Table Of ContentS. Hrg. 104-312
AVIATION SAFETY: DO UNAPPROVED PARTS POSE
A SAFETY RISK?
Y 4. G 74/9: S. HRG. 104-312
Aviatioi Safety: Do Unapproved Part...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT
MANAGEMENT AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 24, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
V**-,
S. Hrg. 104-312
AVIATION SAFETY: DO UNAPPROVED PARTS POSE
A SAFETY RISK?
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OP GOVERNMENT
MANAGEMENT AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY
24, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
91-020cc WASHINGTON : 1996
ForsalebytheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice
SuperintendentofDocuments,CongressionalSalesOffice,Washington,DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-052236-6
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN GLENN, Ohio
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine SAM NUNN, Georgia
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CARL LEVIN, Michigan
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
Franklin G. Polk, StaffDirector and ChiefCounsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority StaffDirector
Michal Sue Prosser, ChiefClerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT AND
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine, Chairman
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CARL LEVIN, Michigan
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas
JCOHAHRNLMEcSCAEI.NG,RAArSiSzLonEaY, Iowa JDOASNEIPELH KI..LAIKEABKEAR,MAHaNw,aiCionnecticut
Kim Corthell, StaffDirector
Paul Brubaker, Deputy StaffDirector
Linda J. Gustitus, Minority StaffDirector
Frankie de Vergie, ChiefClerk
(II)
CONTENTS
Opening statements: Page
Senator Cohen 1
Senator Levin 7
SenatorLieberman 10
WITNESSES
Wednesday, May 24, 1995
Hon. A. Mary Schiavo, Inspector General, U.S. Department ofTransportation,
accompanied by Raymond J. DeCarli, Assistant Inspector General for Au-
diting; Todd J. Zinser, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investiga-
tions; Harry Schaefer, Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge; and Lawrence
W. Weintrob, Deputy Assistant Inspector General 14
Thomas T. Kubic, Section Chief, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal
Bureau ofInvestigation 22
Gabriel Kish, former Repair Station Owner 40
Harry Schaefer, Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge, Office of Inspector Gen-
eral, U.S. Department ofTransportation 44
CMhiecshtaeerl PFa.uRliBouexa,chV,icJre.,Porensibdeehnatl,foEfngAienreoesrpiancge,IMnadiusnttreineasnAcseso&ciaMtaitoenriel, Air 45
Transport Association ofAmerica 45
Walter S. Coleman, President, Regional Airline Association 45
Edward J. Glueckler, President, Airline SuppliersAssociation 45
James Frisbee, Aviation Consultant 45
Hon. David R. Hinson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; ac-
companied by Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administrator for Regulation
and Certification and William J. White, Director ofFlight Standards 55
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Beach, Chester Paul Jr.:
Testimony 45
Prepared statement 137
Coleman, Walter S.:
Testimony 45
Prepared statement 174
Frisbee, James M.:
Testimony 45
Prepared statement 192
Glueckler, Edward J.:
Testimony 45
Prepared statement ." 178
Hinson, Hon. David R.:
Testimony 55
Prepared statement 212
Kish, Gabriel:
Testimony 40
Prepared statement 130
Kubic, Thomas T.:
Testimony 22
Prepared statement 112
Rioux, Michael F.:
Testimony 45
Prepared statement 159
(III)
IV
Page
Schaefer, Harry:
Testimony 44
Prepared statement 132
Schiavo, Hon. A. Mary:
Testimony 14
Prepared statement 69
APPENDIX
Prepared statements ofwitnesses in order ofappearance 69
Additional statements submitted for the record:
Howard B. Davidow, President, Aviation Consultants 233
Edward W. Stimpson, President, General Aviation Manufacturers Asso-
ciation 242
Jack Johnson, President, Professional Airways Systems Specialists 246
Frank L. Jensen, Jr., President of the Helicopter Association Inter-
national 253
Additional questions for the Record:
Senator Cohen to the FAA and responses (Attachments 1-4 retained
in Subcommittee files) 260
Senator Cohen to the AirTransportAssociation and responses 282
Senator Levin to the Department of Transportation Inspector General
and responses 283
Senator Levin to the Aerospace Industries Association and responses 313
RegionalAirline Association response to questions from Senator Levin 316
Senator Levin to the Airline Suppliers Association and response 317
Supplement to Testimony Regarding Aviation Parts, Inspector General, U.S.
Department ofTransportation, May 24, 1995 324
AVIATION SAFETY: DO UNAPPROVED PARTS
POSE A SAFETY RISK?
WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1995
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William S. Cohen,
Chairman ofthe Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cohen, Levin, and Lieberman.
Staff Present: Kim Corthell, Staff Director; Paul Brubaker, Dep-
uty Staff Director; Frankie deVergie, Chief Clerk; Don Mullinax,
Legislative Assistant with the Majority Staff; Andrea Gerber, Staff
Assistant with the Majority Staff; Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff
Director and Chief Counsel; Elise J. Bean, Minority Counsel; and
Scott Parr, Legislative Fellow with the Minority Staff.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN
Senator Cohen. The Committee will come to order. Good morn-
ing.
Early in this century, the thought of moving 600 miles an hour,
6 miles above the Earth, was pure science fiction. Today, it is an
accepted part ofour professional and personal lives.
The popularity ofair travel has climbed steadily since the Wright
Brothers first took off from Kitty Hawk. All of us who travel the
Nation's airways take comfort in the thought that flying in the
United States is safe and well regulated. We take comfort in know-
ing that statistically air travel is the safest form oftravel. The pur-
pose oftoday's hearing is to make sure that it stays that way.
In order to ensure the continuation of safe air travel, we have
given the FAA the responsibility to ensure that parts installed on
aircraft are manufactured by FAA-certified facilities and meet criti-
cal performance standards. Before parts can be installed, they must
have identifying marks or documentation showing that the process
by which they were manufactured or repaired meets FAA's ap-
proval.
Unapproved parts are those that have not been manufactured or
repaired in accordance with these FAA regulations. They include
counterfeit parts, parts with fraudulent documentation, and parts
manufactured without FAA production authority or without proper
quality assurance.
(l)
FAA's approval is, in essence, the Government's "Good House-
keeping Seal of Approval" for the aircraft parts. As with the Good
Housekeeping Seal, it means nothing if standards are not fully en-
forced.
The Subcommittee has been investigating whether the parts
being used by our Nation's air carriers and general aviation air-
craft and helicopters are, in fact, legitimately produced, sold, and
installed. Regrettably, the Subcommittee has learned that unap-
proved parts are a growing problem, that the FAA has not done an
adequate job in identifying and curbing the use of these parts, and
that they do pose a safety problem.
While there may not be agreement this morning on the extent to
which unapproved parts pose a safety risk, one thing I think is un-
deniable. Unapproved parts are finding their way into parts bins,
repair stations, and aircraft all across the country.
Not even the Presidential helicopter is exempt from suspected
unapproved parts. In 1994, an FAA investigation identified two
parts brokers selling counterfeit helicopter parts. An FAA inspector
identified this part as being one used on the Presidential heli-
copter, as well as other military helicopters, and recommended
warning those responsible for maintaining these aircraft to take
heed. I intend to ask the FAA Administrator, Mr. Hinson, about
the outcome ofthis particular case.
As recently as 3 weeks ago, top FAA officials told the Sub-
committee that the issue of suspected unapproved parts has been
exaggerated and is largely a paperwork issue. The officials ex-
plained that most of these parts are airworthy, not critical, and in
some cases were manufactured by the same companies that
produce approved parts. They just do not have the required docu-
mentation.
This attitude, I must say, is of concern to me. To dismiss this
issue as a paperwork problem demonstrates the FAA's failure to
appreciate that the integrity of its regulatory function rests on the
reliability of paperwork. In fact, FAA's own inspectors handbook
states, "The FAA considers the falsification ofrecords, logs or docu-
ments to be among the most serious violations. Such actions war-
rant the most severe sanctions."
The handbook also states, and again I am quoting, "noncompli-
ance with recordkeeping requirements also strikes at the very
heart of our system of monitoring and ensuring compliance with
safety standards. Often, without a record indicating compliance,
the FAA and the air carrier have no other means to be assured
that compliance has in fact been achieved."
Improper or missing paper has serious implications for the avia-
tion parts industry, and certainly it compromises the integrity of
the regulatory system that is designed to assure compliance with
safety standards. Without proper documentation, there is little as-
surance that a part is airworthy.
While the counterfeit watch sold by the local street vendor may,
indeed, tell time, I think we would all agree that mechanically it
is by no means the same as that of the name brand. And although
you can make the argument that there is no problem with unap-
proved parts as long as they work, I seriously doubt that anyone
would knowingly travel on a plane powered by a jet engine that is
the aeronautical equivalent ofa fake Rolex.
In support of its contention that unapproved parts do not pose
a significant safety threat, the FAA points to statistics which pur-
port to show the relatively small number of suspected unapproved
parts in aviation inventories. For a number ofreasons, these statis-
tics are understated and, therefore, in my opinion, of questionable
value.
First, there is no mandatory requirement for parts manufactur-
ers, brokers, repair stations, or air carriers to report suspected un-
approved parts. Consequently, the FAA cannot and should not sug-
gest that its statistics demonstrate the true magnitude ofthe unap-
proved parts in aviation inventories.
Second, the usefulness of FAA statistics may also be limited
given the number of confidential sources that have told the Sub-
committee that some major airline employees have been instructed
by management not to report suspected unapproved parts to the
FAA.
Confidential sources have also told the Subcommittee that FAA
inspectors themselves have been known to withhold reports of sus-
pected unapproved parts submitted by air carriers and repair sta-
tions. These inspectors fear criticism from their FAA superiors for
not discovering the parts themselves sooner.
Finally, the FAA's numbers are simply misleading. The FAA's
database shows that 1,224 reports of suspected unapproved parts
have been received since October of 1991. While that may not
sound like a great deal considering the millions and billions of
parts in aviation inventories, the number does not tell the whole
story. Each single report may refer to thousands of individual
parts. For example, one recent report from south Florida involved
at least 100,000 parts. These parts were considered safety-critical
because they were for aircraft brake systems.
Moreover, the FAA numbers do not fully explain the gravity of
the situation. Twenty-nine percent of the reports of suspected un-
approved parts had the potential to cause a catastrophic component
failure or directly affect the safety ofthe aircraft.
Critical aircraft parts which are bought and sold with improper,
forged, or missing documentation represent more than a paperwork
problem. Indeed, the entire integrity of the parts distribution sys-
tem is rooted in the validity and reliability of identifying informa-
tion that is required by the FAA. Yet the Subcommittee's investiga-
tion shows that this documentation is easily faked and, according
to many sources, the odds of getting caught by the FAA are vir-
tually non-existent.
We are going to hear from a witness today who was convicted of
conspiring to defraud customers by selling them falsely certified
parts. He will describe how he was able to falsify maintenance doc-
uments and identification plates for unapproved parts so these
parts, some of which were junk, could be resold to air carriers. He
did all ofthis with no fear ofdetection from the FAA.
Even my own staff got into the act. One of my staff members
purchased these scrapped jet engine blades. I have a little package
of them here. These particular blades were purchased from a junk
dealer in Miami. In fact, he bought the very blades that are in the
bag being held here and also are shown in the photograph on the
wall. The bag had a red tag on it, and it should be noted that that
red tag identifies the blades as "unserviceable." To the naked eye,
these particular blades simply look like used parts.
Before selling the blades, the scrap yard owner removed the red
tag so the parts could not be traced back to the local repair station
from which he had purchased them, and today we are going to hear
testimony that will confirm that, once removed from the bag, this
blade could be furnished with false documentation and easily resold
to a repair station or an air carrier.
The scrap yard dealer, once convinced my staff were not mem-
bers of the press, but unaware that they were, in fact, Senate in-
vestigators, said, "I know some of you boys rework these things,
but that is not my concern." He also told them he had been buying
unserviceable parts from about five separate repair stations for the
past 20 years.
Although scrap dealers are not doing anything illegal by reselling
used and un-airworthy parts, they are fully aware of the value of
the parts and certainly the less than benign intentions of those
who are buying them. If manufacturers, repair stations, and air-
lines would properly mutilate scrap parts prior to disposing of
them, the parts would only be worth the value of the metal. While
the FAA has issued a circular giving guidance on how to properly
dispose ofscrap, the circular is advisory only.
After today's hearing, no one should doubt how lucrative selling
unapproved parts can be. For instance, this part that I held up be-
fore is a jet engine blade that can be used on 727s and on DC-9s.
Some ofthese parts new sell for roughly $1,500 each. This was pur-
chased for $1.30. This particular part, if it is cleaned up or refur-
bished for a small fraction of the original cost, can then be placed,
with or without false documentation, back into the aviation inven-
tory.
If this part were installed on an aircraft, it could easily fail and
cause a catastrophic engine failure, and the best-case scenario is
that the pilot could shut down the one engine and land the plan
safely with only one engine functioning appropriately.
The worst case is that the engine could catch on fire and cause
the plane to crash. In other words, a multi-million dollar plane con-
taining millions of parts could be put in serious jeopardy simply by
the failure of a blade like this one costing a little more than a dol-
lar.
During the Subcommittee's investigation, we discussed this issue
with a number ofpeople who have direct knowledge ofthe problem.
We also interviewed scores of aviation experts and others in the in-
dustry who told us that not only are unapproved parts a problem,
but that they are a "present danger to the public safety."
It would be irresponsible to ignore evidence of safety problems
and fail to act. I am concerned that the FAA to date has been more
reactive than proactive on the issue. We should not have to wait
for a major catastrophe to convince the FAA to aggressively ad-
dress the problem ofunapproved parts.
The simple fact is that we do not really know the extent to which
unapproved parts are being used on our aircraft. And not knowing
