An Atheistic Critique of Christian Apologetics

24 Pages·2015·0.6 MB·English

by  Wesley Whitman

Epistemology and Ethics:
An Atheistic Critique of Christian Apologetics
By W. J. Whitman

Christianity was historically useful. Christianity is relatively
functionally isomorphic to the truth, which made it vitally useful as a
historical movement. Prior to discoveries made in the 19th century,
the only logical alternative to religion was nihilism. Nihilism is not a
philosophy that one can live by. Religion supplied an alternative to
nihilism for centuries. As such, religion was basically necessary for the
survival of the human species. Religion has many positive aspects.
Christianity in particular is, in my opinion, among the most rational
and useful of all the world religions. Nevertheless, Christians do have
certain beliefs that I regard as dangerous.
The Roman Catholic is bound to support statism and oppose
free markets, simply because there are papal encyclicals that teach
the virtues of government intervention. Whenever the Roman
Catholic approaches the questions of politics and economics, he is
bound by his faith to look at it through the lens of official Catholic
dogma. He cannot, as a Catholic, look at economics as a mere social
science, apply logic to it, and arrive at the most rational conclusion if
the most rational conclusion does not coincide with Catholic dogma.
The Pope is the sole authority for the Catholic. Similarly, Calvinists and
fundamentalists suppose that the Bible is the sole authority.
Consequently, some of them have concluded that biblical law or
theonomy should be the basis of all modern law—and some of these
people advocate bringing back execution as the punishment for
adultery, prostitution, and “sodomy.”1 It is interesting to note that
they do not apply biblical law without considerable cherry picking.
They overlook the fact that Jesus identified pornography with
adultery and recommended that you gouge your own eye out if you
look at a woman lustfully, cut your hand off if you are tempted to
masturbate, and castrate yourself to prevent temptation if you can
bear it.2 The existence of dangerous sectarian ideologies that seek to

1 Cf. R. J. Rushdoony, Gary North, Gary DeMar, Greg Bahnsen, etc.
2 Cf. Matthew 5:27-30; 19:12
influence secular politics, in my opinion, justifies this attempt at
refuting the Christian worldview.
The most powerful arguments for religion are of an
abductive nature. There are three sorts of logical processes:
deduction, induction, and abduction. Deduction is merely
observational and descriptive. Deductive reasoning is based on
observing phenomena and describing what has happened. Inductive
reasoning is a processes whereby one infers general rules from
repeated observations. Abductive reasoning is a process whereby
one forms an explanatory hypothesis to explain phenomena that one
has observed. The really weighty arguments for Christianity are those
abductive logical arguments that come from Cornelius van Til, C. S.
Lewis, and G. K. Chesterton. There are many versions of the
argument, but they all reduce down to this: everything about the
universe that we live in makes sense if we presuppose the truth of
Christianity, but makes no sense at all if we assume that any
alternative religion or worldview is true. Christianity, therefore, can
be looked at as a hypothesis that was proposed as a way of explaining
existing evidence. The atheist and the skeptic tend to just brush off
this argument as nonsense. However, when you unpack this
argument and examine it closely, you will find that there really is
something to this argument. It is a weighty argument for a reason.
This argument has historically been quite powerful. Prior to mid-way
through the 19th century, Western civilization had not discovered any
viable alternative to Christianity.
Christianity assumes that there is an Absolute Rationality
behind the universe, a divine and personal Being, who has designed
the world in which we live. The world was created and organized by
an all-powerful entity. The universe is not random and chaotic, but
functions in a highly rational, harmonious, and orderly fashion. There
is a uniformity of the laws of nature because God has created natural
laws to govern how the universe acts. Humans were created by God.
Our bodies were designed to function the way that they do. He
designed our brains and minds to function in a particular way, so as
to allow for true rationality. He designed our eyes in a way that
facilitates accurate visual perception. He designed our ears in a way
that facilitates accurate auditory perception. He created us and
knows what is best for us. He knows what we must do to achieve our
own ultimate happiness. Consequently, He has given us a divine law
and has revealed it to us in written form (theonomy or biblical law)
and has “inscribed it in our hearts,” so that we can know it through
intuition (natural law). As you can see, the Christian worldview
explains the world we live in—it supplies us with a coherent
epistemology (theory of knowledge) and a coherent ethic (theory of
right conduct or morality).
The presuppositionalists, following Cornelius van Til, argue
that this worldview is the only one that can explain the universe in
which we live and provide a framework that allows us to go about
living rationally and sanely in this world. The presuppositionalist
brings up the problem of induction, which was raised by David Hume.
Inductive reasoning makes inferences from repeated observations.
For instance, we observe that objects keep falling every time that they
are dropped, so inductive reasoning leads us to the conclusion that
there must be some general rule or natural law that dictates that
objects must behave this way. Thus, we arrive at the law of gravity.
Hume pointed out that this method of reasoning is actually invalid—
it is logically a non sequitur, it does not follow from the fact that we
have seen tons of objects fall to the ground that objects must
necessarily always act that way. The presuppositionalist says, “Now,
let’s compare my Christian worldview to your atheistic worldview.
Upon Christian presuppositions, it makes perfect sense that there
would be a uniformity of natural laws because God has designed the
universe to function just so. Yet, upon your assumptions—assuming
that the universe was not designed by a rational being, but came
about through random chance and arose basically from chaos—, we
have absolutely no reason to suppose that there would be any
uniform laws governing natural processes.” Thus, Cornelius van Til
and the presuppositionalists conclude, “There is no intelligibility in
any phenomena of the universe without the presupposition of God’s
all-encompassing plan.”3
Then there is the evolutionary argument against
naturalism, popularized by Alvin Plantinga, but which was better

3 Cornelius van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, Chapter 9
espoused by C. S. Lewis. If we assume that human beings came about
entirely through random natural processes, then we have absolutely
no reason to trust our own sensory perceptions and cognitive
faculties. The Christian trusts his senses and his mind because he
assumes that they were designed by a benevolent and rational God.
However, the naturalistic atheist can make no such assumption. The
logical structure of the human brain, upon atheistic assumptions, is
really just the result of natural chemical reactions and colliding atomic
particles inside the human skull. Why should I assume that the
collision of particles and chemicals within the body should produce
accurate perceptions, accurate logical deductions, and a viable
structure of mind? Isn’t it much more likely that any conscious
perceptions and thoughts produced by such processes would result
in inaccurate perceptions, since the processes are random and are not
being guided by any rational design? Why would evolution ever have
produced a creature with accurate knowledge of the world around it?
Natural selection would select individuals with characteristics that
facilitate survival, but it would not necessarily select individuals with
accurate perceptions and sound minds.
Another argument is the argument from universal morality,
which was also brilliantly espoused by C. S. Lewis. All men share some
basic ethical principles. We assume that some things are right and
other things are wrong. If somebody does something that is “mean”
and we dislike it, we may say, “Hey, that’s not fair.” If someone takes
our spot at a table, we may object, “That’s my spot. I was there first.”
We are assuming that there are some general rules of fair play that
we all agree on—that the person who is not being fair is also in
agreement with us on these principles of fairness. The person who
took our spot may argue, “But you left the spot, so you have given it
up,” but she will hardly ever say, “To hell with your morality!”4 She
will not dismiss the code of conduct altogether. On the contrary, she
will try to claim the moral high ground. In actuality, we both believe
that there are some general rules of fairness, justice, or morality that
are, at least for humankind, universally applicable. Classical
theologians, like Thomas Aquinas, referred to these rules as the

4 Cf. C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, Chapter 1
natural law. There is a universal law; and a universal law presupposes
a universal lawmaker. These laws were given to us by God, inscribed
upon our hearts, and are the basis of our ethical codes.
Furthermore, we may add to these arguments the necessity
of comprehensive knowledge argument. Cornelius van Til has argued
that it is necessary for comprehensive knowledge to exist somewhere
in order for real knowledge to exist anywhere.5 Humans used to think
that the world was flat, but new discoveries have disproven that
theory. The discovery of new facts can falsify things that we once
thought that we “knew” to be true. We used to “know” that the world
is flat, but new facts have falsified that theory. Man is finite, so he
cannot know everything that there is to know. Man cannot have
comprehensive knowledge of all the facts. This is very dangerous for
the epistemologist! Every little fact that man does not know about
could potentially falsify everything that he thinks that he “knows.”
But, according to Van Til, comprehensive knowledge actually does
exist. Comprehensive knowledge does exist in the mind of God.
Human knowledge is derivative of divine knowledge. We can have
relative knowledge of the universe because God has absolute
knowledge. God protects us from the possibility of the falsification of
our knowledge by the facts that we are unaware of.
Finally, there is Cornelius van Til’s one-many argument.
From times immemorial, philosophers have been wrestling with the
problem of the one and the many (or of the general and the
particular). There is a general category of trees, then there are
particular trees. There is a general category of cats, and then there
are particular cats. Do we call a tree “a tree” because we see it and
perceive that it fits neatly into the category of trees? or, do we
generalize from the many different trees and then create a category
in our minds so that we can classify them? Which is logically prior, the
general category or the particular instance? Which is ultimate, the
one (general) or the many (particular)? Philosophers have answered
this in various ways. Most of their answers have been unsatisfactory.
Yet, this is quite an important question. Human knowledge rests upon
compare-and-contrast analyses. Whenever we discover something

5 Cf. James Anderson, If Knowledge Then God
new, we compare it to similar objects and contrast it against objects
that differ from it. We gain an understanding of the new object
through this compare-and-contrast analysis. We must have both the
comparison and the contrast together in order to learn anything.
Epistemology needs both the general and the particular to be equally
real. Cornelius van Til supplies us with an interesting solution to the
one-many problem. He suggest the equal ultimacy of the one and the
many. Van Til points out that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity
supplies a perfect solution. In the ontological Trinity, the one and the
many are equally ultimate: God is simultaneously one and three.
There are three particular persons within the one essence of the
Godhead. So, it is suggested that God came to knowledge through an
internal compare-and-contrast analysis of His own being: prior to the
creation, God contemplated the Triune nature of His own being.6 This
ties in to the necessity of comprehensive knowledge argument
because God could not possibly have arrived at comprehensive
knowledge if He had not been simultaneously one and many. Prior to
creation, God existed all alone, in a void. There was nothing outside
of Himself against which He could have made any contrasting
analysis. Without the possibility of a compare-and-contrast analysis,
God could never have had any knowledge of Himself apart from
creation. This explains the importance of the Trinitarian conception
of God for Christian epistemology. God created the world with the
knowledge that He had gained through His own internal compare-
and-contrast analysis. His self-analysis led to His thinking in a one-
many fashion, and the relative categories of the one and the many
in the created world correspond to eternal categories within the
mind of God, which in turn depend upon the eternal categories of the
one and the many within the ontological Trinity as their ultimate
foundation. Cornelius van Til follows St. Augustine in asserting that
the general categories that we use to classify things correspond to
ideal forms in the mind of God. There is an ideal form of tree-ness in

6 However, since God exists in eternity, outside space-time, we are speaking
by way of analogy when we say that God “came to knowledge.” In reality,
God’s self-analysis was not a temporal process. God eternally knows Himself
through an eternal compare-and-contrast analysis of the categories of the one
(essence) and the many (persons) within the ontological Trinity.
God’s mind, and a tree is “a tree” insofar as it corresponds to that
form. There is an ideal form of human-ness within the mind of God,
and humans are “humans” insofar as they correspond to God’s pre-
defined concept of humankind. When we classify things into
categories, according to Van Til, we are simply “thinking God’s
thoughts after Him.” We are able to classify all of these things because
God has created the categories for us. When we apply logic to the
things that we see, and attempt to understand them and describe
them, we are able to do so because God has already rationalized the
world for us—we are not rationalizing the world for the first time.
Up to this point, I have tried to just describe Christian
dogma and explain the rationale for Christian belief. I hope that I have
been clear and accurate in my representation of the Christian
position. As a former believer, I think that I have accurately
represented the Christian position. I will, however, ignore those
points of Christian doctrine where there is considerable disagreement
among believers. I think that the above is a decent summary of the
essence of Christian teaching. From this point on, I will be making the
case against Christianity.
Christianity supplies a worldview that makes sense of the
world. That is the main argument for Christianity; so, what if I can
posit some other worldview that makes equal sense of everything?
Wouldn’t that undermine Van Til’s contention that Christianity is a
necessary presupposition? Well, I’m pretty sure I can come up with
another worldview that can supply an equally coherent explanation.
And I don’t have to look very far. For instance, you can look to Hindu
philosophy for an alternative worldview that explains all the same
things. The universe is really all an extension of the being of Bhagavan,
Vishnu/God. The universe is the cosmic body of Vishnu. Everything
that exists is part of God, but at the highest level—at the level of
cosmic consciousness—Bhagavan is a unified whole. Each man and
animal in this world is a manifestation, a little incarnation, of the
deity. God is one and many. The cosmic mind of Vishnu has guided
everything in the universe so that things happen in a certain way,
creating a uniformity of nature. Vishnu created our bodies so that we,
as little sparks of Him, might inhabit them; thus, the body is designed
so that its eyes can see and its mind can think rationally. All living
entities are expansions of the being of Bhagavan, containing the
Paramatma (the fullness of the Godhead) within their souls. When we
become enlightened, we realize that all men are really just part of the
same universal being. We realize that the distinction between me and
you—between the self and the other—is false. Consequently, it is in
our own rational self-interest for us to not harm other people because
hurting other people is actually hurting us too because there isn’t
actually a difference between “us” and “them.” It is quite easy to see
how Hinduism can explain all the same things that Christianity does.
Christianity is not the only worldview that can be “proven” using the
abductive logic of the Christian apologists. Most religions have
solutions to all of these epistemological and ethical problems.
Throughout history, philosophers have always discussed the same
problems, and it is no surprise that religious philosophers have
independently developed basically functionally isomorphic
worldviews (i.e. perspectives that literally contradict each other but
nevertheless lead to similar logical conclusions if they are acted
upon).
Now, this little exercise in comparative religion was a mere
parenthetical gloss. It was just something to get you thinking. I do not
mean to propose some other religious worldview as an alternative. I
simply wanted to point out that all of the arguments for Christianity
are equally valid arguments for other non-Christian religions. This
alone, I think, is a serious stumbling block for the educated and
philosophical Christian.
As I noted above, the Christian believes that God created
natural laws and that this explains the uniformity of nature. Thus,
according to the Christian apologist, the uniformity of nature itself is
evidence that God exists. Bertrand Russell responded to this
argument thus:
“Then there is a very common argument from natural law. That was
a favorite argument all through the eighteenth century, especially
under the influence of Sir Isaac Newton and his cosmogony. People
observed the planets going around the sun according to the law of
gravitation, and they thought that God had given a behest to these
planets to move in that particular fashion, and that was why they
did so. That was, of course, a convenient and simple explanation
that saved them the trouble of looking any further for explanations
of the law of gravitation. Nowadays we explain the law of
gravitation in a somewhat complicated fashion that Einstein has
introduced. I do not propose to give you a lecture on the law of
gravitation, as interpreted by Einstein, because that again would
take some time; at any rate, you no longer have the sort of natural
law that you had in the Newtonian system, where, for some reason
that nobody could understand, nature behaved in a uniform
fashion. We now find that a great many things we thought were
natural laws are really human conventions. You know that even in
the remotest depths of stellar space there are still three feet to a
yard. That is, no doubt, a very remarkable fact, but you would
hardly call it a law of nature. And a great many things that have
been regarded as laws of nature are of that kind. On the other
hand, where you can get down to any knowledge of what atoms
actually do, you will find they are much less subject to law than
people thought, and that the laws at which you arrive are statistical
averages of just the sort that would emerge from chance. There is,
as we all know, a law that if you throw dice you will get double sixes
only about once in thirty-six times, and we do not regard that as
evidence that the fall of the dice is regulated by design; on the
contrary, if the double sixes came every time we should think that
there was design. The laws of nature are of that sort as regards a
great many of them. They are statistical averages such as would
emerge from the laws of chance; and that makes this whole
business of natural law much less impressive than it formerly was.
Quite apart from that, which represents the momentary state of
science that may change tomorrow, the whole idea that natural
laws imply a lawgiver is due to a confusion between natural and
human laws. Human laws are behests commanding you to behave
a certain way, in which you may choose to behave, or you may
choose not to behave; but natural laws are a description of how
things do in fact behave, and being a mere description of what they
in fact do, you cannot argue that there must be somebody who told
them to do that, because even supposing that there were, you are
then faced with the question ‘Why did God issue just those natural
laws and no others?’ If you say that he did it simply from his own
good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is
something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural
law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that
in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those
laws rather than others—the reason, of course, being to create the
best universe, although you would never think it to look at it—if
there were a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself
was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by
introducing God as an intermediary. You really have a law outside
and anterior to the divine edicts, and God does not serve your
purpose, because he is not the ultimate lawgiver. In short, this
whole argument about natural law no longer has anything like the
strength that it used to have.”7
The presuppositionalist would likely respond to Bertrand Russell’s
argument by quoting Cornelius van Til:
“On the assumption of the natural man [that is, the non-believer]
logic is a timeless, impersonal principle, and facts are controlled by
chance. It is by means of universal timeless principles of logic that
the natural man must, on his assumptions, seek to make intelligible
assertions about the world of reality or chance. But this cannot be
done without falling into self-contradiction. About chance no
manner of assertion can be made. In its very idea it is the irrational.
And how are rational assertions to be made about the irrational? If
they are to be made, then it must be because the irrational is itself
wholly reduced to the rational. That is to say, if the natural man is
to make any intelligible assertions about the world of ‘reality’ or
‘fact’ which, according to him, is what it is for no rational reason at
all, then he must make the virtual claim of rationalizing the
irrational.”8
Indeed, the presuppositionalists have a point; but the regularity upon
which probability rests can be explained without the presupposition
of God. As Russell hinted, the notion of God really just sidesteps the
question of the uniformity of nature and the laws of nature. Why did
God create those laws? “Because He wanted to create the best
possible world for us.” Why did He want to do that? “Because He
loves us.” Why does He love us? “Because the essence of God is love.
His nature dictates that He loves us.” But now the Christian has
posited some law even further back than the laws of nature. The
atheist must ask: If the laws of nature need some explanation apart
from the fact that they just are, then the laws of God’s nature need
an explanation too. If God’s nature can be posited as just existing and

7 Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian
8 Cornelius van Til, The Defense of the Faith, Chapter 7, Section 1