Cambrai 1917: The birth of armoured warfare (Campaign)

100 Pages·2007·38.27 MB·English

by  Alexander Turner

Cambrai 1917
The birth of armoured warfare
ALEXANDERTURNERisa
servingBritishArmyofficer
intheIrishGuards.His
operationalexperience
includesNorthernIreland,
Kosovo,theIraqwarof2003
andserviceasaUnited
NationsMilitaryObserver.
HehasaBAinWarStudies
from King'sCollegeLondon
andisagraduateoftheUK
CommandandStaffCollege.
HealsowroteCampaign 151:
VimyRidge 1917forOsprey.
PETERDENNISwas
bornin1950.Inspiredby
contemporarymagazinessuch
asLookandLearnhestudied
illustrationatLiverpoolArt
College.Peterhassince
contributedtohundreds
ofbooks,predominantly
onhistoricalsubjects.
Heisakeenwargamerand
modelmaker.Heisbased
inNottinghamshire,UK.
Cambrai 1917
The birth of arllloured warfare

Campaign • 187
Call1brai 1917
The birth of arllloured warfare
Alexander Turner • Illustrated by Peter Dennis
FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2007byOspreyPublishing, Dedication
MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX2OPH,UK
443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY10016,USA
DedicatedtothememoryofLance-CorporalIanMaloneand
E-mail:[email protected]
PiperChristopherMuzvuru,IrishGuards;killedinactioninBasra
©2007OspreyPublishingLtd. onSunday6April2003.QuisSeparabit.
Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,
Acknowledgements
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aretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic, Astheaphorismgoes, 'historyismerelytherearrangementofother
electrical,chemical,mechanical,optical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise, people'swords'soIamgratefulforallthescholarship,military
withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionofthecopyrightowner.Inquiriesshould
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beaddressedtothePublishers.
DavidFletcherandJaniceTaitattheBovingtonTankMuseum
ACIPcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. Librarywereespeciallyhelpfulinnavigatingmearoundthat
first-classresource.Asalways,thestaffattheImperialWar
ISBN9781846031472 MuseumandNationalArchiveswereexemplary.Thanksalsoto:
VinceMcEllinandDonKearneyatRegimentalHeadquartersIrish
Editorialby!IiosPublishingLtd,Oxford,UK(www.iliospublishing.com)
Guards,CrispinDalyforwadingthroughtheGermanofficialhistory
PagelayoutbyTheBlackSpot
anditsindecipherableGothicscript,PeterDennisforhisinfectious
IndexbyAlanThatcher
TypesetinHelveticaNeueandITCNewBaskerville enthusiasmandtheeditorMarcusCowperforputtingupwithmy
MapsbytheMapStudioLtd opinionswellintotheearlyhours.
3Dbird's-eyeviewsbyTheBlackSpot
BattlesceneillustrationsbyPeterDennis
Author's note
OriginatedbyUnitedGraphicsPteLtd,Singapore
PrintedinChinathroughWorldPrintLtd
Indescribingmilitaryformationsthetextofthisnarrativeconforms
0708091011 10987654321 totheconventionofonlyusingcapitallettersintheformaltitles
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Imperial War Museum Collections
FRONTCOVER 'Hyacinth'(MaleH45commandedby2ndLieutenant
F.H.Jackson)stuckonHindenburgSupportLinewestofRibecourt
on20November1917.Attendantinfantryarefromthe71stBrigade ManyofthephotosinthisbookcomefromtheImperialWar
of6thDivision.(IWMQ 6432) Museum'shugecollectionswhichcoverallaspectsofconflict
TITLE PAGEAFemaleMarkIVfromtheperspectiveofadefending involvingBritainandtheCommonwealthsincethestartofthe
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 7
Originsofthecampaign
CHRONOLOGY 11
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 13
TheBritish • TheGermans
OPPOSING FORCES 16
TheGermans• TheBritish• Ordersofbattle
OPPOSING PLANS 25
TheGermans• TheBritish
THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 35
Finalassembly• Atideofiron • HeroicsatFlesquieres
Scrambleforcanal crossings• A Herculean repeat
'Hell'sLadies' danceinFontaine • 'Atotofrumandwewereoff'
Bourlonblooded • DasRingenumSourlon • Beginningoftheend
'AdirtyandanoisyplacewasBourlon' • Rupprecht'sturn •Angriffschlacht
AFTERMATH 88
Recrimination • Elusiveexploitation • Thebirthofarmouredwarfare
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 92
FURTHER READING 94
INDEX 95
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INTRODUCTION
In thefront ... tanks, manoeuvringback andforth! Wepulltheammunition
beltsfrom theboxes- ourmachinegun works itselfinto aglow and the cooling
waterhisses. Now a heavy tank has reached the line. It rolls overand away.
Some men try to escape. The tankgun stretches them down. One ofthesewide,
dangerous shodwheels drives overthe lyingwoundedLiesenfield, pounding
him;poundinghis body into thesoftground.1
T
his perception of the tank's emergence onto the battlefields of
World War I has, to a large extent, substituted myth for reality.
Initially, the metal beasts crawling inexorably across no man's
landwere a terrible and effectiveshockto German defenders.Yetevents
were quick to show that the tankwas not destined to be a 'silver bullet'
thatwould break trench deadlock and open up the war on the Western
Front. Far from e~oying the invincibility popularly associated with
them, early tanks were still defined by their limitations; ponderous,
unreliable and surprisinglyvulnerable to all forms ofenemy fire. Only
OPPOSITE Cambrai'ssignificance
hindsight confers laurels on a weapon system whose relevance was less
asatransporthubisself-evident
fromthismap. Itscapturewould than certain at conception.
causechaosfortheGerman Nevertheless, whilst the tank's hulking anonymity appears so
army'slogisticeffort. incompatible with human endeavour, the men inside displayed
TheCambraibattlefieldis
astonishing fortitude in pursuit of that ever-elusive 'breakthrough'.
boundedbytheStQuentinCanal
Mter early disappointments, they maximized the utility ofthis budding
totheeastand BourlonRidge
andSenseeRivertothenorth. innovation by harnessing it to the traditional military tenets of
Astheoperationwasconceived coordination, cooperation and training; demonstrating the tank's true
originallyasaraid,these promise through kinship with parallel advances in combat aviation
limitationsonmanoeuvrewere
and artillery. Rather than complementingexisting plans, theysoughtto
intendedtodisruptGerman
employ tanks in an operation that was conceived with these strengths
counterattacks. OnceByngand
Haig'sambitionsforbreakthrough in mind- surprise andconcentrationofforce. AtCambraiinNovember
enteredtheequation,they 1917 the fledgling Tank Corps found theirfirst opportunity.
becamealiability.
Specificobjectives(Blue, Brown
and Red Lines)wereonlyset ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
fordayone(1).Thereafterthe
plannersenvisagedafluid battle
ofexploitation,withtheCavalry The opportunity for an offensive at Cambrai was established by
Corpssweepingthrougha Germany's retirement to the mighty Siegfried Stellung in February
narrowgaptowreakhavoc
1917. Since the failure ofthe August 1914 Schlieffen Plan, the German
beyondCambrai(2)and infantry
High Command (OHL) had opted for a defensive posture on the
pressingontoBourlonRidge. The
eventualaimwastoconsolidate Western Front, concentrating instead on defeat of the Russians in
ontheSenseeRiverinorderto the east. Nonetheless, an absolute refusal to accept any territorial
threatentheentireHindenburg withdrawal in the face of sustained Allied attacks through 1915 and
systemnorthofCambrai (3).
1916 had come at a high price. These extravagances on Verdun and
Subsidiaryattackswestofthe
CanalduNordwould protect
theflanksofthebreach(4). 1P.Ettighoffer,GespenteramTotenMannBertelsmann:GOttersloh,1937. 7
ThebloodymorassofFlanders
wastheworstpossible
environmentfortankstoprove
theirworth.Theirreputation
miredalongsidethefortunes
ofHaig'soffensive.Whether
judgedtobeaPyrrhicvictory
orhumiliatingimpasse,thenet
strategicresultwasthesame:
exhaustion.(Regimental
Collection,IrishGuards)
the Somme cost them nearly 750,000 men. Infantry divisions were
halvedin size to disguise the damage butGermanycould notmatch the
Allies' stocks ofmanpower. The retirement theyhad resistedfor so long
became inevitable.
Originally conceived as an insurance policy, the Siegfried Stellung
defensive system ran betweenArras on the riverScarpe and the Chemin
des Dames ridge above the river Aisne, saving 25 miles of front. In
manning terms this equated to 13 divisions, precisely the number the
Germans needed to create aviable theatre reserve. In the Cambraiarea,
these defences ran between the prominent obstacles ofthe St Quentin
canal and uncompleted Canal du Nord, which was effectively a deep,
dry ditch. Moving north, the line then cut abruptly north-west, across
the Canal du Nord, in orderto protectthevital rail hubatCambraiand
logistic conduit ofthe Sensee River. This created a bulge shaped like a
nose, with the commanding Bourlon Ridge at its base. Salients always
make temptingpointstoattackbecausetheyoffertheopportunitytocut
offenemyforces with only a modestpenetration oftheir defences. The
Cambrai area had added potential because it had not been fought over
yet. Its gentle, chalkfarmlandwasfirm goingandunscarredbyshellfire.
This first attracted attention during the Allied spring offensives of
April 1917when the Commander-in-Chiefofthe British Expeditionary
Force (BEF), Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, suggested a combined
Anglo-French attack on the tempting Cambrai sector. Lieutenant
General Sir William Pulteney's IV Corps was instructed to submit a
scheme but, by its completion, preparations for the summer Flanders
offensive were well under way. Haig was still enthused by his Cambrai
project but Flanders took precedence and General Headquarters
(GHQ) shelved Pulteney's work.
Meanwhile, exponents of the tank were busy hatching schemes of
their own. The tank's debut at Flers-Courcelette on the Somme in
September 1916 had been premature. Though technologically cutting
edge, the failing lay in application. In its conception, the tank was a
8 means ofprotecting infantry and thus it was employed, spread thin as