis of the operational level of
war in the belief that this level of warfare is at once one of the most
difficult to characterize and one of the most important to understand.
The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by
a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from
the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces, most
of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air Force.
The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distinguished
review committee that included scholars, retired general officers from the
Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current senior gov-
ernment officials. Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct its research
in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members had as their
V
standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D’Olier, chairman of the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the second World War:
“We wanted to burn into everybody’s souls that fact that the survey’s
responsibility . . . was to ascertain facts and to seek truth, eliminating
completely any preconceived theories or dogmas.’’
The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the
reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material
while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more narrow-
ly focused studies, it is possible that discrepancies exist among the reports
with regard to points of detail. More importantly, authors were given
discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to interpret
events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differing
conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences of
view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to serve
as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their ana-
lytical terminus.
This volume consists of two reports. The first, A Statistical Compen-
dium, concentrates on airpower-related aspects of the conflict and is not
intended to portray other facets of Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm except as they concern aerial operations. The organization of
statistics is roughly chronological, moving from prewar force postures and
the deployment of Desert Shield through the air campaign of Desert
Storm, tabulating aircraft victories and losses as well as the human cost
of the war. Briefly, the report intends to serve as a logical starting point
for the issue: “What happened during the war?”
The second report, Chronology, outlines many of the principal events
of clear, direct, and tangible relevance to the planning of the Gulf War.
It begins immediately prior to the Iraqi invasion and ends immediately
following the ceasefire.
vi
Acknowledgments
The Survey’s members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of
the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it
with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and
objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their
resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and com-
mands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for
and, in some cases, personnel to conduct the study. The United States
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways,
including the sharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the
United States’ Coalition partners also made available individuals and
records that were vital to the Survey’s work. Many participants in the
war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Servic-
es were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Private students of the Gulf War also
made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever
possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the
text.
The Survey’s independence was its reason for being. Each report is
the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent
the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force, or the Department of
Defense.
vii
Security Review
The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were
submitted to the Department of Defense for policy
and security review. In accordance with this re-
view, certain information has been removed from
the original text. These areas have been annotated
as [DELETED].
...
Vlll
Gulf War Air Power Survey
Summary Report
Volume I:
Part I: Planning Report
Part 11: Command and Control Report
Volume 11:
Part I: Operations Report
Part 11: Effectiveness Report
Volume 111:
Part I: Logistics Report
Part 11: Support Report
Volume IV
Part I: Weapons, Tactics,
and Training Report
Part 11: Space Operations Report
Volume V
Part I: A Statistical Compendium
Part 11: Chronology
ix